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Network Address Translation (NAT) for IPv4 was 
developed primarily to curb overcrowding of the Internet 
due to dwindling global IP addresses; however, NAT provides 
several other benefits. NAT can be used to mask the 
internal IP addresses of an Intranet. IPv6, the emerging 
standard for Internet addressing, provides three times the 
number of bits for IP addressing. While IPv6 does not need 
NAT for connectivity, other NAT features such as address 
hiding are valuable. There is currently no NAT 
implementation for IPv6. 
The focus of this research was the design and 
development of a NAT implementation for IPv6. This 
implementation will be used within a multilevel testbed. In 
addition, the NAT implementation developed here can 
facilitate the Department of Defense (DoD) transition to 
IPv6 planned for 2008 by providing services currently not 
available for IPv6. 
A working implementation of NAT for IPv6 within the 
Linux kernel has been produced. The NAT development created 
here has been tested for support of the protocols of TCP, 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Internet Protocol version four (IPv4), was accepted 
for military network use by the Department of Defense in 
1981. [IP] At the time of its inception, the DARPA Net was 
a connectivity testbed. As it expanded and its popularity 
grew, it became the commercialized Internet still in use 
today. This expansive network is founded on a host-based 
addressing architecture that assigns a 32-bit address to 
each connected system. In the 1980’s, the expandability of 
the 32-bit address used in IPv4 was not a consideration due 
to the limited use of the protocol, primarily for 
government and academic purposes. Now, with the expanding 
growth of the Internet, it is said that the IPv4 address 
space will be outdated by 2010. [NGI] This imminent address 
exhaustion drives the need for a new protocol that will 
allow for a greater number of addresses and a modular 
approach to security. 
Network Address Translation (NAT) was introduced as a 
temporary solution to the rapidly overcrowding address 
space in IPv4. NAT allows an entire network of systems to 
use a single IP address or pool of IP addresses to access 
the external Internet. The NAT mechanism does this by 
replacing the true source address of the internal system 
with the border address in all outgoing datagrams. 
Furthermore, the mechanism tracks the connection between 
internal and external systems in order to maintain 
addressing information for all incoming datagrams. 
Internet Protocol version six (IPv6) is the solution 
to the address space problem. Instead of 32 bits for 
addressing, this new protocol uses 128 bits, allowing for a 
2 
theoretical maximum of 2128 addresses. Since Network Address 
Translation (NAT) was designed to reduce overcrowding in 
IPv4, many believe that this functionality will not be 
needed with IPv6. The purpose of this thesis is to provide 
evidence that certain benefits provided only by NAT are 
still necessary as well as to create a working 
implementation of it. 
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The popular belief is that since overcrowding is not 
an issue in IPv6, NAT functionality will not be needed. 
However, NAT has two key functionalities aside from address 
space expansion that are beneficial from a security 
perspective. First, by using the NAT mechanism, one is able 
to mask the IP addresses of internal systems. NAT does this 
by replacing the source address of an outgoing datagram 
with another address from a pool of IP addresses or a 
single constant IP address. The NAT device keeps track of 
this connection and alters all incoming datagrams destined 
to the border NAT address to reflect the true internal IP 
address. Second, the NAT mechanism also hides the internal 
structure of an intranet since all connections to the 
Internet must first pass through the NAT border device. 
This forces all external devices to only detect the NAT 
border device: it is not possible to diagram the internal 
topology of the network.  
It is for these security benefits that this research 
is being conducted. The goals of this research are two-
fold. First, the benefits, drawbacks and feasibility of an 
IPv6 NAT implementation were examined. This is advantageous 
to both this thesis in providing direction as well as to 
future research by providing a solid framework of 
3 
background information, design implementation and future 
recommendations. Second, this project has produced a 
working implementation for NAT over IPv6. This 
implementation was done through a modified Linux 2.6.5 
kernel designed to support connection tracking in IPv6. 
There exist multiple benefits of this research. It 
contributes to the DoD initiative to transition to IPv6 
from IPv4 by FY2008. [MEMO] Also, research conducted into 
IPv6 transition mechanisms will aid the construction of 
hybrid networks that support both IPv4 and IPv6 to ease the 
eventual transition to IPv6. This research also supports 
the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) model and shipboard 
operations by providing the network security benefit of 
address hiding and internal network structure masking. NAT 
can also be used to reduce the cost of leasing a range of 
IP addresses by allowing an entire LAN to operate on as few 
as one leased IP address. Finally, NAT for IPv6 contributes 
to the implementation of high assurance multilevel security 
systems, such as MYSEA, for use by coalitions through its 
application in a multilevel testbed.  
B. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This section contains a brief overview of the 
subsequent chapters. 
1. Chapter II, “Network Address Translation Protocol 
in IPv4” 
This chapter provides background information on both 
IPv4 and NAT. The first part discusses the IPv4 protocol 
including general background information, its header 
structure, security issues and the addressing scheme. The 
second part of the chapter is to familiarize the reader 
with NAT by explaining the mechanisms used by the multiple 
types of NAT and the benefits of each. 
4 
2. Chapter III, “Internet Protocol, Version 6” 
Chapter III explains the background of IPv6 as well as 
its header format, addressing scheme and address 
allocation. This chapter also explores the existing 
security features within IPv6 in addition to emerging 
technologies. Furthermore, it contains a comparison between 
the networking and security features provided by NAT for 
IPv6 and the security features provided by NAT that are 
desired but not provided by IPv6. Finally, this chapter 
describes the existing IPv6 support within the current 
Linux 2.6.5 kernel. 
3. Chapter IV, “Monterey Security Architecture” 
This chapter explains the necessity for systems to 
provide multilevel security and the creation of the 
Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) to address those 
needs. It outlines the design of all relevant components 
within the architecture and their implementation within the 
IPv6 NAT testbed.  
4. Chapter V, “Common Criteria Assurance Level 
Exploration” 
Chapter V provides the reader with background 
regarding the Common Criteria. It also describes the 
evaluation process for IT products and explores the 
requirements necessary for an assurance evaluation at EAL5. 
This is done through the framework of the IPv6 NAT 
implementation created in this project. 
5. Chapter VI, “Development of NAT in IPv6” 
This chapter summarizes the development process used 
to implement NAT for IPv6 in conjunction with this thesis. 
It explains the methodology used to port the existing IPv4 
NAT code for use with IPv6. It details the major 
programming difficulties encountered during the porting 
5 
process and how they were resolved. It also explains the 
debugging process used, as well as functionality testing of 
the resulting implementation. 
6. Chapter VII, “Conclusion” 
Chapter VII gives an analysis of the IPv6 NAT 
implementation as it is integrated within the Linux kernel. 
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II. NETWORK ADDRESS TRANSLATION IN IPV4 
Network Address Translation (NAT) has served to 
increase available IP address space as originally noted in 
1994 [TNAT].  This chapter contains a summary of current 
NAT implementations and the functionalities provided by 
NAT.  The chapter then examines NAT and related 
functionalities, as implemented in Red Hat 9.0, the Linux 
platform on which NAT for IPv6 will be developed.  Since 
NAT has not yet been developed for IPv6, any reference to 
NAT, unless explicitly stated, refers to NAT for IPv4. 
 
A.  BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 
This section presents an overview of IPv4, its 
structure and addressing scheme. This section also provides 
an overview of NAT.   
1. Internet Protocol, Version 4 
a. Background Information 
Today’s current Internet Protocol, Version 4 
(IPv4) was specified in 1981 with RFC 791. [IP] The IP 
protocol resides at layer 3 of the OSI 7-layer model (see 
Figure 1) which is responsible for the management of 
network connections. [OSI]  
8 
 
Figure 1.   The OSI 7-layer Model [OSI] 
The purpose of layer 3, or where IP services are 
implemented, was to allow hosts on different network 
topologies to have a standard means of transporting data 
packets to each other across the Internet.  Each host would 
have a unique IP address, almost like a mailing address, to 
distinguish it from all of the other hosts connected to the 
Internet. IPv4 performs two main functions: addressing and 
fragmentation.  The purpose for addressing is obvious 
enough, because without a unique address routers would be 
unable to determine the intended destination for each 
packet.  Fragmentation may not seem as necessary until one 
realizes the myriad of networks and respective standards 
that exist. Ethernet has a maximum transmission unit (MTU) 
size of 1492 bytes, while a Token Ring can be configured to 
have an MTU of 2046. Other layer 2 protocols have other MTU 
9 
sizes. [MTU] Thus, for a Token Ring packet to traverse an 
Ethernet topology, it must be fragmented into two Ethernet 
packets.  In addition to addressing and fragmentation, IP 
allows for error reporting through the use of the Internet 
Control Message Protocol (ICMP). [ICMP SPEC]   
b. IP Header Structure 
IP headers contain all of the IP addressing, 
transportation, and processing information for each packet.  
The IP header is preceded by a layer two header and 
information dependant upon the networking standard 
(Ethernet, Token Ring, etc.), and is followed by the packet 
payload.  Figure 2 below, from RFC 791, displays an example 
IPv4 header. 
 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3   
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1  
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |  Time to Live |    Protocol   |         Header Checksum       | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                       Source Address                          | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Destination Address                        | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                    Options                    |    Padding    | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure 2.   IPv4 Header 
 
 The 192 bit header above displays both the 
bit count and the respective field name.  If laid out in a 
sequential, linear fashion the header would read from left 
to right, top to bottom.  What follows is the bit length of 
each field and a description, taken verbatim from RFC 791 
[IP]: 
- Version (4 bits):  The Internet Protocol 
version. 
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- IHL (4 bits):  Internet Header Length; length 
of the header in 32 bit words,  indicating 
where the data begins. 
- Type of Service (8 bits):  Indicates the 
abstract quality of service parameters desired for 
this packet.    
- Total Length (16 bits):  Length of the entire 
packet (including header) in bytes. 
- Identification (16 bits):  A number assigned by 
the sender to help with re-assembling fragmented 
packets. 
- Flags (3 bits):  Control flags; Reserved (must 
be 0), Don’t Fragment (0 means May Fragment), More 
Fragments (0 means Last Fragment). 
- Fragment Offset (13 bits):  Indicates where, in 
the un-fragmented packet, this fragment belongs; 
measured in units of 64 bits, the first fragment 
has offset zero.  
- Time To Live (8 bits):  TTL; indicates the 
number of times a packet may be processed before 
being destroyed; it is decremented by one every 
time it is processed by a host, router, etc.; when 
it reaches zero the packet is destroyed.   
- Protocol (8 bits):  Specifies the OSI layer 
four (next level) protocol in the payload 
following the IP header (ie, TCP, FTP, etc.). 
- Header Checksum (16 bits):  A checksum on the 
IP header only; it is recomputed every time any of 
the header values are altered.   
11 
- Source Address (32 bits):  IP address where the 
packet came from. 
- Destination Address (32 bits):  IP address 
where the packet is ultimately destined. 
- Options (varies):  Various options for the IP 
packet; its length varies because  many of the 
options have a varying size; the options field may 
require  padding so that it ends on a 32 bit 
boundary.  Below is a list of available  options: 
+ Security – Security and compartmentation 
information 
+  Loose Source Routing – Specifies a route 
that, at some point, must be followed (other 
nodes may be stopped at as well). 
+  Strict Source Routing – Specifies a route 
that must be exactly followed with no other 
nodes stopped at. 
+  Record Route – Record the IP address of 
each node that processes the packet. 
+  Stream ID – Carries a 16-bit SATNET 
stream identifier through networks not 
supporting the stream concept. 
+  Internet Timestamp – Each forwarding node 
inserts a timestamp into this field. 
c. Security 
The IPv4 standard relies on applications and 
upper-level protocols to implement security features.  The 
security option described in the last section only provides 
compartmentalization as a method of security and this is 
12 
only effective if systems that process the packet adhere to 
the standard.  The protocol allows the options field to 
contain information regarding the intended compartment of 
the packet. This field is for administrative purposes only 
and does not support encryption or data security services. 
However, these labels can support, as noted by the DoD 
Internet Protocol Security Options (IPSO), a classification 
scheme that enables packets to be labeled in a Multi-level 
Secure (MLS) environment. As stated in RFC 1108, this 
labeling system is designed for a classification system 
rather than a cryptographic system. [DoD SOIP] 
d. Addressing 
IP addresses are 32 bits long and can be 
represented in either bitwise or dotted-decimal notation.  
Figure 3 gives an example of this: 
 
10000000.00001111.11111111.00000000 = 128.15.255.0 
 
Figure 3.   Bitwise / Dotted-decimal 
 
By using 32 bits for its address space, IPv4 is 
limited to slightly more than 4.2 billion unique IP 
addresses, which at the time of its conception was thought 
to be sufficient; however, the world-wide Internet boom 
quickly depleted IP addresses to the point that solutions 
to the dwindling number of addresses had to be found.  IPv4 
has a addressing scheme that declared networks to be of 
three different sizes, or classes.  Class A networks, the 
largest but also the least abundant, use the first 8 bits 
of the 32 addressing bits for network identification and 
the last 24 bits for host identification.  Class B networks 
use the first 16 bits for network identification, while 
Class C networks use the first 24 bits. [IP]  
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Unfortunately, this scheme wastes addresses.  Assume, for 
example, that a software company is given a class C address 
for its 100 computers.  This would leave 156 IP addresses 
unused by the company.  To prevent such waste, IPv4 also 
uses a classless addressing scheme, which essentially 
creates networks using any number of leading bits through a 
subnet mask.  The subnet mask allows the class to be 
partitioned by reserving a portion of the host address to 
reference the underlying subnets created by the division of 
the address space.  Another important aspect of the IPv4 
addressing scheme, defined by RFC 1918 [AAPI], is the 
reservation of certain ranges of addresses for private 
networking.  These private network addresses are not 
routable and cannot be used on the Internet, but may be 
duplicated amongst any separate private networks.  This is 
the basis for the concept of NAT. There can be a seemingly 
infinite number of networks with reserved address ranges 
provided they are known to the public Internet by a 
routable, global IP address or addresses.  Figure 4 shows 
the standard private IP address ranges that are not 
globally viable:   
 
 
Class A (private):  10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255 
Class B (private):  172.16.0.0 – 172.16.255.255 
Class C (private):  192.168.0.0 – 192.168.255.255 
 
Figure 4.   Private IP Address Ranges [AAPI] 
 
2. Network Address Translation 
According to RFC 2663 [IPNATTC], “The term ‘Network 
Address Translator’ means different things in different 
contexts.”  This section will cover many of the different 
14 
forms and uses of NAT and will focus on basic NAT, since it 
will be implemented in the thesis development. 
a. Basic NAT 
RFC 3022 [TNAT] specifies what most people refer 
to when they use the term NAT.  NAT was introduced as a 
short-term solution to the Internet address space crowding 
until long-term solutions with larger address spaces were 
accepted.  Its operation depends on adherence to the 
private/public IP addressing scheme and the placement of 
NAT functionality on all network devices that form the 
border between the local area network using private IP 
address space and the Internet.  The local, private 
addresses can be re-used by any other local area networks 
not directly connected to the same border device, while the 
global addresses are unique to the Internet.  Besides the 
primary advantage of effectively alleviating the strain on 
the IP address pool, NAT also hides the local area network 
topology (see Figure 5) from outside hosts.  According to 
RFC 3022, NAT also “takes advantage of the fact that a very 
small percentage of hosts in a stub domain [(local area 
network)] are communicating outside of the domain at any 
given time.”   
15 
 
Figure 5.   IPv4 NAT Diagram 
What follows are the core steps to a basic NAT 
translation, also referred to as traditional NAT or 
outbound NAT, which only allows connections to be initiated 
from the inside: 
(1) Address assignment - NAT devices bind 
globally unique and locally re-usable IP addresses at the 
beginning of a network connection to the address fields of 
IP packets.  At this point, there are two possible 
scenarios depending on whether the particular session is 
receiving a static or dynamic address assignment.  In the 
case of static address assignment, the NAT device merely 
looks up the pre-determined private/public address mapping 
in its routing table and assigns IP addresses accordingly.  
In the case of dynamic address assignment, the NAT device 
selects a globally unique IP address from its address pool, 
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maps it to the local IP address and stores the connection 
pairing in its NAT table. 
(2) Address translation and lookup - 
Anytime an outbound packet crosses the NAT device, the 
source/destination IP address pair is looked up in the NAT 
table to see if connection information exists.  Once 
connection information is either found or created (for new 
sessions) the NAT device strips the private IP address off 
of the packet and replaces it with a globally unique 
address.  Additionally, the NAT device must recalculate the 
IP checksums, as well as, other fields that relate to the 
original source/destination IP address.  Incoming packets 
have the selected global IP address as the destination 
address. For these packets, the NAT device looks up the 
globally unique IP address in the NAT table to determine 
the corresponding local area network host, and forwards it 
with the proper header modifications.  All of these address 
translations are intended to occur transparently to any of 
the hosts engaged in a session.  However, RFC 2663 states 
that “the NAT function cannot by itself support all 
applications transparently and often must co-exist with 
application level gateways (ALGs) for this reason.” 
[IPNATTC]  Note that IPSec techniques that protect the 
contents of IP headers and are intended to preserve 
endpoint addresses of an IP packet cannot function with 
NAT, as NAT’s primary role is to alter the IP address of an 
IP packet.  NAT will, however, work with Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs) and tunneling schemes that can tolerate the 
alteration of the IP address fields.   
(3) Address unbinding - A NAT device may 
detect that communication between the local and remote 
hosts has halted for some given amount of time using 
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various heuristics. When this happens, the NAT connection 
expires for the corresponding address pair.  The globally 
unique address is returned to the pool of available 
addresses for use with another mapping.  New session 
pairings will have to be assigned to all new connections as 
they are encountered.   
This basic series of events is what most people 
refer to when they use the term NAT, however, there are 
many NAT variants. 
b. Network Address Port Translation (NAPT) 
This NAT mechanism extends the concept of IP 
address translation mappings to include the transport layer 
ports.  NAPT allows multiple sessions from multiple private 
hosts to be mapped onto one globally unique IP address by 
keeping track of the port numbers associated with the 
global address.  Essentially the mappings contained in the 
NAT table are expanded to include the port number in 
addition to the IP address pair. This mechanism allows more 
unique combinations, thereby allowing multiple private 
hosts to access the Internet using one global IP address.  
For example, three different private IP hosts wish to start 
an HTTP session with an outside server.  The NAT device 
would map each session to a specific IP/port pairing and 
store them in its NAT table.  An example of a NAPT mapping 











Private IP Address mapped to Globally Unique IP 
Address/Port Combination 
 
192.168.0.1:80 =>   60.60.60.60:2500 
192.168.0.1:23 =>   60.60.60.60:6489 
192.168.0.249:80 =>  60.60.60.60:2502 
10.255.255.255:1024 =>  60.60.60.60:5009 
 
Figure 6.   NAPT Example 
 
NAPT is a common instance of NAT that is used by 
many users to setup home networks using the single IP 
address provided by their Internet Service Provider.  NAPT 
can also be used in conjunction with traditional NAT to 
further increase the amount of usable global space.  For 
example, assume that a network has two globally unique IP 
addresses, by using NAPT, the network now has 2 (IP 
addresses) * 65535 (ports per IP address) = 131070 unique 
session mappings available. 
c. Bi-directional NAT 
Also known as two-way NAT, bi-directional NAT 
allows sessions to be initiated from outside of the private 
network, as well as, from the inside.  Bi-directional NAT 
employs a Domain Name Service – Application Level Gateway 
(DNS-ALG) that alters DNS packets to reflect any static or 
dynamic address mappings the NAT device will or has made.  
When an outside host wishes to initiate a session with an 
internal host, it sends a DNS query that ultimately reaches 
the internal host DNS server, which returns a DNS reply.  
If the internal host has either a statically mapped IP 
address or both a statically mapped IP address and a port 
enty, the DNS NAT device forwards the DNS reply.  
Otherwise, the DNS reply is altered by the DNS-ALG and the 
NAT device to reflect a dynamic mapping that the NAT device 
supplies as the IP address of the internal host.  Since the 
19 
mapping has been made, the external host may now initiate a 
session with the internal host via the returned address, 
assuming the reply occurs before the session information is 
purged from the routing tables. 
d. Twice NAT 
Twice NAT modifies both the source and 
destination address of an IP packet whenever it passes 
through the NAT device.  This is necessary when a private 
network (improperly most of the time, sometimes on purpose) 
labels one or more of its internal nodes with public IP 
addresses officially assigned to other networks.  The 
reasons for this address misuse vary, but the result is 
that a conflict arises when a host from the offending 
network must communicate with the public network.  Because 
of the duplication in IP addresses, the packet is forwarded 
to another local host instead of the public host.  Twice 
NAT attempts to solve this problem by altering both the 
source and destination address as the packet travels.  





















Twice NAT Configuration: 
Private to Public:  200.200.200.0/24 => 138.76.28.0/24 
Public to Private:  200.200.200.0/24 => 172.16.1.0/24 
  
 Datagram flow:  Private => Public 
a) Within private network 
Dest.Addr.: 172.168.1.100   
Src.Addr.:  200.200.200.1 
b) After twice-NAT translation 
Dest.Addr.:  200.200.200.100   
Src.Addr.:  138.76.28.1 
 
 Datagram flow:  Public => Private 
 a)Within public network 
   Dest.Addr.:  138.76.28.1 
     Src.Addr.:  200.200.200.100 
 b)After twice-NAT translation, in private network 
Dest.Addr.:  200.200.200.1   
Src.Addr.:  172.16.1.100 
Figure 7.   Twice NAT Example [IPNATTC] 
 
 
e. Multihomed NAT 
This terminology refers to the concept of using 
multiple NAT border devices in a network.  For NAT to be 
effective it must process all packets being sent to the 
internal network, essentially creating a single point 
through which all external communications must pass.  Users 
quickly realized that this created a bottle neck in 
traffic, as well as a single point of failure for the 
network with respect to external connectivity.  Multihomed 
NAT enables a private network to have several exits to 
external networks, which allows for redundancy in 
communications and better use of routing efficiency 
algorithms.  This approach requires that all NAT devices 
maintain the same routing information. Otherwise packets 
will be incorrectly dropped, routed inefficiently, or have 
duplicated session entries in the tables.  Methods for NAT 
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information exchange vary, but all produce the same result: 
all NAT boxes have the same tables. 
B. NAT IN THE LINUX OS 
Because the chosen platform for this thesis is Linux 
Red Hat 9.0, it is important to understand how NAT 
functions within the Linux 2.6.5 kernel.  This section will 
examine the primary packet monitoring mechanism within the 
kernel, netfilter, and both the kernel-space and user-space 
code of the iptables implementation that supports NAT. 
1. Netfilter 
To understand NAT within the Linux OS, it is important 
to have a broad picture of what happens to a packet 
entering a Linux system.  A packet entering a network 
interface on a Linux computer goes through a series of 
“sanity checks” which include packet checksum, destination 
(if it is, in fact, destined for this computer), etc. in 
order to determine if what is received is a valid packet.  
Any packet failing these checks is dropped.  Following 
these sanity checks is the first instance of a netfilter 
hook.  Effectively, “netfilter is a set of hooks inside the 
Linux 2.4.x kernel’s network stack, which allows kernel 
modules to register callback functions called every time a 
network packet traverses one of those hooks.” [MOSIX]  In 
essence, each hook provides an opportunity for a kernel 
module to look at and manipulate the packet before it 
continues (or is dropped) down the routing chain.  This 
approach provides more modularity than implementing both 
netfilter and the underlying NAT code as a monolithic block 
of kernel code. The layering is inherent in the setup of 
“kernel to netfilter to iptables processing stack“ and 
since the traversal of the netfilter hooks and queues is 
linear, any introduction of a looping problem would be the 
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result of poorly written code.  Each netfilter hook 
contains a prioritized list (it may be empty) of the kernel 
modules that must access the packet when the hook is 
activated.  The netfilter hooks accept the following return 
codes from the processes, following any alterations the 
process may chose to do:  NF_DROP (drop the packet), 
NF_ACCEPT (keep the packet), NF_STOLEN (keep the processor 
and memory resources for the packet, but the process will 
handle the packet so netfilter can forget about it), 
NF_QUEUE (queue the packet for userspace processing).  
These hooks are used by iptables to allow other kernel 
space programs the ability to view or alter a packet.  
Iptables is the built-in packet manipulation mechanism 
that processes packets according to a set of user-defined 
rules. The first netfilter hook, following the sanity 
checks, is the NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING hook, during which 
connection tracking, packet mangling, and destination NAT 
occur in that order.  Connection tracking looks at the 
destination and source address fields of the packet and 
records them in a table for a certain amount of time.  
Other programs desiring to determine what connections are 
active can access this information through the connection 
tracking mechanism.  Packet mangling is essentially a 
sequentially traversed table of rules that are applied to 
packets to allow kernel space programs the ability to 
manipulate certain fields of a packet.  For instance, one 
could use the mangling table to perform static NAT by 
instituting a rule that forwards all packets with a 
specific globally unique IP/port address to a specific 
private IP/port address.  Destination NAT (DNAT) modifies 
the destination IP address of all incoming packets using 
23 
the nat table to determine the proper IP and/or port 
mappings.  Variations of DNAT include redirection (back to 
the incoming interface), port forwarding (multiple 
servers), and load sharing.  There is a good excerpt from 
Paul Russell and Harald Welte’s “Netfilter Hacking HOWTO” 
that describes what happens whenever the NAT code is 
called: 
“Anyway, the first thing the NAT code does is to 
see if the connection tracking code managed to 
extract a tuple and find an existing connection, 
by looking at the skbuff's nfct field; this tells 
us if it's an attempt on a new connection, or if 
not, which direction it is in; in the latter 
case, then the manipulations determined 
previously for that connection are done. 
If it was the start of a new connection, we look 
for a rule for that tuple, using the standard 
iptables traversal mechanism, on the `nat' table. 
If a rule matches, it is used to initialize the 
manipulations for both that direction and the 
reply; the connection-tracking code is told that 
the reply it should expect has changed. Then, 
it's manipulated as above. 
If there is no rule, a `null' binding is created: 
this usually does not map the packet, but exists 
to ensure we don't map another stream over an 
existing one. Sometimes, the null binding cannot 
be created, because we have already mapped an 
existing stream over it, in which case the per-
protocol manipulation may try to remap it, even 
though it's nominally a `null' binding.” 
After all of this occurs at the first netfilter hook, 
including the previous connection tracking and packet 
mangling, the packet then enters “the routing code, which 
decides whether the packet is destined for another 
interface, or a local process.  The routing code may also 
drop packets that are unroutable.”(Russell and Welte)  If 
the packet is an incoming packet, a second netfilter hook, 
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NF_IP_LOCAL_IN is called.  This hook again allows kernel 
modules, namely iptables, the ability to manipulate and 
examine the packet based on information obtained from rules 
within the filter, conntrack, and mangle tables.  At this 
point the incoming packet is passed off to other kernel 
modules and is no longer under control of the netfilter 
mechanism.  If a packet is forwarded to be sent out of the 
computer, a third netfilter hook called NF_IP_FORWARD is 
initiated which allows packet mangling and filtering, as 
well as any other registered processes.  From here, a 
fourth netfilter hook, NF_IP_POST_ROUTING, is initialized 
which allows packet mangling, source NAT (SNAT), and the 
connection tracking mechanism to access the packet.  Again, 
as is the case with all of the netfilter hooks, any kernel 
module can access the packet at this point if they have 
registered callback functions with the NF_IP_POST_ROUTING 
hook prior to the arrival of the packet.  The only other 
netfilter hook occurs when a packet originates locally and 
is destined to leave the system via the local network.  
NF_IP_LOCAL_OUT is called which allows conntrack, mangle, 
DNAT, and filter to work on the packet.  The packet is then 
routed and triggers the NF_IP_POST_ROUTING hook mentioned 
previously.  At each point in the netfilter architecture 
where NAT occurs, namely the prerouting, postrouting and 
output hooks, the aforementioned processing steps are 
repeated. To summarize, NAT checks with the connection 
tracking mechanism to see if a connection for the 
particular IP address pair has existed before, and if so, 
applies the proper rules.  If not, the nat table is checked 
for rules and if a NAT rule for that address pair exists, 
it is applied to the originating packets and its expected 
reply packets.  Finally, if there is no correlated rule in 
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the nat tables, the originating packet and replies are 
assigned a null binding to prevent multiple mappings for a 
single session.  Figure 8 provides a graphical 
representation of the above proceedings. 
 
Figure 8.   Netfilter Packet Flow [LNF] 
  
2. Kernel-Space Iptables 
The kernel-space iptables code, ip_tables.c, and 
related code work together to form the engine for table 
traversal and packet manipulation within netfilter.  
Whenever a packet reaches a netfilter hook, iptables is 
invoked in order to traverse each of its tables to 
determine if there are kernel modules that are scheduled at 
that hook and, if a rule exists, for that kernel module to 
gain control of the packet.  To do this, iptables invokes 
get_entry() with the IP fields and the table to be 
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traversed as arguments.  Once a rule is returned, iptables 
then invokes other kernel modules specific to the 
particular table in order to perform the requested 
operations.  For example, when a packet passes the 
netfilter pre-routing hook, destination NAT might be 
necessary.  Iptables is called, with parameters including 
packet information from connection tracking and which table 
it is to traverse. At this point, iptables checks the nat 
table to see if a rule exists.  If a rule does exist, 
iptables calls another function to perform destination NAT 
using the rule it found in the table.  Should there not be 
any rule for the given packet, a null-session is assigned 
and nothing happens to the packet itself.  These steps are 
repeated for all tables scheduled at the netfilter 
prerouting hook.  The advantage of having a kernel-space 
mechanism for performing these packet manipulations is that 
its priority within netfilter for accessing the packet can 
be compiled into the kernel so that, if configured to do so 
at runtime, iptables can be assured the first action on an 
incoming packet instead of a user-space process outside of 
the kernel.   
3. User-Space Iptables 
The user-space iptables code supports user interation 
with the kernel-space iptables engine.  Iptables is a 
command-line interface used to set various flags and rules 
used by kernel-space iptables. It then performs the 
requested action on the specified table.  User-space 
iptables can perform any number of operations, such as 
listing all of the rules of a certain table, deleting a 
user-created table, deleting a rule within a table, 
appending a rule to a table, etc.  It is important to note 
that the user-space iptables and the kernel space iptables 
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share the same set of tables.  Since the kernel-space 
iptables code needs to continuously access the tables in 
order to traverse them and apply their rules, a serious 
conflict would arise should the user-space process write to 
a table at the same time as the kernel-space process is 
traversing it looking for rules. A locking mechanism is 
employed to avoid such a conflict.  When accessing the 
tables to perform a requested operation, the user-space 
iptables locks the tables, preventing any other process or 
the kernel from accessing them.  Should the kernel-space 
iptables attempt to access the table while it is locked, 
the kernel-space iptables would return an NF_DROP value to 
netfilter causing the packet to be dropped so that it will 
have to be re-sent. Similarly, the kernel-space iptables 
would use the same lock to gain exclusive access to the 
tables. 
C. MODULE SEQUENCE MAPPING 
To better understand what happens in the iptables 
code, both kernel and user-space, it was necessary to 
inject tracing code into the original Linux source code and 
recompile.  What follows is a description of what was 
injected and the results.   
1. Kernel-Space Trace 
Rather than writing completely new modules to perform 
a trace of what happens in the kernel space when a packet 
comes in, the debugging system already in place was used.  
Kernel debugging is essentially performed by a switch at 
the beginning of the code that turns debugging on or off.  
When debugging is turned on, various printk() statements 
become active and send debugging messages to the kernel 
logfile.  The printk() statements used in this trace were 
customized to output the file and function that they were 
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located in, and were put into every function of every file 
in the /usr/src/linux2.4/net/ipv4 directory.  When 
implemented, this produced too many debugging statements 
and filled up the logfile too quickly to produce any useful 
results.  The reason for this is that the 
/usr/src/linux2.4/net/ipv4 directory contains the core 
TCP/IP stack that is touched every time a packet enters the 
NIC. What was desired was the ability to trace everything 
that would be used within the connection tracking, 
iptables, and NAT processes.  Realizing this, the kernel 
debugging was turned off for everything in the  
/usr/src/linux2.4/net/ipv4 folder except for everything in 
the subdirectory /netfilter.  All of this was implemented 
on the Trusted Path Extension (TPE) computer within the 
MYSEA network.  (More information on the network topology 
will be presented in Chapter 4)  After successfully adding 
code to the kernel and recompiling it, the ICMP echo 
request and reply message generated by a ping command were 
successfully sent from the client machine, through the TPE, 
which was NAT enabled, to the server machine, and back 
again.  NAT performed the necessary packet translations in 
both directions and successfully forwarded the packet.   
The results from the kernel logfile indicated several 
things.  First, that connection tracking accounted for 
almost all of the function calls throughout the process.  
Second, that ip_tables.c was only called twice during the 
entire process, and both times were actually during the 
outbound portion of the ping.  The first call is to check 
for a specific instance of this session, which has not been 
established yet, and the second call is to record the 
session mapping that the NAT code has performed.  At both 
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points ip_tables.c calls the functions ipt_do_table() and 
get_entry().  Third, it appears that with return packets, 
NAT already knows the bindings it must perform for this 
specific IP mapping, and therefore does not need to call 
any functions from ip_tables.c.  Fourth, if another ping 
packet is sent after this one, before the session mapping 
is unbound, iptables.c is only called once, because it 
finds the session mapping on its first try.  To see a 
graphical representation of the logfile results from this 
test, and the actual logfile results, see Appendix D. 
2. User-Space Trace 
Another key to understanding the operation of 
iptables, in general, is to understand how the user-space 
iptables operates.  In order to gain a better understanding 
of how this part of iptables works, it was again necessary 
to insert tracing code into the user-space source code, 
recompile the user-space iptables, and perform some basic, 
NAT-related commands to see what occurs.  The tracing code 
consisted of 4 lines of code inserted into every function 
of every file of the user-space iptables code.  These lines 
of code declared an input file, opened it, used fprintf() 
to send the file and function information, and closed the 
file.  This method worked well and did not cause any 
compilation problems.  One drawback was that it was 
difficult to separate the different commands, so it was 
necessary to manually annotate the output file after every 
command in order to separate the actions.  The results were 
fairly simple.  Whenever a table was manipulated via the 
command line interface, almost all of the functions called 
within iptables involved converting the user-friendly 
information into a more machine-friendly format.  The 
process then calls functions to allocate memory space and 
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generate the entry in proper format.  Finally, depending on 
the exact nature of the command, its operating function is 
called.  For example, if the NAT table was to have an entry 
appended onto it, after a large amount of formatting and 
some information processing, the actual append_entry() 
command is called.  An important feature is that, within 
the final commands, just before a table is actually written 
to, it is locked to prevent simultaneous access by both the 
user-space and kernel-space iptables. 
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III. INTERNET PROTOCOL, VERSION 6 
This chapter contains a summary of the IPv6 structure 
and functionality as it applies to this thesis. Background 
information regarding the protocol is presented through the 
analysis of relevant RFC’s and supporting academic 
research. The application of the protocol to our thesis is 
explained and a comparison between NAT functionalities and 
those of the IPv6 protocol is examined. Finally, the 
current application of this protocol in the Linux kernel is 
explained. 
 
A. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 
This section examines the history and structure of the 
IPv6 protocol. It also describes the IPv6 addressing scheme 
and address allocation. 
1. Introduction 
The growing demand for interconnectivity and the 
increasing consumer desire to have more devices wired, 
drove the creation of the next version of the Internet 
protocol. IPv6 addresses are 128-bits long. This is 4 times 
longer than the standardized IPv4 addresses currently in 
use. This is 296 times the size of the IPv4 address space, 
allowing for hundreds of billions of additional addresses. 
Moreover, the most stringent studies regarding the 
efficiency of addressing architectures predicts that the 
protocol will be capable of “accommodating between 8 x 1017 
and 2 x 1033 nodes” [IPng] if the IPv6 addressing 






Figure 9.   IPv6 Header [ACM IP6] 
 
 
What follows is the bit length of each field and a 
description, taken verbatim from RFC 2460 [IP6 SPEC]: 
- Version (4 bits) : Internet Protocol version 
number = 6 
- Traffic Class (8 bits) : Used to identify and 
distinguish between different classes or 
priorities of IPv6 packets 
- Flow Label (20 bits) : Used by a source to 
label sequences of packets for which it 
requests special handling by the IPv6 router 
- Payload Length (16 bits) : Length of the IPv6 
payload, i.e., the rest of the packet following 
the IPv6 header, in octets. (Extensions are 
included in this number) 
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- Next Header (8 bits) : Identifies the type of 
header immediately following the IPv6 header 
- Hop Limit (8 bits) : Decremented by 1 by each 
node that forwards the packet. Similar to the 
time to live (TTL) field in IPv4 
- Source Address (128 bits) : Address of the 
originator of the packet 
- Destination Address (128 bits) : Address of the 
intended recipient of the packet 
In the IPv6 addressing scheme, there are three 
different types of addresses: unicast, anycast and 
multicast. Noticeably, the multicast address has updated 
the broadcast function used in IPv4. The unicast address 
allows packets to be sent to an interface at a single 
address. This is used when the address is targeting a 
specific, known location. Anycast is an address that is 
assigned to multiple interfaces and the packet with an 
anycast address is sent to the most easily accessible 
(“closest”) node. This addressing format is useful when a 
client needs to get a packet to the closest available 
server. The multicast address also identifies a set of 
interfaces; however, in this mode, the packet is sent to 
all interfaces identified by a specific address. This 
flexibility in addressing allows a single machine to have 
multiple IPv6 addresses of varying types. [IPng]  
The increased address length and the number of extra 
nodes permitted by it present the subsequent problem of 
domain name resolution and address lookup. Currently, when 
an IP router receives a packet, the router must determine 
what routing subnet in its database most closely matches 
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the incoming packet. It then routes the packet to the 
appropriate destination. With the address size increasing 
so dramatically, this method of packet forwarding quickly 
becomes time and memory intensive. A solution to this 
problem has been proposed in a collaborative effort between 
the University of Washington and ETH Zurich in Switzerland. 
This improved method creates a hash table of prefix lengths 
and performs a binary search. It is claimed that the search 
method results in an “order of magnitude performance 
improvement” [IPROUTE] due to only seven hash lookups 
needed for a 128-bit address. 
2. Packet Header Format 
The number of fields in the IPv6 header is greatly 
reduced compared to the IPv4 header, thus making it simpler 
and more reliable. The header in an IPv6 packet (see Figure 
9) includes information about the version, the priority, 
the flow label, the payload length, the next header, the 
hop limit and the source and destination addresses. This 
header significantly reduces the amount of overhead that 
existed in IPv4 (see Figure 2), by removing the 
differentiated services byte, IP header length, the 
identification field, the flag, the fragment offset, the 
time to live (TTL) and the header checksum field. Removing 
all of these fields allows IPv6 to include a larger source 
and destination address without radically increasing the 
time spent on transmitting and receiving the header. [IPng] 
Though the IPv6 header is less complex, its design has 
allowed for the relatively simple addition of extension 
headers or footers. These additional headers can serve many 
purposes and allow for future development of the protocol. 
Currently, the following headers are being used according 
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to RFC 2460, “Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPV6)”: Hop-by-
Hop Options, Routing, Fragment, Destination Options, 
Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security 
Payload (ESP). [IP6 SPEC] It is easily conceivable that 
future headers will provide more functionality than 
currently available headers and be just as easy to 
implement. 
3. Addressing Scheme 
The primary benefit of IPv6 is the increased address 
space. Instead of only using 32 bits in the header for a 
source or destination address, IPv6 uses 128 bits per 
address. Considering the new address space, a new address 
formatting scheme had to be introduced. Basically, there 
are three methods of expressing an IPv6 address. The first 
and most standard form is the following: 
xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx, where each x is a 
hexadecimal digit. Thus, an example of a typical IPv6 




The second method to describe IPv6 addresses is used 
when there are leading zeros within an octet or several of 
the middle octets are zero. In these cases, the leading 
zero can be omitted from the octet. Or, in the case of 
several octets being zero, the octets can be omitted and 
replaced with a double colon. Note that the double colon 
can only be used once within the address, denoting one or 
multiple octets that are all zero. 
 









The following address is not valid: 
94AD::ABCD::7A4B 
 
Finally, the third method is used for addresses that 
are used to transition from the IPv4 protocol to the IPv6 
protocol or to maintain both addresses at the same time. 
This format essentially allows the last two octets to 
represent the old IPv4 address while the first six octets 
represent the new IPv6 subnet.  
 
For instance, the following IPv4 address: 
192.168.100.100 
 




Notice that after the sixth octet, the notation 
transitions from the separating colons to the current IPv4 
standard of dot notation. This format in particular will be 
imperative in the transition from IPv4 to IPv6. Given the 
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proper routing mechanisms, it will allow hosts to maintain 
sites for both protocols with relative ease.    
4. Address Allocation 
Just as in IPv4, IPv6 has allocated its address space 
through the acceptance of the initial designation presented 
in RFC 3513 [IP6 ADDR]. This allocation is a remarkable 
paradigm for future planning. As one can see in Table 1 
below, the majority of addresses are unassigned and 
available for public use. However, a large number of 
addresses, proportional to IPv4, are reserved for future 
protocol use, link-local, site-local and multicast use. 
 








This section will examine the security functionality 
inherent in the IPv6 protocol as well as the additional 
headers available that enhance security. 
1. Existing Security Mechanisms 
At the time IPv4 was accepted, the security threat to 
packet transmission and reception was minimal. Thus, very 
little was built into the IPv4 architecture to protect it 
from threats like Man-in-the-Middle attacks, where an agent 
intercepts message traffic between two clients; or 
masquerading, where an agent masks his true identity with a 
false one in order to gain access to a system. IPv6 has 
incorporated three main deterrents for the previously 
mentioned attacks, an Authentication Header (AH), 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), and Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE). The AH provides authentication and 
integrity both to the end client and forwarding server. It 
is able to do this by creating a cryptographic hash of the 
packet. If the hash is invalid upon receipt by the end 
client, the user knows the packet has either been tampered 
with or was not successfully transmitted. Using ESP, an 
authenticator is placed at the end of the packet. It uses 
the same hash mechanism as AH, however it also encrypts the 
payload data and the primary source and destination 
address. This conceals the payload of the packet to 
intermediate servers, giving extra security to the packet 
against a Man-in-the-Middle attack. This mode of packet 
transportation is known as tunneling mode transmission. 
Finally, the IKE follows the same principles as Kerberos. 
[KERB] A private key is encrypted with the end user’s 
public key, the packet is sent and then decrypted with the 
sender’s public key. [NGI] 
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2. Emerging Technologies 
Packets are sent from node to node, eventually ending 
at the specified destination address. A router is only able 
to send packets to IP addresses that are stored in its 
routing table. Neighbor and router discovery and the 
sharing of routing information from those routers generate 
this table. A security concern arises in this situation due 
to the damaging potential that the unknown routers being 
queried might supply malicious routing information. Two 
emerging security methods for IPv6 neighbor and router 
discovery are Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) 
and Address Based Keys (ABK). In CGA, the lower 62 bits of 
an IP address are used to “store a cryptographic hash of 
the public key.” [NRD]  To identify a CGA encrypted 
address, both bits 6, the universal/local bit, and bit 7, 
the individual/group bit, are set to one. The cryptographic 
hash of the server’s public key allows the client to send 
an encrypted public key to be used in coordination with the 
server’s private key, instead of sending the public key “in 
the clear.” Using ABK, the user’s private key is used to 
generate a digital signature and is placed in the lower 64 
bits of the header. The end client then verifies that 
portion of the header using a public key to decrypt it. 
[NRD]   
C. FEATURES PROVIDED BY NAT FOR IPV6 
The following section is an examination of the 
benefits of NAT for IPv6 and how they apply to this thesis 
and the MYSEA architecture. 
1. Address Hiding 
The implementation of a network address translation 
protocol (NAT) for IPv6 will hide internal addresses on a 
private network from external view.  The new IPv6 protocol 
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does not have any methods for address hiding and cannot 
inherently hide internal network addresses from external 
view.  IPv4 NAT provides address hiding as a result of its 
address translation.  Every computer on the external side 
of a NAT device only sees and communicates with the NAT 
device.  When outbound communications occur, the NAT device 
strips off the source headers and changes them to correlate 
with the pool of publicly acceptable addresses assigned to 
the device.  When the destination computer receives the 
packet, it returns communications via the NAT assigned 
address and port, not the native private address of the 
computer behind the NAT device.  The only way a computer 
outside the network could initiate communication with a 
computer behind a NAT device would be if the internal 
computer was statically bound to a particular IP/port 
mapping. Meaning that there is a constant 1-to-1 
relationship between the true address of the client and the 
address of the client after being translated.  Even then 
the NAT device still performs an address translation on all 
incoming and outgoing packets. 
2. Dynamic Address Assignment 
NAT for IPv6 will provide dynamic address assignment.  
IPv4 NAT provides dynamic address assignment through its 
address mappings and translations, unless they are 
statically bound.  This provides an advantage because each 
new connection is tracked and mapped to different ports or 
ranges of addresses by the NAT mechanism. This makes it 
difficult for an outsider to determine which computer in 
the NAT-protected network they are communicating with.  
Thus, enumeration and mapping of the network are extremely 
difficult, which in turn makes certain forms of hacking 
more difficult.  IPv6 does not provide any method for 
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obscuring the network topography, nor does it provide any 
method for translating addresses.  NAT for IPv6 will 
provide this functionality. 
3. Transitioning Mechanism 
NAT for IPv6 will help provide a transition from IPv4 
to IPv6.  Currently IPv4 NAT does not support a packet 
transitioning from an IPv4 network to an IPv6 network.  
However, the possibility of using an ALG or reconfiguring 
NAT to do so does exist.  It would be relatively simple to 
configure NAT to encapsulate the IPv4 address into an IPv6 
format in order to traverse an IPv6 network.  All that 
would be required would be to put the IPv4 packet entirely 
into the data field of an appropriately labeled IPv6 
packet.  The NAT device would still maintain an appropriate 
translation table so that when the returning IPv6 packet 
arrives and is stripped down to IPv4 it knows which 
computer to forward it to.  Address hiding in this way 
could still occur as the NAT device could strip the private 
IPv4 network address, assign a global IPv4 address and then 
encapsulate that datagram into an IPv6 packet.  IPv6 does 
not have an inherent method of communicating with an IPv4 
network without using either encapsulation or reformatting 
the header.  This is due to the differences in structure 
between the IPv4 and IPv6 header formats. Again, while NAT 
does not support a packet transitioning from an IPv6 
network to an IPv4 network, it is possible to use an ALG or 
to reconfigure the NAT device. In the case of the latter, 
either the datagram is encapsulated, or the IPv6 header is 
stripped off and replaced with an IPv4 header.   
4. Tunneling 
NAT for IPv6 will be able to tunnel end to end.  IPv4 
NAT is transparent to end-to-end tunneling, as stated in 
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RFC 2663: “All variations of address translations discussed 
in the previous section can be applicable to direct 
connected links as well as tunnels and virtual private 
networks (VPNs). Note also that end-to-end ESP based 
transport mode authentication and confidentiality are 
permissible for packets such as ICMP, whose IP payload 
content is unaffected by the outer IP header translation.” 
[IPNATTC]  IPv6 is also compatible with any application 
layer end-to-end tunneling as it is merely an IP layer 
protocol. 
NAT for IPv6 will also work with link encryption. 
Since NAT for IPv6 is based on NAT for IPv4, it will have 
the same IPv4 NAT characteristics including the ability to 
encrypt the payload on an end-to-end basis. The NAT 
mechanism does not alter any payload data during 
transmission or reception, thus any encryption mechanisms 
at the application level remain untouched by NAT as does 
all application level data. 
5. Connection Limiting 
NAT for IPv6 can be used to limit the number of 
connections to an external network.  IPv6 has no inherent 
method of limiting external connections or performing 
bandwidth shaping.  However, IPv4 NAT can indirectly limit 
the number of external connections a network can make.  By 
limiting either the pool of IP addresses from which a NAT 
device can assign translations, or the range of ports that 
can be assigned for port translation, a NAT device can 
effectively control traffic flow. For example, suppose one 
wishes to limit the number of external connections from a 
network to 50. By limiting the NAT device to a 50-port 
range, all additional requests would result either in the 
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packet being dropped or in an error message. This provides 
a unique way to shape the bandwidth of a network, and can 
possibly act as a security measure by preventing the NAT 
network from becoming a participant in some sort of zombie 
or DoS attack. 
D. DESIRED NAT FEATURES NOT PROVIDED BY IPV6 
Mapping out the respective features of IPv6 and NAT 
individually allows a comparison to be drawn between the 
two.  From this comparison, the desired NAT functionality 
that IPv6 does not provide can be discerned with the 
ultimate goal of understanding the benefits IPv6 NAT has 
over just IPv6.  The primary benefit that NAT provides to a 
networked computer, one neither IPv4 or IPv6 provides, is 
address hiding.  By altering the incoming and outgoing 
addresses of IPv4 or IPv6 packets, the true IP address of 
an internal computer cannot be seen by an outside computer.  
IPv6 has no inherent mechanism for this, while NAT provides 
this implicitly as part of its implementation.  The only 
time an internal computer can be externally identified is 
when there is a static NAT mapping to an external address.  
This ability to hide the topography of a network provides 
an additional layer of security by disrupting a hacker’s 
attempt to enumerate the network.  Another additional 
benefit of NAT is that it prevents broadcasts from 
traversing it, thereby preventing broadcast attacks.  
Additionally, since only internally initiated connections 
will be allowed through dynamic NAT (static NAT is used for 
externally initiated sessions through the NAT device) any 
attempts to flood a network would be stopped at the NAT 
device.  Besides internal network security, NAT can also be 
used to limit the number of simultaneous connections by 
limiting the pool of mappable addresses.  
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 Ultimately, the primary benefit of NAT that IPv6 does 
not provide is the ability to mask the internal network 
from the external viewer. This is well stated by RFC 3022, 
titled the IP Network Address Translator: “On the other 
hand, NAT itself can be seen as providing a kind of privacy 
mechanism.  This comes from the fact that machines on the 
backbone cannot monitor which hosts are sending and 
receiving traffic (assuming of course that the application 
data is encrypted).”[TNAT] Most other security benefits 
from NAT are derived from the primary benefit of address 
hiding.  Even though there were not many other discernable 
benefits of implementing NAT in IPv6, address hiding alone 
is enough to merit the addition of NAT to IPv6.   
E. IPV6 SUPPORT WITHIN THE LINUX KERNEL 
This section will examine the current IPv6 
functionality within the Linux kernel (version 2.6.5) that 
will be used in the remainder of this thesis. It is vital 
that the current functionality that supports IPv6 within 
the kernel is understood so that the existing functionality 
is not used effectively and is not duplicated. 
1. Initialization 
In the Linux kernel version used for this thesis, as 
in all current kernel releases, IPv6 protocol support is 
available as a loadable kernel module, and is not pre-
loaded by default. To enable IPv6, the developer can either 
load the module with the command “modprobe ipv6” or set the 
IPv6 module initialization switch to “yes” in the ifcfg 
file for each interface. If the development is an ongoing 
process, the latter of the two options will be more 
efficient for the developer.  Once the module is loaded, 
the Ethernet interface, unless the IPv4 module is turned 
off, will act in dual-stack mode. This allows the interface 
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to receive both IPv4 and IPv6 packets. Loading the module 
will also assign each interface controlled by the kernel an 
IPv6 address. It will be a link-local address that is based 
on the interface’s MAC address. The system now has 
connectivity to IPv6 devices connected directly to it. 
2. User-Space Functionality 
A large part of the iptables command line interface 
for IPv4 functionality has been directly adapted for IPv6 
usage. Consequently, much of the formatting is exactly the 
same, except for a few v6 notations. Examples of these are 
the ping function and the traceroute function. The switches 
are predominantly the same, however the syntax is ping6 
<IPv6 address>. This formatting is somewhat consistent 
throughout the multiple user interfaces. For example, with 
the Netfilter ip6tables, the syntax is nearly the same as 
the syntax for IPv4 iptables regarding the switches and 
inputs.  
Unfortunately, there are several functionalities 
missing in IPv6 that were present in the IPv4 protocol. 
Namely, the nat table within iptables is not present within 
ip6tables. The primary reason for this is due to the 
developers’ lack of priority for developing connection 
tracking for IPv6 within the Linux kernel. Since there is 
such a large address space in IPv6, it was thought that the 
network address translation functionality would not need to 
be ported from IPv4. [NONAT] Also, since there is no 
connection tracking, some of the filtering rules through 
ip6tables do not work, such as the filtering based on TCP 




3. Kernel-Space Functionality 
Much of the kernel-space ip6tables and netfilter IPv6 
functionality is directly adapted from the current IPv4 
functions. There are several functions within the IPv6 
portion of the kernel that even state in the source code 
that they are blatant copies of the IPv4 source code with 
function name changes and different header files. When the 
source code and file structure of the two protocols is 
compared, it is obvious that functionality is basically 
being duplicated and syntactically manipulated to work with 
a different header structure. (See IPv6 Module Sequence 
Mapping & Directory Comparison Appendices) It is debatable 
whether this is beneficial or not to the Linux and 
netfilter communities. It could be argued that since the 
code and functional structure worked in the IPv4 
environment, it is not necessary to change it for IPv6. 
Conversely, if the programming community at large allows a 
blind direct port, it is possible that the port could 
adversely impair the modularity of future enhancements to 
the code.    
The source code and file structure within the kernel-
space iptables and netfilter supporting IPv4 and IPv6 are 
somewhat similar. As stated previously, many of the 
functions are direct copies of IPv4 functions adapted to 
work with the IPv6 protocol. Much of the functionality 
however, was grouped differently with regards to the file 
system. For the most part however, the resulting function 





IV. MONTEREY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
 This chapter contains a summary of the Monterey 
Security Architecture (MYSEA): both its purpose and its 
topology as they relate to this thesis. The idea and design 
of which originated from the problem of achieving 
multilevel security in a high assurance manner. By 
enforcing mandatory security policies, this architecture 
can support such government and military contexts as 
coalition environments, inter-Department dependencies 
created by the Homeland Security Department and the Global 
War on Terrorism. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The basis of the MYSEA project is to provide “a 
trusted distributed operating environment for enforcing 
multilevel security policies.” [MYSEA] The MYSEA 
architecture provides centralized management while 
maintaining compatibility with existing consumer 
applications. MYSEA is a heterogeneous architecture that 
consists of low-assurance, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
clients, specialized authentication devices, and a small 
number of MLS servers (see Figure 10). High assurance 
capabilities are achieved through the policy enforcement by 
a high assurance platform, namely the DigitalNet XTS-400 
which supports the high assurance labeling of subjects, 
objects and networks. [MYSEA] MYSEA allows an organization 
to implement high assurance security without the need to 
completely replace their existing network. The only 
additional hardware needed would be the MLS server and a 
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set of specialized authentication devices, such as the 
Trusted Path Extension (TPE).  
B. ARCHITECTURE 
The MYSEA design is primarily a two-tier, client-
server relationship. The client, through the Trusted Path 
Extension (TPE), authenticates itself at a given session 
level with the MYSEA MLS server. The client is then 
recognized by the server for the remainder of the session 
at the authenticated level and is therefore authorized for 
information of that classification. It may seem that since 
the client must authenticate through the TPE, that the 
architecture is in fact a 3-tier architecture, similar to 
that found in most web-based database clients. Though the 
client must authenticate itself through the TPE, the two 
entities can actually be viewed as one node to the server 
and to the outside network. The TPE, acting as an extension 
of the MLS server, provides a trusted path for the user to 
authenticate with the server.  
49 
 
Figure 10.   MYSEA Architecture [MYSEA] 
In the MYSEA framework, a large majority of an 
organization’s network can stay relatively the same. The 
primary differences in the MYSEA architecture as compared 
to the standard enterprise architecture are the TPE, the 
MLS servers, the Trusted Channel Modules (TCMs) and the 
border data link encryptors. As noted by the diagram, the 
TCM and the border encryptors are outside the scope of this 
thesis. The TCM though, provides basically the same 
functionality as the TPE, however the TCM authenticates a 
data link to the server whereas the TPE authenticates a 
client. [MYSEA]  
C. IPV6 NAT TESTBED COMPONENTS 
Only the MLS LAN portion depicted in Figure 10 is 
within the scope of this thesis and is used as the basis 
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for the IPv6 NAT testbed. Abstractly, the network sees the 
TPE and the client as one device. The TPE must perform NAT 
to hide the address of the client. The following diagram 
(Figure 11) shows the IPv6 NAT testbed on which the 
analysis, development, testing and implementation of this 
thesis occurred.  
 
Figure 11.   MYSEA IPv6 NAT Testbed 
As illustrated, the testbed topology consists of two 
subnets, the 2003 subnet and the 2004. The TPE within the 
IPv6 NAT testbed is equipped with two Ethernet cards and is 
consequently able to forward packets between the client and 
the MLS server. A simple addressing scheme was used for 
ease of maintenance within the IPv6 NAT testbed. This 
scheme assigns the middle six octets in the address as well 
as the first three digits in the last octet to zero. The 
following is a description of each component within the 
IPv6 NAT testbed. 
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1. MYSEA Server 
In the MYSEA architecture, the server runs the 
DigitalNet STOP operating system on top of the XTS-400 
platform.  [MYSEA] The reason for this is to make the best 
use of the Bell and LaPadula as well as Biba policies 
supported by the system. For this thesis however, the 
server is an earlier prototype of the MYSEA server that 
runs on a modified version of OpenBSD 3.1. The modified OS 
has the ability to label data at different classifications. 
It does not have the required level of assurance for a 
MYSEA server. There are relatively few of the DigitalNet 
servers that will be used in the MYSEA architecture and are 
fairly expensive, thus development and testing on other, 
less cost prohibitive equipment was acceptable. Also, since 
the protocols that will be used for NAT will be same 
regardless of the server or client systems. [MYSEA COMP] 
2. MYSEA Trusted Path Extension 
The TPE is an extension of the MLS server, providing 
an unforgeable interface for the user to authenticate with 
the MLS server. The principal importance of the TPE is that 
it is non-bypassable by the client. All traffic that is 
transmitted or received by the client must first pass 
through the TPE. This is a mechanism that cannot be 
subverted, regardless of the sophistication of the 
malicious software.  
The TPE can take the form of a separate device from 
the client CPU. Herein, all network traffic leaving the 
Ethernet device must first pass through the TPE before 
reaching the server. The TPE can also take the form of a 
specially designed Ethernet card with a separate processor 
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and memory. The TPE can possibly even be a cutting-edge 
Common Access Card (CAC) with its own processor. The 
primary concern is that the TPE’s domain is separate from 
the client’s with regards to the processor and memory. This 
ensures that the trusted path will not be corrupted by 
malicious activities that might take place on the client  
In the IPv6 NAT testbed environment, the TPE is a PC 
with a heavily modified version of Linux 2.6.5 running on 
an Intel x86 processor. As noted previously, the TPE 
maintains two separate Ethernet cards on two different 
subnets. Currently, the TPE in the IPv6 NAT testbed 
environment does not run the actual TPE code. It only 
emulates the NAT functionality of a TPE and maintains the 
non-bypassability characteristic inherent in any trusted 
path. The packets transmitted or received by the client 
must first be forwarded by the TPE before reaching the 
server.  
It is for this reason that the NAT functionality is 
placed within the TPE. Therefore, as a result of the 
architecture, one could hide either a single client or an 
entire network of clients behind the TPE. From the 
viewpoint of the MLS server, the network topology appears 
as if the server is only in communication with the TPE. In 
reality, there could be one or more nodes hidden behind it. 
Though it is possible to conceal multiple systems behind 
one NAT device, the MYSEA architecture is designed for one 
TPE for every client. The goal of this thesis is to achieve 





3. MYSEA Client 
The MYSEA client is intended to be a diskless COTS 
system running unmodified end-user applications. This 
client will have enough RAM to run various applications at 
the same time. Client memory will be reset when a session 
is terminated and all user-specific files and settings will 
be stored on the MLS server.  
In the IPv6 NAT testbed, however, the client is 
currently a Linux 2.4.20-8 kernel running on an Intel x86 
processor. This was done primarily to facilitate the 
testing of NAT in an IPv6 environment. Since Linux has 
built-in support for IPv6 and netfilter, it was chosen for 
developmental reasons. The most important functionality 
requirement for the client system in the testbed 
environment is the capability to test multiple network 
protocols over the NAT environment as well as monitor the 
































































V. COMMON CRITERIA ASSURANCE LEVEL EXPLORATION 
This chapter contains a summary of the Common Criteria 
security evaluation process, a presentation of requirements 
for Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and a discussion of 
how some of these requirements were used to guide the IPv6 
NAT implementation. The IPv6 NAT mechanism implemented for 
this thesis is primarily a one-to-one port of the existing 
IPv4 NAT mechanism, thus the implementation does not 
satisfy many of the EAL5 requirements.  
 
A. COMMON CRITERIA BACKGROUND 
The Common Criteria (CC) was created as a solution to 
the multiple international standards that were intended to 
independently regulate the field of IT security evaluation. 
Before 1999, when the CC was adopted as an ISO standard, 
several standards existed including the Information 
Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) of Europe, 
the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC - 
Orange Book) of the US and the Canadian Trusted Computer 
Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) from Canada. A 
comparison of the assurance evaluation levels between the 
aforementioned standards can be found in Table 2. 
The intent of the CC was to create a standard set of 
components that define the security requirements needed to 
categorize IT products by assurance and functionality. The 
CC provides a great deal of flexibility in that the design 
team for a particular IT product can specify the security 
functionality within the definition of the protection 
profile for that class of IT products if one exists. The 
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design team also has the flexibility to select the 
assurance level at which the product is evaluated.  
Table 2.   Assurance Evaluation Comparison [CC WWC] 
 
B. EVALUATION PROCESS 
The CC format requires developers to have their IT 
product or code independently evaluated by a third-party 
using a common set of evaluation standards. This process 
involves the examination of the IT product for claimed 
functionality as well as for adherence to a stated set of 
security requirements. This evaluation is performed by an 
independent testing lab and can be costly in terms of both 
time and money. The major benefit received from this 
evaluation is the ability to give confidence in the product 
to the end-user based on a guaranteed security assurance 
level. 
For a CC evaluation there are two principal components 
that the developer must provide to the independent 
evaluator: the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and the Security 
Target (ST). The Protection Profile (PP) is optional, 
however it can provide a more abstract statement of 
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security objectives to which many security targets may be 
conformant. 
The Protection Profile (PP) defines the set of 
security objectives and requirements (both functional and 
assurance) for an IT product class. Product categories 
include but are not limited to: firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems (IDS), key recovery, operating systems 
(OS), peripheral switches and tokens. These are the 
categories for which, at the time of this publication, a 
valid US Government PP exists. If the IT product claims 
conformance to a PP, then the validation and fulfillment of 
the appropriate profile is required for certification of 
the IT product. [CC SECEVAL] 
The Security Target (ST) contains the security 
objectives and requirements for a particular IT product. 
The level to which the independent lab examines the TOE’s 
assurance measures and functionality is dependent on the 
desired Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL). As illustrated in 
Table 2, the EALs correlate to the evaluation levels of 
TCSEC and ITSEC, with EAL7 being the highest evaluation 
level and EAL0 the lowest.  
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Table 3.   EAL5 Fulfilled Requirements By This Project [CC] 
 
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the actual IT 
product that is to be evaluated by the third-party lab. The 
PP defines the scope of the product for the specific 
category of evaluation that the TOE must satisfy in order 
to claim conformance. [CC SECEVAL] 
C. EAL5 REQUIREMENTS 
For an IT product to receive an EAL5 certification, it 
must satisfy a series of conditions that verify its 
evaluated level of assurance. The security assurance 
evaluation of an IT product includes verifying its 
configuration management (CM), delivery and operation, 
development, guidance documents, life cycle support, 
testing, and vulnerability assessment. A summary of these 
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requirements can be found in Appendix F. Table 3 
illustrates the fulfilled assurance components by this 
implementation for an evaluation level of EAL5. [CC 
SECEVAL] The following sections describe the security 
assurance requirements that were partially satisfied by 
this NAT for IPv6 implementation.  
1. Installation, Generation and Start-Up 
The installation guide to install and setup the 
modified kernel with NAT functionality for IPv6 is 
described in Appendix G. This guide patially satisfies the 
ADO_IGS.1 requirements described in Appendix F, Section 5. 
2. Administrator Guidance 
Appendix E describes how to administer and use the NAT 
mechanism for IPv6 developed for this thesis. This guidance 
manual is intended for use as the man page for the 
ip6tables service provided by the  Linux kernel. This 
manual partially satisfies the AGD_ADM.1 requirements 
described in Appendix F, Section 13. 
3. Development Security 
This development meets these requirements on many 
levels. First, the development occurred at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, which is currently subject to the 
Department of the Navy Force Protection measures. Second, a 
cipher-locked door that remains shut at all times protects 
the lab in which development occurred. Finally, the 
computers used for development are protected by 
identification and authentication mechanisms that validate 
the identity of the user to prevent unauthorized access on 
the development system. Since there was no prior written 
plan or procedures regarding security, these measure only 
partially satisfy the ALC_DVS.1 requirements described in 
Appendix F, Section 15. 
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4. Functional Tests 
Appendix D provides the results from testing the 
functionality of the IPv6 NAT implementation. This 
requirement is only partially fulfilled since there are no 
test plans, procedures or documentation. These test results 
partially satisfy the ATE_FUN.1 requirements described in 





















VI. DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF NAT FOR IPV6 
This chapter discusses the development and 
implementation of NAT for IPv6, which primarily is a one-
to-one port of the IPv4 netfilter NAT mechanism.  The order 
in which the layer 3 and layer 4 checksums were calculated 
had to be reversed because the standard IPv6 header 
structure does not containing a checksum.  Additionally, 
the introduction of a pseudo-header checksum to ICMPv6 
required the functionality to be restructured.  These 
modifications, as well as, porting methodology, testing 
procedures, and debugging outputs will also be discussed. 
In addition, the specification document for this project 
can be found in Appendix B. 
 
A. CONNECTION TRACKING 
For NAT to function properly, it must be able to track 
connection information for each initiated session.  This 
allows NAT to translate a packet to the proper internal IP 
address.  Otherwise, NAT would not be able to determine if 
an incoming packet is attempting to initiate a new session, 
or if it is a reply to a previously established connection.  
For IPv4, the netfilter connection tracking module 
performed this function by capturing and storing session 
information accessable to any number of processes to 
access, NAT being one of them.  However, from the time IPv6 
was integrated into the kernel up to the latest standard 
2.6.5 Kernel distribution, connection tracking for IPv6 was 
not developed.   
The Universal Playground for IPv6 (USAGI) project 
develops and distributes IPv6 programs and kernel patches 
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for interested developers.  Included in some of the more 
recent Linux 2.6 kernels is a connection tracking module 
for IPv6 that closely mirrors the IPv4 connection tracking 
implementation.  For this thesis the IPv6 NAT mechanism was 
ported to run on the USAGI-altered 2.6.5 Linux kernel.  
Using the USAGI kernel allowed the development to focus on 
NAT rather than supporting functionality.  This helped to 
shorten the development time. 
B. PORTING METHODOLOGY 
Since the netfilter, connection tracking, and user-
space iptables framework for IPv6 had already been ported 
to IPv6, it was decided that a one-to-one port of the IPv6 
NAT code would be the easiest way to create a functional 
implementation.  The IPv6 programming convention used by 
the netfilter developers was maintained in the ported code.  
This port was easier because it was done on the same 
hardware architecture, Intel X86, instead of crossing over 
to some other hardware architecture, SPARC for example.  
Additionally, porting this code using the same operating 
system made the process easier.  Porting between Linux and 
Windows would have been far more difficult than to and from 
Linux.   
Performing this port using the same hardware and 
operating system prevented some potential difficulties.  
For example, recompiling the Linux kernel requires complex 
configuration for hardware dependancies, but using the same 
hardware allowed the same configuration to be used each 
time.  A majority of the one-to-one port involved copying 
the existing IPv4 NAT code into the IPv6 codebase, and then 
changing variable names, function names, and references to 
reflect IPv6 values.  Problems other than simple porting 
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errors are discussed later.  Using the same porting 
methodology as the netfilter developers allowed the coding 
process to transition much more smoothly than if an entire 
restructuring of the code had been attempted.   
1. User-Space Iptables 
Iptables package 1.2.9 contained the latest user-space 
iptables and ip6tables implementation available at the time 
of the IPv6 NAT development.  Since NAT was not ported to 
the IPv6 ip6tables, this version did not have the logic 
necessary to interact with the kernel-space IPv6 NAT code.   
In order to have basic NAT functionality, it was 
necessary to perform a one-to-one port of the source NAT 
(SNAT) target.  SNAT provides the logic needed to allow the 
user-space ip6tables to interact with the nat table shared 
by the kernel-space.  Instead of creating an SNAT target, 
the IPv4 SNAT target was ported to ip6tables.  The one-to-
one port was chosen because it followed the methodology of 
the netfilter programmers.  Additionally configuration of 
the main ip6tables file was necessary so that it recognized 
the new SNAT target.  This process succeeded with little 
difficulty as the one-to-one port was relatively 
straightforward.   
One coding issue relative to the parsing of a port 
number from a given IP address range was encountered.  The 
standard convention for designating a layer 4 port with an 
IPv4 address is to use a colon to separate the IP address 
and port pairing.  For example, 192.168.100.100:80 would 
specify that the 192.168.100.100 IP address was to operate 
on port 80.  This IPv4 convention does not work with IPv6, 
as colons are used to separate the IPv6 octets.  However, 
RFC 2732 [IP6 URL] establishes the convention of placing 
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brackets around the IP address to delineate it from the 
port pairing.  For example, specifying that IPv6 address 
2003::5 operates on port 80 results in the expression: 
[2003::5]:80.  However, because this IPv6 NAT development 
only deals with Basic NAT, which does not deal with ports, 
this problem was not addressed.  
2. Connection Tracking and Netfilter 
Although the USAGI developers had ported the 
connection tracking modules for IPv6, they deliberately 
left out NAT-specific code.  The connection tracking core 
source code file ip6_conntrack_core.c was modified to 
include NAT functionality that had not been ported from its 
IPv4 counterpart.  This code is referenced in Appendix C.   
Additionally, the connection tracking header file was 
changed to allow programmers to utilize NAT helpers and 
helper private information in connection tracking.  Nat 
helpers are functions that help NAT process packets from 
applications that require more than simple layer 3 and 
layer 4 alteration.  For example, FTP, TFTP, and AH need 
NAT helper functions to deal with IP information within the 
payload.   
Unexpectedly, modifications to netfilter core code had 
to be made as well.  The netfilter.c in Ipv4 file contains 
a function called skb_ip_make_writable that allows NAT to 
write the translated IP information to the networking 
packet buffer (skb).  This function did not exist for IPv6 
and had to be ported in order for NAT to change the packet 
in the network buffer.    
3. NAT Code 
The one-to-one port of the NAT code is described here.  
The porting process began by comparing the IPv4 netfilter 
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files to those in IPv6 to determine where they differed.  
Each file was examined to determine if it had any relevance 
to NAT either as a core code file or as a supporting file.  
Only supporting files that are germane to this thesis 
(i.e., to support SNAT) were ported.  Protocol-specific NAT 
helper files and functions such as the FTP and TFTP modules 
were not ported.  These modules allow NAT to deal with 
applications needing special translation.  Porting of these 
modules is outside the scope of this thesis.   
The Change Control Procedures Appendix (see Appendix 
A) contains a list of all NAT files that were either 
modified or ported, and a brief description of their 
functionality.   
Porting the NAT code involved updating the IPv4 code 
to handle the differences in format between the IPv4 and 
IPv6 headers.  For example, since the IPv4 header can 
include any number of options, its size is dynamic and the 
NAT code has to calculate the actual header length whenever 
it needs to know the IP header length.  However, IPv6 
headers are static in length and the NAT code can use a 
constant index value to determine the header length of an 
IPv6 packet.   
Another difference between the IPv4 and IPv6 code that 
had to be fixed was how different pointers reference 
specific structures and fields.  For example, the IP header 
pointer of the network packet buffer structure (skb) in 
IPv4 is named iphdr, yet in IPv6 the IP header pointer is 
named ipv6hdr.  Many of the variable names had to be 
altered to reflect name changes made between IPv4 and IPv6 
because of the convention that already existed when 
netfilter was ported to IPv6.  In addition to changing 
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variable names, it was also necessary to edit many of the 
included header files and many of the included, as well as 
referenced, function names.  For instance, the NAT code 
needed the ipv6.h file as opposed to the ip.h file, and it 
had to rename its reference to ip_conntrack_tuple to 
ip6_conntrack_tuple.  All of these changes were based on 
the porting conventions used by the netfilter programmers 
when they ported the networking suite from IPv4 to IPv6.   
C. PORTING DIFFICULTIES 
The one-to-one method of porting NAT code provided a 
streamlined framework for modifying and creating code. 
However, several difficulties arose during development.  
These are described in this section.  
1. IPv6 Address Structure 
The first major obstacle experienced in the NAT code 
port dealt with differences in how the kernel handled the 
IP addresses.  In the Linux kernel an IPv4 address is 
defined as an unsigned 32-bit integer, yet an IPv6 address 
is defined as a 128-bit structure.  This structure contains 
a union of three arrays of 4, 8, and 16 elements, allowing 
the 128-bit IPv6 address to be accessed in three different 
formats.  Many of the functions in IPv4, both NAT and other 
netfilter functions, manipulate the IP address through 
binary operators.  However, binary operators cannot be 
applied to a structure, making it difficult to compare IP 
addresses for equality, increment or decrement IP 
addresses, or to perform bitwise manipulations.  A simple 
assignment of a translated IP address to a source IP 
address (src.ip = nat.ip) cannot be performed with a 
structure data type.  Some functions use bitwise 
manipulation as a shortcut to performing standard 
mathematical operations.  For example, computing a checksum 
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based only on what has changed would be a shortcut to re-
computing the entire checksum after one or more fields have 
changed. 
In most cases the solution to this problem involved 
accessing the IP address one array entry at a time or by 
assigning pointers to the array.  For instance, if the 
above IP address assignment were to be performed through 
array access, the result would look something like the 
following:  src.ip.s6_addr32[0] = nat.ip.s6_addr32[0]. The 
index is then incremented on each array element until it 
reaches 3, thereby assigning each 32-bit portion of the 
temporary IP address to the respective 32-bit portion of 
the source IP address.  If the operation were to be done 
with pointers, the contents of the location pointed to by 
the source IP pointer would be assigned to contain the 
contents of the location pointed to by the temporary IP 
pointer.  In some cases the solution simply involved using 
existing functions already ported by netfilter and USAGI 
programmers. 
2. Checksum Calculation Ordering 
When the NAT mechanism alters the header of a packet, 
it must recalculate the packet’s checksum so that the 
packet will not be dropped at its next hop due to an 
invalid checksum.  In IPv4, a recalculation of the layer 4 
checksum is needed when layer 4 information is manipulated.  
The new checksum is based off of the translated layer 4 
information.  Following the checksum recalculation for 
layer 4, the NAT code manipulates the IP addresses and re-
computes the IP header checksum.  This logic flow works for 
ICMP for IPv4, however it does not work for ICMP for IPv6 
(ICMPv6).  The checksum for ICMPv6 is different from that 
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for ICMP because it includes in its calculations not only 
the checksum of the layer 4 header information and the 
layer 4 data, but also the checksum of a pseudo-header.  
This pseudo-header is needed because there is no checksum 
in the IPv6 header to protect the header information.  The 
pseudo-header consists of the source and destination IP 
address, the length of the layer 4 header and packet, the 
checksum field, and the next header field.  Figure 12 shows 
the pseudo header format for IPv6 as taken from RFC 2460. 
[IP6 SPEC] 
 
Figure 12.   Layer 4 Pseudo-header for IPv6 [IP SPEC] 
 
Calculation of the ICMPv6 checksum before IP address 
translation results in an incorrect checksum due to the IP 
addresses in the pseudo-header.  The solution to this 
problem was to switch the order of the IP address 
translation and the layer 4 checksum calculation.  Figure 
13 shows a portion of the IPv4 manip_pkt() function, 
located in ip_nat_core.c, that recalculates the checksum of 
the IP header.   
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Figure 13.   IPv4 Function manip_pkt() 
 
In IPv4, the ICMP protocol information is manipulated 
(line 1) before the IP address is changed (lines 6 or 9 
depending on the type of NAT) because the ICMP checksum did 
not depend on the IP addresses.  For IPv6, the calculation 
of the pseudo-header in the ICMPv6 checksum requires a 
switch in logic so that the modified IP addresses can be 
included in the ICMP pseudo header checksum calculation.    
This change can be seen in Figure 14, which is the IPv6 




Figure 14.   IPv6 Function manip_pkt() 
 
The “Manipulate IP part” (line 2 or 4 depending on 
type of NAT) and the “Manipulate protocol part” (line 5) 
are switched compared to the existing IPv4 NAT code.  This 
change in ordering provided the pseudo-header calculations 
with the translated IP addresses necessary to calculate a 
valid checksum.  Another noticeable difference between 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 is the absence of an IP header 
checksum calculation, which is present on lines 5 and 8 in 
Figure 13, but not needed by IPv6 (Figure 14). 
3. Checksum Calculation Algorithm 
In addition to changing the order of operations in the 
manip_pkt function, it was also necessary to alter the 
method in which checksums were calculated for the layer 4 
headers.  In IPv4, checksums of translated packets are 
calculated using an optimized algorithm implemented in 
ip_nat_cheat_check that uses bitwise manipulation to re-
calculate the checksum based only on the changed ports and 
IP addresses.  This function performs basic bit 
manipulations in assembly code and assumes that the input 
arguments are 32-bit integers.  This assembly code function 
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was not easily ported to support IPv6 data structures.  A 
less optimized, but straightforward, method that uses the 
existing csum_partial() and csum_ipv6_magic() functions 
solved the problem.  The csum_partial() function calculates 
the layer 4 checksum with the exception of bitwise 
manipulation.  Omitting the final bitwise flip then allows 
the result to be folded into the pseudo-header checksum 
calculations done by csum_ipv6_magic().  This results in a 
valid layer 4 checksum which accounts for the pseudo-
header, layer 4 header, and layer 4 payload.    
D. DEBUGGING 
After the initial one-to-one port was completed and 
successfully compiled into the kernel, the code did not 
function as expected.  Debugging was necessary to determine 
why the code was not operating properly and extensive use 
of printk was the primary method for debugging the code.  
Printk is the kernel debugging mechanism that flushes 
debugging messages to a log file that a user can access.  
The initial solution to the improper code execution was to 
increase the number of debugging messages so that detailed 
call chains could be mapped out.  These additional 
debugging statements allowed the code to be traced to 
within a function call of the problem. 
One drawback of printk is that it requires that the 
kernel messages be flushed to the log file. This limitation 
resulted in a problem during testing, when an errant 
pointer caused the kernel to trap and lock up the system.  
To obtain real-time kernel debugging messages, and to allow 
the point of failure to be isolated, it was necessary to 
enable the serial console interface of the kernel.  This 
interface allowed the display of real-time debugging 
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messages on a remote console.  This helped to isolate the 
trapping code. 
While effective in displaying function call chains and 
variable values, the use of printk to display the actual 
packet data was cumbersome.  To obtain this information it 
was necessary to use the tcpdump program to obtain a 
hexadecimal output of packets entering and leaving the TPE 
interfaces.  This output allowed detailed scrutiny of 
packet contents to ensure that information into and out of 
the TPE was correct.  Tcpdump places the network interface 
card (NIC) into the promiscuous mode to capture all packets 
entering or leaving the interface, and outputs the captured 
information.  This simplicity and its inclusion as a 
standard tool in almost all Linux distributions made 
tcpdump a good choice for packet capturing on the TPE.   
During the later stages of debugging and development 
the TPE would properly translate IP addresses, but the 
packet would be dropped at the server.  This problem was 
approached by placing the Ethereal program on both the 
client and server machines.  Ethereal produced a much more 
detailed and user-friendly output.  This output helped 
solve the question as to why packets would reach the server 
properly translated, yet still be dropped.  Ethereal output 
showed that the packet was properly translated but that its 
checksum was incorrect.  Ethereal also calculated what the 
checksum should have been given the header information.  
The reason packets were being dropped at the server was an 
improper checksum calculated by the NAT code, because the 
wrong length was passed to the checksum functions.  Once 
this problem was fixed, packets were successfully 
transmitted and the NAT code functioned properly. 
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E. TESTING 
For this thesis, different network applications were 
used to verify that the SNAT implementation works 
correctly.  Three types of protocols were tested: ICMPv6, 
UDP, and TCP.  ICMPv6 was tested using the ping6 mechanism, 
UDP was tested using the traceroute6, and TCP was tested 
using rlogin and by downloading a webpage through the TPE.  
During each testing phase various errors were encountered 
and ultimately fixed. 
Ping6 tested ICMPv6 NAT by sending an Echo Request 
packet from the Client to the Server.  This Echo Request 
packet then resulted in transmission of an Echo Reply 
packet back to the client.  During this testing Ethereal 
showed that the ICMPv6 Echo Request packet was properly 
translated through the TPE, but was dropped by the server.  
This problem was a result of the improper calculation of 
the checksum and the calculation of the checksum before the 
IP address was translated.  Once this logic and ordering 
was fixed, ping6 completed successfully.  Ethereal showed 
proper translation of both the ICMPv6 Echo Request and Echo 
Reply packets to and from the client and server machines.  
These Ethereal and tcpdump outputs can be found in Appendix 
D.   
The next test was to run traceroute6 to test UDP 
packet translation.  Traceroute6 determines the hop-by-hop 
route from source to destination.  A UDP packet is sent out 
with a hop limit of one and each time traceroute6 receives 
an ICMPv6 Timeout message, it records the IP address and 
adds it the route.  When the UDP packet reaches the 
specified target destination, an ICMPv6 Destination 
Unreachable message is returned and the route is displayed.  
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During NAT testing, Ethereal output from the server showed 
that while UDP packets were properly translated, the 
replying ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable packet was dropped 
at the TPE.  After finding a misplaced bracket in the 
ported code, the ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable packet was 
properly forwarded from the server, through the TPE, to the 
client.   
At this point, the Ethereal output from the client 
showed that the ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable packet was 
being dropped due to an improper checksum.  Further 
evaluation of the call chain, and respective code, revealed 
that ICMPv6 error messages followed a different logic flow.  
This logic flow reached a checksum calculation, in the 
function icmpv6_reply_translation() located in 
ip6_nat_core.c, that had not been changed to use 
csum_partial() and csum_ipv6_magic().  After the checksum 
calculation logic was fixed, the client properly received 
the ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable packet from the Server, 
and traceroute6 operated successfully.   
The NAT mechanism for TCP uses the same logical flow 
as UDP packets except that the TCP flow also accounts for 
ports which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  After 
changing the TCP checksum calculation to use csum_partial() 
and csum_ipv6_magic(), TCP packets properly traversed the 
NAT mechanism in the TPE.  To test the translation of TCP 
packets from the client to the server and back again, 
rlogin was used in addition to downloading a webpage.  
Using rlogin, an authorized user was able to log into the 
server from the client, list a directory, use “cat” to list 
the contents of a text file, and then log off, all through 
the TPE running NAT.  Downloading the webpage involved 
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setting up an Apache web server on the Server machine and 
then downloading the webpage through the TPE running NAT.  
The results of both tests were verified by Ethereal outputs 
(see Appendix D) that showed the proper translations at 















































VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
This chapter gives an analysis of the NAT mechanism 
integrated within the Linux kernel for use with IPv6. 
Recommendations for future work on the IPv6 NAT mechanism 
and suggestions for pursuit of future work on the current 
NAT implementation for IPv6 within the Linux kernel are 
also presented. 
 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE INTEGRATED NAT 
Upon completion of debugging, the NAT mechanism was 
tested within the framework of the IPv6 NAT tested for use 
with the MYSEA architecture. As explained in Chapter IV, 
the NAT mechanism was placed on the TPE and all traffic 
from the client or server must pass through the TPE. 
Testing of three protocols, TCP, UDP and ICMP, was 
conducted and the results are described in Chapter 4 and 
can be found in Appendix D. The SNAT functionality was 
demonstrated to function properly with use of common 
networking applications such as ping6, traceroute6 and 
rlogin. As a culminating experiment, an Apache web server 
was placed on the testbed server and hosted multiple web 
pages. The IPv6 NAT mechanism was then activated on the TPE 
with rules set to mask the identity of the client. The 
client then accessed the web pages from the server, through 
the TPE, with a connection that was successfully masked 
through the NAT mechanism. Ethereal was used to verify the 
successful translation of packets.  
B. FUTURE ALTERNATE IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN 
The NAT mechanism developed in this thesis is based on 
the current dual-stack architecture in current Linux kernel 
78 
releases. In this architecture, there are separate call 
chains for IPv4 and IPv6. For future NAT developments, 
there are two possibilities for implementation redesign: 
rewrite the current dual-stack netfilter architecture into 
a single stack, or decouple the NAT functionality from 
netfilter. 
Currently, there are two separate netfilter stacks for 
IPv4 and IPv6. This functionality traces to the 
initialization of netfilter where it is called by different 
receive functions for IPv4 packets and IPv6 packets. A 
future design could combine the functionality present in 
both stacks into one, cohesive stack. This would reduce the 
amount of functionality duplication. This is beneficial for 
assurance purposes since there would be less code to 
verify. Also, the code would be more efficient and require 
less memory than the current implementation. This project 
would however involve an immense amount of work and a great 
deal of previous knowledge regarding both netfilter and 
Linux kernel programming. 
Alternately, the NAT mechanism could be removed from 
netfilter such that it is a separate entity. Presently, the 
NAT mechanism is highly dependant on the netfilter 
architecture. 
Another redesign alternative would be to develop a 
kernelized NAT mechanism that operates in a completely 
isolated manner. Here, the mechanism would most likely 
intercept the packet before netfilter manipulates it via 
the receive functions. This design would be beneficial 
since all the NAT functionality would be modular and thus 
better suited for a high assurance design. 
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C. OTHER FUTURE WORK 
There are many areas in which the current 
implementation could be improved without restructuring the 
architecture or design. These include but are not limited 
to work on: extension headers, multiple protocol support, 
greater user-space functionality, port translation, 
multiple types of NAT mechanisms, and address or port 
ranges. 
One recommendation is to fix the checksum calculations 
to handle extension headers when calculating the length of 
layer 4. In the current implementation, this is calculated 
by subtracting the IPv6 header length from the length field 
in the skb. This has the potential to yield an improper 
value, specifically if extension headers are present. In 
the current protocol, the next header field of the IPv6 
header does not necessarily point directly to layer 4, 
primarily in the case of extension headers resulting from 
IPSEC or ESP. [IP SPEC] A suggested method for properly 
calculating the layer 4 payload length would be parse 
individual fields from the skb until the beginning of the 
layer 4 header is reached and then calculate the length. 
Another recommendation for future development would be 
to enable support for other layer 4 protocols. Currently, 
the implementation supports TCP, ICMP and UDP. Though these 
protocols enable a great deal of functionality, there are 
other protocols, such as FTP, TFTP and IRC, that are 
functional in IPv4 that are not yet developed for IPv6. For 
example, IRC will be required to support the new Naval 
Research Laboratory multilevel chat program in the MYSEA 
multilevel testbed. 
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At this time, only the SNAT target has been ported to 
the IPv6 user-space ip6tables. For the purposes of this 
thesis within the IPv6 NAT testbed for the MYSEA 
architecture, it was the only target needed for testing 
purposes. There are other targets, such as DNAT and 
MASQUERADE, which are present in IPv4 that have yet to 
ported to IPv6. Porting these targets would allow greater 
flexibility for the nat table within ip6tables. 
Future work could involve advancing the current NAT 
implementation to perform the additional NAT functions as 
dictated by RFC 2663. [IPNATTC] This NAT implementation 
only handles the functionality necessary for basic NAT. 
[IPNATTC] This work could involve adding port translation, 
destination NAT and static NAT support to the current NAT 
implementation.  
Finally, this NAT implementation does not support the 
assignment of ranges of either ports or addresses for the 
address translation mechanism to use. Future work in this 
area could include not only developing the user space and 
kernel space to accept ranges, but also the development of 
a robust algorithm for use in assigning either addresses or 
ports. 
D. SUMMARY 
A working implementation of NAT for IPv6 within the 
Linux kernel has been produced. It was created on a 
modified version of the Linux 2.6.5 Kernel that supports 
connection tracking. The NAT development created here has 
been tested for support of the protocols of TCP, UDP and 
ICMP for IPv6. 
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APPENDIX A. CHANGE CONTROL PROCEDURES 
VERSION CONTROL AND BACKUP PLAN 
A standard naming scheme was developed that allowed 
versions to be tracked as well as the restoration of 
previous versions, should that become necessary.  The 
naming scheme is as follows:  NAME-MM-DD-YYYY-V, where NAME 
is the name of the document, MM is the month, DD is the 
day, YYYY is the year, and V is the version for that 
particular day using the alphabet (ie, ver A, ver B, etc.).  
This allowed versions to be found easily and changes to be 
tracked throughout the development process.  
The backup plan was fairly simple as well.  Upon 
creation of a new version of any document, the first step 
was to save the document locally on either the network 
drive or the home computer.  The next immediate step was to 
email the document to the thesis partner and the originator 
of the document, effectively storing a copy on the mail 
server.  Additionally, an archive of all thesis related 
documents was compiled on writeable CD/DVD media, and on 
home computers as needed.  This provided sufficient 
redundancy, and given the version control scheme, it 
permitted fairly easy recovery from any loss of data.  In 
the event of data loss, the procedure would have been to 
copy the archive over to the affected machine. 
In addition to the backup plan, multiple systems were 
maintained on which the most up to date files and pieces of 
code could be found.  The client machine in the lab was 
configured to dual boot into either Windows XP or Red Hat 
Linux.  Both of these partitions served as repositories for 
thesis documents. The source code for the project was 
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stored on both the TPE and on writeable CD. In addition, 
versions of the thesis were stored on personal 
workstations, USB removable storage and writeable CD. 
 
CONFIGURATION ITEMS AND DESCRIPTION 
This project included all the listed files ported or 
altered in order to obtain working NAT functionality.  A 
distinction was made between ported and altered files.  
Altered files were existing files that required 
modification in order to support NAT.  Ported files were 
files that did not exist in the working 2.6.5 kernel with 
IPv6 connection tracking, and were necessary to obtain NAT 
functionality.  This code was comprised mostly of NAT files 
ported to IPv6.  The following is a list of all the altered 
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APPENDIX B. SPECIFICATION DOCUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Network Address Translation (NAT) for IPv6 will be 
developed using a modified Linux 2.6.5 kernel that supports 
connection tracking.  Intended users for this application 
are any user desiring IPv4 NAT functionality for IPv6.  
Specifically, these are users desiring to translate 
addresses from a private network to authorized public 
network addresses.   
The main purpose of this application is to provide NAT 
functionality for IPv6. NAT only deals with altering the IP 
header fields and checksums in the IPv6 datagram packets.  
Additionally, an interface for interaction with the NAT to 
allow static binding of IP addresses and assignment of 
dynamic IP address ranges is desired.  User and system 
interactions include calls to and from the kernel module, 
calls to the ip6tables, calls to the netfilter module, 
which handles packet processing in general, calls to 
connection tracking, and reference to information in the 
NAT table.   
Users will interact with the protocol from a command 
line interface by altering the nat table entries to reflect 
desired translations.  Additional software requirements 
include the use of Application Level Gateways (ALGs) to 
help any software that alters IP information interact with 
the NAT device.  These gateways would be designed and 
implemented by the producers of the given software. 




The expected operating environment of this NAT 
implementation will be on a networked computer running a 
modified version of Red Hat 9.0 design to support 
connection tracking interacting with an IPv6 network.  
Initially the environment will be a closed, with the NAT 
mechanism performing a one-to-one translation; however, 
ultimately the implementation will be usable by any person 
running the modified Linux 2.6.5 kernel wishing to run NAT 
on IPv6.  Off-the-shelf tools will be the modified 2.6.5 
Linux kernel designed to support connection tracking and a 
personal computer capable of being networked and of running 
the operating system and capable of networking with an IPv6 
network.   
The computer running the NAT protocol should be of 
sufficient speed to perform the address translation without 
any noticeable delay or hindrance to network 
communications.  The physical environment of the protocol 
will be constrained by the physical hardware needed to 
implement the NAT protocol.  Namely, the requirements the 
physical computer and networking devices have will also be 
those of the application.  Should this application be 
deployed in an untrusted environment, special care must be 
take to safeguard the NAT device so that it is not turned 
off or manipulated, allowing external networks to 
communicate directly with the internal networks using their 
true IP address.   
Users are expected to understand the basics of both 
the Linux operating system and IP networking. The user must 
know what NAT does and how it performs its job.  Expected 
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usage pattern of the NAT protocol will be that of the 
network.   
INTERFACES 
Operation of NAT should be fairly transparent to the 
user, therefore only a simple interface to allow static 
binding of IP addresses will be provided. It will allow the 
NAT protocol to be turned on or off, and will allow the 
user to program desired translations into the nat table.  
The existing ip6tables will be used as the interface.  
Access to the NAT interface will be limited to users 
with root privilege.   
The interface will be command line, since it was 
previously implemented in command line in IPv4 and this 
would appear to be the simplest and most efficient method 
of interaction.   
The interface will consist of commands that allow the 
user to perform the tasks of configuring translations, 
static bindings, and turning NAT off and on.  The interface 
will only manipulate the nat table and allow the user to 
start and stop the NAT.  Since there will be only one 
interface, there will not be any inter-interface 
dependencies.  NAT information will be transferred to and 
from the interface as soon as it is updated so that the 
interface gives the user accurate information of what the 
nat table contains.  The NAT interface will still be 
functional when there is no networking connection because 
the user can still set up a nat table and NAT rules 
regardless of whether or not there is connectivity. 
SYSTEM OPERATION 
The runtime protocol will operate in a passive mode.  
Its presence should be transparent to the user. NAT 
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operation will begin after the user invokes the protocol 
through the interface, which will activate the NAT 
functionality within the netfilter hooks.  An overview of 
the protocol’s operation is characterized diagrammatically 
by the following flow chart. (See Figure 15) Note that in 
the diagram the firewall system merely refers to the 
computer that receives the packet. 
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Figure 15.   Netfilter Packet Flow [NF OVER] 
The user interface alters the nat table rules that are 
traversed when it is called by one of the netfilter hooks.  
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The application of this development is restricted to a 
networking environment.  There is no necessity for NAT in a 
stand-alone environment.  Major components of the 
application include: the interface, the nat table, any 
modified kernel source code, netfilter and its hooks, and 
the user interface to netfilter and ip6tables.  The nat 
table will be stored in a non-volatile location to 
eliminate the necessity of re-entering the translation 
mappings every time the machine is rebooted. 
DATA TYPES & STORAGE 
 The NAT protocol for IPv6 will use the source and 
destination addresses, the IP header checksum, and the nat 
table, which stores the mappings.  All other information 
within the IPv6 header, while related to the task of NAT, 
is not specific to what the NAT protocol will do.  The 
source and destination address both tell the IP packet 
where to go, and in the case of this implementation, they 
will be replaced by desired mappings to hide the true IP 
address from the sender or receiver, depending on the type 
of NAT employed, preventing them from gaining privileged 
knowledge of the network topography.   
The source and destination addresses will be stored by 
the connection tracking module and read by the netfilter 
hooks to determine if any rules exist in the nat tables for 
the specific IP conversation.  The IP address will then be 
translated by ip6tables.  The layer 4 header checksum is a 
quality of service mechanism that helps assure that the 
original packet has remained unchanged.  This checksum will 
be invalid if either the source or destination IP addresses 
are modified, unless the checksum is recalculated to 
reflect the changed IP addresses. The NAT mechanism will 
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recalculate this checksum in a manner dependant on the 
protocol of the packet traversing the NAT mechanism.  The 
mappings contained in the nat table will be compared by 
ip6tables to the session information saved in connection 
tracking to see if rules need to be applied. 
PERFORMANCE 
A majority of the performance requirements were listed 
in the above sections.  Basically, the ip6tables will 
interact with the NAT code in a manner that does not prove 
to be a hindrance to network operations.  The exact 
threshold for this is not static, but rather it varies from 
user to user, since a network administrator with a gigabit 
Ethernet LAN may have higher performance requirements than 
a home user with a small LAN connecting to the Internet via 
a 56K modem.   
The maximum number of concurrent users will be the 
number of users within the administrator group, as the NAT 
rules are only able to altered by a user with administrator 
privilege.  In general there will be no necessity for 
multiple users to alter the nat tables, unless there is 
some sort of cooperative environment agreed upon by 
multiple users of the LAN.  Also, any user that requests to 
alter the nat table must have administrator privilege.  
The maximum number of concurrent connections will be 
limited by the maximum number of ports available multiplied 
by the number of public IP addresses the NAT device 
maintains for external translation.  The expected usage 
pattern will be constant.  Once configured and operational, 
the only further alterations to the nat table should be 
when external IP address bindings are reconfigured.  
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The tolerance for error will be fairly low, as any 
error in translation will result in undesired network 
operation and the probable loss of connectivity to the 
Internet.  Workload expectations for the protocol will 
depend on the amount of network traffic passing through the 
computer.  Critical resources for this program are Internet 
connectivity and adequate processor speed. 
PARALLELISM 
This NAT development does not require any parallelism, 
as it is an in-line function.  When a packet enters the NIC 
interface netfilter hooks are called.  These hooks traverse 
a list of processes that have requested access to the 
packet in a priority queue.  One of these processes is 
always ip6tables, and within ip6tables is the NAT code.  
While the NAT process is running and manipulating the 
packet, there will not be any other processes manipulating 
the packet simultaneously.   
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING 
There will not be any concurrent engineering with 
respect to development, testing, and deployment of this 
program.  As was stated with parallelism, there is no 
necessity for parallel access, engineering, or development.   
SECURITY 
The process will have all of the security 
characteristics of ip6tables, the user interface to 
netfilter. Currently, ip6tables cannot be edited unless the 
user has administrator privileges.  Therefore, the NAT 
process will not be accessible to any user other than root 
or those users with root permissions.  Allowing any users 
to edit any of the tables for ip6tables would leave the 
system open to any number of security violations as a 
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malicious user could set mappings and intercept traffic, as 
well as, masquerade as any user on the LAN.   
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
Development of NAT for IPv6 will occur on a modified 
2.6.5 Linux kernel designed to support connection tracking.  
The necessary IPv4 NAT code will be ported and modified 
into the IPv6 environment.  Initially, the focus was to 
enable connection tracking for IPv6 before the development 
of the NAT functionality. However, a modified 2.6.5 Linux 
kernel was released that enabled this functionality. From 
this point, the nat table to the ip6tables code and its 
respective functionality will be introduced.  After this 
foundation is laid, the desired NAT functionality will be 
implemented in a method similar to IPv4.  Finally, open-
source testing suites will be used to test module 
compatibility, and the MYSEA IPv6 NAT testbed will be used 
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APPENDIX C. SOURCE CODE 
This appendix contains all the source code for files 
within the Linux netfilter suite for IPv6 that were either 
altered or created in order to support NAT in IPv6. The 
altered files contain the inserted code.  The created code 





 * Copyright (C)2003 USAGI/WIDE Project 
 * 
 * Authors: 
 * Yasuyuki Kozakai <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp> 
 * 
 * Based on: include/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_conntrack.h 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 * 
 * 24-May-2004  : Ported application helper data union for later use - 
TB MP 
 *            : Ported NAT helper connection tracking data union for 




/* per expectation: application helper private data */ 
union ip6_conntrack_expect_help { 
 /* insert conntrack helper private data (expect) here */ 
 struct ip6_ct_ftp_expect exp_ftp_info; 
         
 
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - This is where nat helper private data goes.  Not ported by 
USAGI.  This was  
 * ported, however it was not used because the thesis only deals with 
basic NAT.    
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */  
 
#ifdef CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_NEEDED 
 union { 
  /* insert nat helper private data (expect) here */ 









/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - Nat helper information for connection tracking goes here.  
Not ported by USAGI. 
 * This was ported, however it was not used because the thesis only 
deals with basic NAT. 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */ 




/* per conntrack: nat application helper private data */ 
union ip6_conntrack_nat_help { 







































 * IPv6 Connection Tracking 
 * Linux INET6 implementation 
 * 
 * Copyright (C)2003 USAGI/WIDE Project 
 * 
 * Authors: 
 * Yasuyuki Kozakai <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp> 
 * 
 * Based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_conntrack_core.c 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 * 
 * 24-May-2004: Ported NAT code for ICMP tracking - TB MP 
 *            : Ported NAT code to reverse connection direction - TB MP 
 *            : Ported NAT function that expects a connection change - 
TB MP  
 */ 
 
struct ip6_conntrack * 
icmp6_error_track(struct sk_buff *skb, 
    unsigned int icmp6off, 
    enum ip6_conntrack_info *ctinfo, 
    unsigned int hooknum) 
{ 
 
 struct ip6_conntrack_tuple intuple, origtuple; 
 struct ip6_conntrack_tuple_hash *h; 
 struct ipv6hdr *ip6h; 
 struct icmp6hdr hdr; 
 struct ipv6hdr inip6h; 
 unsigned int inip6off; 
 struct ip6_conntrack_protocol *inproto; 
 u_int8_t inprotonum; 
 unsigned int inprotoff; 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(skb->nfct == NULL); 
 
 ip6h = skb->nh.ipv6h; 
 if (skb_copy_bits(skb, icmp6off, &hdr, sizeof(hdr)) != 0) { 
  DEBUGP("icmp_error_track: Can't copy ICMPv6 hdr.\n"); 
  return NULL; 
 } 
  
 if (hdr.icmp6_type >= 128){ 
  return NULL; 
 } 
 /* 
  * Should I ignore invalid ICMPv6 error here ? 
  * ex) ICMPv6 error in ICMPv6 error, Fragmented packet, and so 
on. 
  * - kozakai 
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  */ 
 
 /* Why not check checksum in IPv4 conntrack ? - kozakai */ 
 /* Ignore it if the checksum's bogus. */ 
 
 
 if (csum_ipv6_magic(&ip6h->saddr, &ip6h->daddr, skb->len - 
icmp6off, 
       IPPROTO_ICMPV6, 
       skb_checksum(skb, icmp6off, 
      skb->len - icmp6off, 0))) { 
  DEBUGP("ICMPv6 checksum failed\n"); 
  return NULL; 
 } 
 
 inip6off = icmp6off + sizeof(hdr); 
 
 
 if (skb_copy_bits(skb, inip6off, &inip6h, sizeof(inip6h)) != 0) { 
  DEBUGP("Can't copy inner IPv6 hdr.\n"); 
  return NULL; 
 } 
 
 inprotonum = inip6h.nexthdr; 
 inprotoff = ip6_ct_skip_exthdr(skb, inip6off + sizeof(inip6h), 
           &inprotonum, 
           skb->len - inip6off - sizeof(inip6h)); 
 
 if (inprotoff < 0 || inprotoff > skb->len 
     || inprotonum == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) { 
  DEBUGP("icmp6_error: Can't find protocol header in ICMPv6 
payload.\n"); 
  return NULL; 
 } 
 
 inproto = ip6_ct_find_proto(inprotonum); 
 /* Are they talking about one of our connections? */ 
 if (!ip6_get_tuple(&inip6h, skb, inprotoff, inprotonum, 
      &origtuple, inproto)) { 
  DEBUGP("icmp6_error: ! get_tuple p=%u\n", inprotonum); 
  return NULL; 
 } 
 
 /* Ordinarily, we'd expect the inverted tupleproto, but it's 
    been preserved inside the ICMP. */ 
 
 if (!invert_tuple(&intuple, &origtuple, inproto)) { 
  DEBUGP("icmp6_error_track: Can't invert tuple\n"); 
  return NULL; 
 } 
 
 *ctinfo = IP6_CT_RELATED; 





/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - Code necessary for NAT that was not originally ported over 
to IPv6 with the USAGI 
 * connection tracking port. 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */ 
  if (!h) { 
 
  /* Locally generated ICMPs will match inverted if they 
     haven't been SNAT'ed yet */ 
  /* FIXME: NAT code has to handle half-done double NAT --RR 
*/ 
   if (hooknum == NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT){ 
     h = ip6_conntrack_find_get(&origtuple, NULL); 
 
     /*TB MP - END NAT CODE*/  
  
   } 
   if (!h) { 
    DEBUGP("icmp6_error_track: no match\n"); 
     return NULL; 
   } 
    
 
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - Code necessary for NAT that was not originally ported over 
to IPv6 with the USAGI 
 * connection tracking port. 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */ 
 
   /*Reverse direction from that found */ 
   if (DIRECTION(h) != IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY){ 
     *ctinfo += IP6_CT_IS_REPLY; 
   } 
   /*TB MP - END NAT CODE*/ 
 
 
  } else { 
     if (DIRECTION(h) == IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY){ 
       *ctinfo += IP6_CT_IS_REPLY; 
     } 
  } 
 
 /* Update skb to refer to this connection */ 
 skb->nfct = &h->ctrack->infos[*ctinfo]; 




/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - Code necessary for NAT that was not originally ported over 
to IPv6 with the USAGI 
 * connection tracking port. 
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 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */ 
int ip6_conntrack_change_expect(struct ip6_conntrack_expect *expect, 
          struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *newtuple) 
{ 




 DEBUGP("exp tuple: "); DUMP_TUPLE(&expect->tuple); 
 DEBUGP("exp mask:  "); DUMP_TUPLE(&expect->mask); 
 DEBUGP("newtuple:  "); DUMP_TUPLE(newtuple); 
 if (expect->ct_tuple.dst.protonum == 0) { 
  /* Never seen before */ 
  DEBUGP("change expect: never seen before\n"); 
  if (!ip6_ct_tuple_equal(&expect->tuple, newtuple)  
      && LIST_FIND(&ip6_conntrack_expect_list, expect_clash, 
     struct ip6_conntrack_expect *, newtuple, &expect->mask))  
{ 
 
   /* Force NAT to find an unused tuple */ 
   ret = -1; 





   ret = 0; 
  } 
 } else { 
  /* Resent packet */ 
  DEBUGP("change expect: resent packet\n"); 
  if (ip6_ct_tuple_equal(&expect->tuple, newtuple)) { 
   ret = 0; 
  } else { 
   /* Force NAT to choose again the same port */ 
   ret = -1; 
  } 
 } 
 WRITE_UNLOCK(&ip6_conntrack_expect_tuple_lock); 
 return ret; 
} 
 


















 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: include/linux/ip_nat.h 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
















/* SRC manip occurs only on POST_ROUTING */ 
#define HOOK2MANIP(hooknum) ((hooknum) != NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING) 
#else 
/* SRC manip occurs POST_ROUTING or LOCAL_IN */ 
#define HOOK2MANIP(hooknum) ((hooknum) != NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING && 
(hooknum) != NF_IP6_LOCAL_IN) 
#endif 
 
#define IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS 1 
#define IP6_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED 2 
/* Used internally by get_unique_tuple(). */ 
#define IP6_NAT_RANGE_FULL 4 
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/* NAT sequence number modifications */ 
struct ip6_nat_seq { 
 /* position of the last TCP sequence number  
  * modification (if any) */ 
 u_int32_t correction_pos; 
 /* sequence number offset before and after last modification */ 
 int32_t offset_before, offset_after; 
}; 
 
/* Single range specification. */ 
struct ip6_nat_range 
{ 
 /* Set to OR of flags above. */ 
 unsigned int flags; 
 
 /* Inclusive: network order. */ 
 struct in6_addr min_ip, max_ip; 
 
 /* Inclusive: network order */ 
 union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto min, max; 
}; 
 
/* A range consists of an array of 1 or more ip6_nat_range */ 
struct ip6_nat_multi_range 
{ 
 unsigned int rangesize; 
 
 /* hangs off end. */ 
 struct ip6_nat_range range[1]; 
}; 
 
/* Worst case: local-out manip + 1 post-routing, and reverse dirn. */ 




 /* The direction. */ 
 u_int8_t direction; 
 
 /* Which hook the manipulation happens on. */ 
 u_int8_t hooknum; 
 
 /* The manipulation type. */ 
 u_int8_t maniptype; 
 
 /* Manipulations to occur at each conntrack in this dirn. */ 







/* Protects NAT hash tables, and NAT-private part of conntracks. */ 
DECLARE_RWLOCK_EXTERN(ip6_nat_lock); 
 




 struct list_head list; 
 
 /* conntrack we're embedded in: NULL if not in hash. */ 
 struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack; 
}; 
 
/* The structure embedded in the conntrack structure. */ 
struct ip6_nat_info 
{ 
 /* Set to zero when conntrack created: bitmask of maniptypes */ 
 int initialized; 
 
 unsigned int num_manips; 
 
 /* Manipulations to be done on this conntrack. */ 
 struct ip6_nat_info_manip manips[IP6_NAT_MAX_MANIPS]; 
 
 struct ip6_nat_hash bysource, byipsproto; 
 
 /* Helper (NULL if none). */ 
 struct ip6_nat_helper *helper; 
 
 struct ip6_nat_seq seq[IP6_CT_DIR_MAX]; 
}; 
 
/* Set up the info structure to map into this range. */ 
extern unsigned int ip6_nat_setup_info(struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
          const struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr, 
          unsigned int hooknum); 
 
/* Is this tuple already taken? (not by us)*/ 
extern int ip6_nat_used_tuple(const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
        const struct ip6_conntrack *ignored_conntrack); 
 
/* Calculate relative checksum. */ 
extern u_int16_t ip6_nat_cheat_check(struct in6_addr oldvalinv, 
        struct in6_addr newval, 
        u_int16_t oldcheck); 
 
extern u_int16_t ip6_int_nat_cheat_check(u_int32_t oldvalinv, 
        u_int32_t newval, 

















 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_core.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
/* NAT for netfilter; shared with compatibility layer. */ 
 
/* (C) 1999-2001 Paul `Rusty' Russell 
 * (C) 2002-2004 Netfilter Core Team <coreteam@netfilter.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 
















#define IPV6_HDR_LEN (sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) 
#define ASSERT_READ_LOCK(x) MUST_BE_READ_LOCKED(&ip6_nat_lock) 














#define DEBUGP printk 
#else 






/* Calculated at init based on memory size */ 
static unsigned int ip6_nat_htable_size; 
 
static struct list_head *bysource; 




extern struct ip6_nat_protocol ip6_unknown_nat_protocol; 
 
/* We keep extra hashes for each conntrack, for fast searching. */ 
static inline size_t 
 hash_by_ipsproto(struct in6_addr src, struct in6_addr dst, u_int16_t 
proto) 
{ 
 /* Modified src and dst, to ensure we don't create two 
           identical streams. */ 
 
 return (src.s6_addr32[0] + src.s6_addr32[1] + src.s6_addr32[2] + 
src.s6_addr32[3] + dst.s6_addr32[0] + dst.s6_addr32[1] + 
dst.s6_addr32[2] + dst.s6_addr32[3] + proto) % ip6_nat_htable_size; 
} 
 
static inline size_t 
hash_by_src(const struct ip6_conntrack_manip *manip, u_int16_t proto) 
{ 
 
 /* Original src, to ensure we map it consistently if poss. */ 
 return (manip->ip.s6_addr32[0] + manip->ip.s6_addr32[1] + manip-




/* Noone using conntrack by the time this called. */ 
static void ip6_nat_cleanup_conntrack(struct ip6_conntrack *conn) 
{ 
 
 struct ip6_nat_info *info = &conn->nat.info; 
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 unsigned int hs, hp; 
 
 if (!info->initialized){ 






 hs = hash_by_src(&conn->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple.src, 
                  conn->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL] 
                  .tuple.dst.protonum); 
 
 hp = hash_by_ipsproto(conn-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.src.ip, 
                       conn-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.ip, 
                       conn->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY] 
                       .tuple.dst.protonum); 
 
 WRITE_LOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 LIST_DELETE(&bysource[hs], &info->bysource); 




/* We do checksum mangling, so if they were wrong before they're still 
 * wrong.  Also works for incomplete packets (eg. ICMP dest 




static inline int cmp_proto(const struct ip6_nat_protocol *i, int 
proto) 
{ 
 return i->protonum == proto; 
} 
 




 struct ip6_nat_protocol *i; 
 MUST_BE_READ_LOCKED(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 i = LIST_FIND(&ip6_protos, cmp_proto, struct ip6_nat_protocol *, 
protonum); 
 if (!i){ 
  i = &ip6_unknown_nat_protocol; 
 } 
 return i; 
} 
 
/* Is this tuple already taken? (not by us) */ 
int 
ip6_nat_used_tuple(const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack *ignored_conntrack) 
{ 
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 /* Conntrack tracking doesn't keep track of outgoing tuples; only 
    incoming ones.  NAT means they don't have a fixed mapping, 
    so we invert the tuple and look for the incoming reply. 
    We could keep a separate hash if this proves too slow. */ 
 
 struct ip6_conntrack_tuple reply; 
 ip6_invert_tuplepr(&reply, tuple); 
 
 return ip6_conntrack_tuple_taken(&reply, ignored_conntrack); 
} 
 
/* Does tuple + the source manip come within the range mr */ 
static int 
in_range(const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
  const struct ip6_conntrack_manip *manip, 
  const struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr) 
{ 
 struct ip6_nat_protocol *proto = ip6_find_nat_proto(tuple-
>dst.protonum); 
 unsigned int i; 
 struct ip6_conntrack_tuple newtuple = { *manip, tuple->dst }; 
 
 for (i = 0; i < mr->rangesize; i++) { 
  /* If we are allowed to map IPs, then we must be in the 
     range specified, otherwise we must be unchanged. */ 
  if (mr->range[i].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS) { 
   if (ntohl(newtuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[0]) < ntohl(mr-
>range[i].min_ip.s6_addr32[0]) 
       || (ntohl(newtuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[0]) 
    > ntohl(mr->range[i].max_ip.s6_addr32[0]))){ 
    continue; 
   } 
  } else { 
 
 if ((newtuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[0] != tuple->src.ip.s6_addr32[0]) || 
(newtuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[1] != tuple->src.ip.s6_addr32[1]) || 
(newtuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[2] != tuple->src.ip.s6_addr32[2]) || 
(newtuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[3] != tuple->src.ip.s6_addr32[3])){ 
                          continue; 
                          } 
 
  } 
  
  if (!(mr->range[i].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED) 
      || proto->in_range(&newtuple, IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC, 
          &mr->range[i].min, &mr->range[i].max)){ 
 
   return 1; 
  } 
 } 
 return 0; 
} 
 
static inline int 
src_cmp(const struct ip6_nat_hash *i, 
 const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 





  == tuple->dst.protonum 
  && (i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[0] 
      == tuple->src.ip.s6_addr32[0]  
      && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[1] 
      == tuple->src.ip.s6_addr32[1]  
      && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[2] 
      == tuple->src.ip.s6_addr32[2]  
      && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[3] 
      == tuple->src.ip.s6_addr32[3] ) 
  && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple.src.u.all 
  == tuple->src.u.all 
   && in_range(tuple, 
       &i->conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL] 
       .tuple.src, 
       mr)); 
} 
 
/* Only called for SRC manip */ 
static struct ip6_conntrack_manip * 
find_appropriate_src(const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
       const struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr) 
{ 
 unsigned int h = hash_by_src(&tuple->src, tuple->dst.protonum); 
 struct ip6_nat_hash *i; 
 MUST_BE_READ_LOCKED(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 i = LIST_FIND(&bysource[h], src_cmp, struct ip6_nat_hash *, 
tuple, mr); 
 if (i){ 









/* Simple way to iterate through all. */ 
static inline int fake_cmp(const struct ip6_nat_hash *i, 
      struct in6_addr src, struct in6_addr dst, 
u_int16_t protonum, 
      unsigned int *score, 
      const struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack) 
{ 
 /* Compare backwards: we're dealing with OUTGOING tuples, and 
           inside the conntrack is the REPLY tuple.  Don't count this 
           conntrack. */ 
 if (i->conntrack != conntrack 
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     && (i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[0] == 
dst.s6_addr32[0]  
  && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[1] == 
dst.s6_addr32[1]  
  && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[2] == 
dst.s6_addr32[2]  
  && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.src.ip.s6_addr32[3] == 
dst.s6_addr32[3])  
     && (i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.ip.s6_addr32[0] == 
src.s6_addr32[0] 
  && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.ip.s6_addr32[1] == 
src.s6_addr32[1] 
  && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.ip.s6_addr32[2] == 
src.s6_addr32[2] 
  && i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.ip.s6_addr32[3] == 
src.s6_addr32[3]) 
     && (i->conntrack-
>tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.protonum 
  == protonum)) 
  (*score)++; 
 return 0; 
} 
 
static inline unsigned int 
count_maps(struct in6_addr src, struct in6_addr dst, u_int16_t 
protonum, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack) 
{ 
 unsigned int score = 0; 
 unsigned int h; 
 
 MUST_BE_READ_LOCKED(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 h = hash_by_ipsproto(src, dst, protonum); 
 LIST_FIND(&byipsproto[h], fake_cmp, struct ip6_nat_hash *, 
           src, dst, protonum, &score, conntrack); 
 
 return score; 
} 
 
/* For [FUTURE] fragmentation handling, we want the least-used 
   src-ip/dst-ip/proto triple.  Fairness doesn't come into it.  Thus 
   if the range specifies 1.2.3.4 ports 10000-10005 and 1.2.3.5 ports 
   1-65535, we don't do pro-rata allocation based on ports; we choose 
   the ip with the lowest src-ip/dst-ip/proto usage. 
 
   If an allocation then fails (eg. all 6 ports used in the 1.2.3.4 
   range), we eliminate that and try again.  This is not the most 
   efficient approach, but if you're worried about that, don't hand us 
   ranges you don't really have.  */ 
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static struct ip6_nat_range * 
find_best_ips_proto(struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
      const struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr, 
      const struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
      unsigned int hooknum) 
{ 
 unsigned int i; 
 struct { 
  const struct ip6_nat_range *range; 
  unsigned int score; 
  struct ip6_conntrack_tuple tuple; 
 } best = { NULL,  0xFFFFFFFF }; 
 struct in6_addr *var_ipp, *other_ipp, saved_ip, orig_dstip; 
 /*static unsigned int randomness;*/ 
 
 if (HOOK2MANIP(hooknum) == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC) { 
  var_ipp = &tuple->src.ip; 
  saved_ip = tuple->dst.ip; 
  other_ipp = &tuple->dst.ip; 
 } else { 
  var_ipp = &tuple->dst.ip; 
  saved_ip = tuple->src.ip; 
  other_ipp = &tuple->src.ip; 
 } 
 /* Don't do do_extra_mangle unless necessary (overrides 
           explicit socket bindings, for example) */ 
 orig_dstip = tuple->dst.ip; 
 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(mr->rangesize >= 1); 
 for (i = 0; i < mr->rangesize; i++) { 
  /* Host order */ 
   struct in6_addr minip, maxip;  /*, j;*/ 
 
  /* Don't do ranges which are already eliminated. */ 
  if (mr->range[i].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_FULL) { 
   continue; 
  } 
 
  if (mr->range[i].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS) { 
   minip.s6_addr32[0] = ntohl(mr-
>range[i].min_ip.s6_addr32[0]); 
   minip.s6_addr32[1] = ntohl(mr-
>range[i].min_ip.s6_addr32[1]); 
   minip.s6_addr32[2] = ntohl(mr-
>range[i].min_ip.s6_addr32[2]); 
   minip.s6_addr32[3] = ntohl(mr-
>range[i].min_ip.s6_addr32[3]); 
 
   maxip.s6_addr32[0] = ntohl(mr-
>range[i].max_ip.s6_addr32[0]); 
   maxip.s6_addr32[1] = ntohl(mr-
>range[i].max_ip.s6_addr32[1]); 
   maxip.s6_addr32[2] = ntohl(mr-
>range[i].max_ip.s6_addr32[2]); 
   maxip.s6_addr32[3] = ntohl(mr-
>range[i].max_ip.s6_addr32[3]); 
  }  
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  else { 
    minip.s6_addr32[0] = maxip.s6_addr32[0] = var_ipp-
>s6_addr32[0]; 
    minip.s6_addr32[1] = maxip.s6_addr32[1] = var_ipp-
>s6_addr32[1]; 
    minip.s6_addr32[2] = maxip.s6_addr32[2] = var_ipp-
>s6_addr32[2]; 
    minip.s6_addr32[3] = maxip.s6_addr32[3] = var_ipp-
>s6_addr32[3]; 
  } 
 
 
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - Not needed by our particular implementation. This function 
was ported, but commented out because it was not tested, and was not 
part of our implementation. Our basic NAT implementation did 
 * not necessitate port translation or multiple IP address translation, 
and so calculating   
 * random IP addresses to use was not needed. 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */ 
 
  /* 
  randomness++; 
  for (j = 0; j < maxip.s6_addr32[0] - minip.s6_addr32[0] + 
1; j++) { 
   unsigned int score; 
 
   var_ipp->s6_addr32[0] = htonl(minip.s6_addr32[0] + 
(randomness + j)  
      % (maxip.s6_addr32[0] - 
minip.s6_addr32[0] + 1)); 
 
    Reset the other ip in case it was mangled by 
   do_extra_mangle last time.  
   other_ipp->s6_addr32[0] = saved_ip.s6_addr32[0]; 
 
#ifdef CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL 
   if (hooknum == NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT 
       && var_ipp->s6_addr32[0] != 
orig_dstip.s6_addr32[0] 
       && !do_extra_mangle(var_ipp->s6_addr32[0], 
other_ipp.s6_addr32[0])) { 
    DEBUGP("Range %u  %u:%u:%u:%u rt failed!\n", 
           i, NIP6(var_ipp->s6_addr32[0])); 
     Can't route?  This whole range part is 
      probably screwed, but keep trying 
      anyway.  
    continue; 
   } 
#endif 
 
    Count how many others map onto this.  
   score = count_maps(tuple->src.ip.s6_addr32[0], tuple-
>dst.ip.s6_addr32[0], 
        tuple->dst.protonum, conntrack); 
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   if (score < best.score) { 
    Optimization: doesn't get any better than 
       this.  
    if (score == 0) 
     return (struct ip6_nat_range *) 
      &mr->range[i]; 
 
    best.score = score; 
    best.tuple = *tuple; 
    best.range = &mr->range[i]; 
   } 
  } 
  */ 





 *tuple = best.tuple; 
 
 /* Discard const. */ 
 return (struct ip6_nat_range *)best.range; 
} 
 
/* Fast version doesn't iterate through hash chains, but only handles 
   common case of single IP address (null NAT, masquerade) */ 
static struct ip6_nat_range * 
find_best_ips_proto_fast(struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
    const struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 




 if (mr->rangesize != 1 
     || (mr->range[0].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_FULL) 
     || ((mr->range[0].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS) 
  && (mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr32[0] != mr-
>range[0].max_ip.s6_addr32[0] 
      || mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr32[1] != mr-
>range[0].max_ip.s6_addr32[1] 
      || mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr32[2] != mr-
>range[0].max_ip.s6_addr32[2] 
      || mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr32[3] != mr-
>range[0].max_ip.s6_addr32[3]) 
 
  )){ 
    
 return find_best_ips_proto(tuple, mr, conntrack, hooknum); 
 } 
 if (mr->range[0].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS) { 
   if (HOOK2MANIP(hooknum) == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC){ 
  
   tuple->src.ip = mr->range[0].min_ip; 
 } 
  else { 
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   /* Only do extra mangle when required (breaks 
                           socket binding) */ 
#ifdef CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL 
   if ((tuple->dst.ip.s6_addr32[0] != mr-
>range[0].min_ip.s6_addr32[0] 
        || tuple->dst.ip.s6_addr32[1] != mr-
>range[0].min_ip.s6_addr32[1] 
        || tuple->dst.ip.s6_addr32[2] != mr-
>range[0].min_ip.s6_addr32[2] 
        || tuple->dst.ip.s6_addr32[3] != mr-
>range[0].min_ip.s6_addr32[3]) 
       && hooknum == NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT){ 
 
    return NULL; 
   } 
#endif 
 
   
   tuple->dst.ip = mr->range[0].min_ip; 
  } 
 } 
 
 /* Discard const. */ 
 
  




get_unique_tuple(struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
   const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *orig_tuple, 
   const struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mrr, 
   struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 




 struct ip6_nat_protocol *proto 
  = ip6_find_nat_proto(orig_tuple->dst.protonum); 
 struct ip6_nat_range *rptr; 
 unsigned int i; 
 int ret; 
 
 /* We temporarily use flags for marking full parts, but we 
    always clean up afterwards */ 
 struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr = (void *)mrr; 
 
 /* 1) If this srcip/proto/src-proto-part is currently mapped, 
    and that same mapping gives a unique tuple within the given 
    range, use that. 
 
    This is only required for source (ie. NAT/masq) mappings. 
    So far, we don't do local source mappings, so multiple 
    manips not an issue.  */ 
 
 
 if (hooknum == NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING) { 
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  struct ip6_conntrack_manip *manip; 
 
 
  manip = find_appropriate_src(orig_tuple, mr); 
 
  
  if (manip) { 
   /* Apply same source manipulation. */ 
   *tuple = ((struct ip6_conntrack_tuple) 
      { *manip, orig_tuple->dst }); 
   DEBUGP("get_unique_tuple: Found current src map\n"); 
 
 
 if (!ip6_nat_used_tuple(tuple, conntrack)){ 
    return 1; 
 } 
  } 
 } 
 
 /* 2) Select the least-used IP/proto combination in the given 
    range. 
 */ 
 *tuple = *orig_tuple; 
 
 while ((rptr = find_best_ips_proto_fast(tuple, mr, conntrack, 
hooknum)) 
        != NULL) { 
  DEBUGP("Found best for "); DUMP_TUPLE(tuple); 
  /* 3) The per-protocol part of the manip is made to 
     map into the range to make a unique tuple. */ 
 
  /* Only bother mapping if it's not already in range 
     and unique */ 
 
  if ((!(rptr->flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED) 
       || proto->in_range(tuple, HOOK2MANIP(hooknum), 
     &rptr->min, &rptr->max)) 
      && !ip6_nat_used_tuple(tuple, conntrack)) { 
  ret = 1; 
 
  goto clear_fulls; 
  } else { 
  
   if (proto->unique_tuple(tuple, rptr, 
      HOOK2MANIP(hooknum), 
      conntrack)) { 
    /* Must be unique. */ 
    IP6_NF_ASSERT(!ip6_nat_used_tuple(tuple, 
        conntrack)); 
  
    ret = 1; 
    goto clear_fulls; 
 
   } else if (HOOK2MANIP(hooknum) == IP6_NAT_MANIP_DST) 
{ 
    /* Try implicit source NAT; protocol 
                                   may be able to play with ports to 
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                                   make it unique. */ 
 
    struct ip6_nat_range r 
     = { IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS,  
         tuple->src.ip, tuple->src.ip, 
         { 0 }, { 0 } }; 
    DEBUGP("Trying implicit mapping\n"); 
 
    if (proto->unique_tuple(tuple, &r, 
       IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC, 
       conntrack)) { 
     /* Must be unique. */ 
 
     IP6_NF_ASSERT(!ip6_nat_used_tuple 
           (tuple, conntrack)); 
 
     ret = 1; 
     goto clear_fulls; 
    } 
   } 
   DEBUGP("Protocol can't get unique tuple %u.\n", 
          hooknum); 
  } 
 
  /* Eliminate that from range, and try again. */ 
 
  rptr->flags |= IP6_NAT_RANGE_FULL; 
  *tuple = *orig_tuple; 
 } 
 ret = 0; 
 
 clear_fulls: 
 /* Clear full flags. */ 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(mr->rangesize >= 1); 
 for (i = 0; i < mr->rangesize; i++) 
  mr->range[i].flags &= ~IP6_NAT_RANGE_FULL; 
 
 
 return ret; 
} 
 
static inline int 
helper_cmp(const struct ip6_nat_helper *helper, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple) 
{ 




/* Where to manip the reply packets (will be reverse manip). */ 
static unsigned int opposite_hook[NF_IP6_NUMHOOKS] 
= { [NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING] = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING, 
    [NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING] = NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING, 
#ifdef CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL 
    [NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT] = NF_IP6_LOCAL_IN, 






ip6_nat_setup_info(struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
    const struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr, 
    unsigned int hooknum) 
{ 
 struct ip6_conntrack_tuple new_tuple, inv_tuple, reply; 
 struct ip6_conntrack_tuple orig_tp; 
 struct ip6_nat_info *info = &conntrack->nat.info; 




 IP6_NF_ASSERT(hooknum == NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING 
       || hooknum == NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING 
       || hooknum == NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT); 
 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(info->num_manips < IP6_NAT_MAX_MANIPS); 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(!(info->initialized & (1 << HOOK2MANIP(hooknum)))); 
 
 /* What we've got will look like inverse of reply. Normally 
    this is what is in the conntrack, except for prior 
    manipulations (future optimization: if num_manips == 0, 
    orig_tp = 
    conntrack->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple) */ 
 
 ip6_invert_tuplepr(&orig_tp, 
         &conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple); 
#if 1 
 { 
 unsigned int i; 
 DEBUGP("Hook %u (%s), ", hooknum, 
        HOOK2MANIP(hooknum)==IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC ? "SRC" : "DST"); 
 DUMP_TUPLE(&orig_tp); 
 
 DEBUGP("Range %p: ", mr); 
 for (i = 0; i < mr->rangesize; i++) { 
  DEBUGP("%u:%s%s%s   %x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x -  
%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x %u - %u\n", 
         i, 
         (mr->range[i].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS) 
         ? " MAP_IPS" : "", 
         (mr->range[i].flags 
   & IP6_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED) 
         ? " PROTO_SPECIFIED" : "", 
         (mr->range[i].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_FULL) 
         ? " FULL" : "", 
         NIP6(mr->range[i].min_ip), 
         NIP6(mr->range[i].max_ip), 
         mr->range[i].min.all, 





 do { 
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  if (!get_unique_tuple(&new_tuple, &orig_tp, mr, conntrack, 
          hooknum)) { 
   DEBUGP("ip6_nat_setup_info: Can't get unique for 
%p.\n", 
          conntrack); 
   return NF_DROP; 
  } 
 





  DEBUGP("Hook %u (%s) %p\n", hooknum, 
         HOOK2MANIP(hooknum)==IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC ? "SRC" : 
"DST", 
         conntrack); 
  DEBUGP("Original: "); 
 
 
  DUMP_TUPLE(&orig_tp); 
  DEBUGP("New: "); 
 
 
  DUMP_TUPLE(&new_tuple); 
#endif 
 
  /* We now have two tuples (SRCIP/SRCPT/DSTIP/DSTPT): 
     the original (A/B/C/D') and the mangled one (E/F/G/H'). 
     We're only allowed to work with the SRC per-proto 
     part, so we create inverses of both to start, then 
     derive the other fields we need.  */ 
 
  /* Reply connection: simply invert the new tuple 
                   (G/H/E/F') */ 
 
  ip6_invert_tuplepr(&reply, &new_tuple); 
 
  /* Alter conntrack table so it recognizes replies. 




 } while (!ip6_conntrack_alter_reply(conntrack, &reply)); 
 
 /* FIXME: We can simply used existing conntrack reply tuple 
           here --RR */ 
 /* Create inverse of original: C/D/A/B' */ 
 
 ip6_invert_tuplepr(&inv_tuple, &orig_tp); 
 
 /* Has source changed?. */ 
 
 if (!ip6_ct_tuple_src_equal(&new_tuple, &orig_tp)) { 
 
  /* In this direction, a source manip. */ 
  info->manips[info->num_manips++] = 
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   ((struct ip6_nat_info_manip) 
    { IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL, hooknum, 




  IP6_NF_ASSERT(info->num_manips < IP6_NAT_MAX_MANIPS); 
 
 
  /* In the reverse direction, a destination manip. */ 
  info->manips[info->num_manips++] = 
   ((struct ip6_nat_info_manip) 
    { IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY, opposite_hook[hooknum], 
      IP6_NAT_MANIP_DST, orig_tp.src }); 
  IP6_NF_ASSERT(info->num_manips <= IP6_NAT_MAX_MANIPS); 
 } 
 
 /* Has destination changed? */ 
 if (!ip6_ct_tuple_dst_equal(&new_tuple, &orig_tp)) { 
 /* In this direction, a destination manip */ 
  info->manips[info->num_manips++] = 
   ((struct ip6_nat_info_manip) 
    { IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL, hooknum, 
      IP6_NAT_MANIP_DST, reply.src }); 
  IP6_NF_ASSERT(info->num_manips < IP6_NAT_MAX_MANIPS); 
  /* In the reverse direction, a source manip. */ 
  info->manips[info->num_manips++] = 
   ((struct ip6_nat_info_manip) 
    { IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY, opposite_hook[hooknum], 
      IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC, inv_tuple.src }); 
 
  IP6_NF_ASSERT(info->num_manips <= IP6_NAT_MAX_MANIPS); 
 } 
 
 /* If there's a helper, assign it; based on new tuple. */ 
 if (!conntrack->master){ 
  info->helper = LIST_FIND(&ip6_helpers, helper_cmp, struct 
ip6_nat_helper *, 
      &reply); 
 } 
 /* It's done. */ 
 info->initialized |= (1 << HOOK2MANIP(hooknum)); 
 if (in_hashes) { 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(info->bysource.conntrack); 
  ip6_replace_in_hashes(conntrack, info); 
 } else { 
  ip6_place_in_hashes(conntrack, info); 
 } 
 return NF_ACCEPT; 
} 
 
void ip6_replace_in_hashes(struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
         struct ip6_nat_info *info) 
{ 
 
 /* Source has changed, so replace in hashes. */ 
 unsigned int srchash 
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  = hash_by_src(&conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL] 
         .tuple.src, 
         conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL] 
         .tuple.dst.protonum); 
 /* We place packet as seen OUTGOUNG in byips_proto hash 
           (ie. reverse dst and src of reply packet. */ 
 unsigned int ipsprotohash 
  = hash_by_ipsproto(conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY] 
       .tuple.dst.ip, 
       conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY] 
       .tuple.src.ip, 
       conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY] 
       .tuple.dst.protonum); 
 




 list_prepend(&bysource[srchash], &info->bysource); 
 list_prepend(&byipsproto[ipsprotohash], &info->byipsproto); 
} 
 
void ip6_place_in_hashes(struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
       struct ip6_nat_info *info) 
{ 
 unsigned int srchash 
  = hash_by_src(&conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL] 
         .tuple.src, 
         conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL] 
         .tuple.dst.protonum); 
 /* We place packet as seen OUTGOUNG in byips_proto hash 
           (ie. reverse dst and src of reply packet. */ 
 unsigned int ipsprotohash 
  = hash_by_ipsproto(conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY] 
       .tuple.dst.ip, 
       conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY] 
       .tuple.src.ip, 
       conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY] 




 info->byipsproto.conntrack = conntrack; 
 info->bysource.conntrack = conntrack; 
 list_prepend(&bysource[srchash], &info->bysource); 





/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - The manip_pkt function necessitated some changes due to the 
introduction of  
 * a pseudo-header to ICMPv6 header checksum calculation and the 
removal of the IP header  
124 
 * checksum.  In IPv4, the checksum of the ICMP packet was calculated 
first, then the IP 
 * addresses were translated and an IP checksum calculated.  IPv6 no 
longer has a checksum 
 * in the header, so those checksum calculations were removed.  Since  
the translated IP addresses need to be part of the ICMP pseudo-header, 
the order of operations in this function 
 * was switched so that the IP addresses are translated first, then the 
upper layer header gets 
 * manipulated. 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */ 
 
/* Returns true if succeeded. */ 
static int 
manip_pkt(u_int16_t proto, 
   struct sk_buff **pskb, 
   unsigned int ipv6hdroff, 
   const struct ip6_conntrack_manip *manip, 
   enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype) 
{ 
 struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h; 
 (*pskb)->nfcache |= NFC_ALTERED; 
  if (!skb_ip6_make_writable(pskb, ipv6hdroff+sizeof(ipv6h))){ 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 ipv6h = (void *)(*pskb)->data + ipv6hdroff; 
 if (maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC) { 
 
 
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - IPv6 headers do not have checksums, therefore these checksum 
calculations are 
 * not necessary. The IPv4 code that was here:    
 * 
 * iph->check = ip_nat_cheat_check(~iph->saddr, manip->ip, 
 *     iph->check); 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */ 
 
   ipv6h->saddr = manip->ip; 
 
 } else { 
 
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - IPv6 headers do not have checksums, therefore these checksum 
calculations are 
 * not necessary. The IPv4 code that was here:    
 * 
 * iph->check = ip_nat_cheat_check(~iph->saddr, manip->ip, 
 *     iph->check); 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */  
 
125 




/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - This part manipulates the upper layer header information 
using the new IP addresses. 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */  
 
 /* Manipulate protcol part. */ 
 if (!ip6_find_nat_proto(proto)->manip_pkt(pskb, 
          ipv6hdroff + IPV6_HDR_LEN, 
      manip, maniptype)){ 
  return 0; 
 } 
 ipv6h = (void *)(*pskb)->data + ipv6hdroff; 
 return 1; 
} 
 
static inline int exp_for_packet(struct ip6_conntrack_expect *exp, 
            struct sk_buff *skb, 
     unsigned int dataoff) 
{ 
 struct ip6_conntrack_protocol *proto; 
 int ret = 1; 
 
 MUST_BE_READ_LOCKED(&ip6_conntrack_lock); 
 proto = __ip6_ct_find_proto(skb->nh.ipv6h->nexthdr); 
 if (proto->exp_matches_pkt) 
  ret = proto->exp_matches_pkt(exp, skb, dataoff); 
 
 return ret; 
} 
 
/* Do packet manipulations according to binding. */ 
unsigned int 
ip6_do_bindings(struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
     enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo, 
     struct ip6_nat_info *info, 
     unsigned int hooknum, 
     struct sk_buff **pskb, 
     unsigned int dataoff) 
{ 
 unsigned int i; 
 struct ip6_nat_helper *helper; 
 enum ip6_conntrack_dir dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); 
 int proto = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->nexthdr; 
 
 /* Need nat lock to protect against modification, but neither 
    conntrack (referenced) and helper (deleted with 




 for (i = 0; i < info->num_manips; i++) { 
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  if (info->manips[i].direction == dir 
      && info->manips[i].hooknum == hooknum) { 
   DEBUGP("Mangling %p: %s to  %x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x 
%u\n", 
          *pskb, 
          info->manips[i].maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC 
          ? "SRC" : "DST", 
          NIP6(info->manips[i].manip.ip), 
          htons(info->manips[i].manip.u.all)); 
   if (!manip_pkt(proto, pskb, 0, 
           &info->manips[i].manip, 
           info->manips[i].maniptype)) { 
 
    READ_UNLOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 
    return NF_DROP; 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 helper = info->helper; 
 READ_UNLOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 if (helper) { 
  struct ip6_conntrack_expect *exp = NULL; 
  struct list_head *cur_item; 
  int ret = NF_ACCEPT; 
  int helper_called = 0; 
  DEBUGP("ip6_do_bindings: helper existing for (%p)\n", ct); 
  /* Always defragged for helpers */ 
  IP6_NF_ASSERT(!((*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->frag_off 
          & htons(IP6_MF|IP6_OFFSET))); 
  /* Have to grab read lock before sibling_list traversal */ 
  READ_LOCK(&ip6_conntrack_lock); 
  list_for_each(cur_item, &ct->sibling_list) {  
   exp = list_entry(cur_item, struct 
ip6_conntrack_expect,  
      expected_list); 
  /* if this expectation is already established, skip */ 
 if (exp->sibling){ 
    continue; 
 } 
   if (exp_for_packet(exp, *pskb, dataoff)) { 
    /* FIXME: May be true multiple times in the 
     * case of UDP!! */ 
    DEBUGP("calling nat helper (exp=%p) for 
packet\n", exp); 
    ret = helper->help(ct, exp, info, ctinfo,  
        hooknum, pskb); 
    if (ret != NF_ACCEPT) { 
     READ_UNLOCK(&ip6_conntrack_lock); 
     return ret; 
    } 
   helper_called = 1; 
   } 
  } 
  /* Helper might want to manip the packet even when there is 
no 
   * matching expectation for this packet */ 
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  if (!helper_called && helper->flags & 
IP6_NAT_HELPER_F_ALWAYS) { 
   DEBUGP("calling nat helper for packet without 
expectation\n"); 
   ret = helper->help(ct, NULL, info, ctinfo,  
        hooknum, pskb); 
   if (ret != NF_ACCEPT) { 
    READ_UNLOCK(&ip6_conntrack_lock); 
    return ret; 
   } 
  } 
  READ_UNLOCK(&ip6_conntrack_lock); 
  
  /* Adjust sequence number only once per packet  
   * (helper is called at all hooks) */ 
 
  if (proto == IPPROTO_TCP 
      && (hooknum == NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING 
   || hooknum == NF_IP6_LOCAL_IN)) { 
   DEBUGP("ip6_nat_core: adjusting sequence number\n"); 
   /* future: put this in a l4-proto specific function, 
    * and call this function here. */ 
 if (!ip6_nat_seq_adjust(pskb, ct, ctinfo)){ 
    ret = NF_DROP; 
 } 
  } 
  return ret; 
 } else { 
  return NF_ACCEPT; 
 } 




icmpv6_reply_translation(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
         struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
         unsigned int hooknum, 
         int dir) 
{ 
 struct { 
  struct icmp6hdr icmp; 
  struct ipv6hdr ip; 
 } *inside; 
 unsigned int i; 
 struct ip6_nat_info *info = &conntrack->nat.info; 
 int hdrlen; 
 if (!skb_ip6_make_writable(pskb, IPV6_HDR_LEN + sizeof(*inside))) 
  return 0; 
 inside = (void *)(*pskb)->data + IPV6_HDR_LEN; 
 
 /* We're actually going to mangle it beyond trivial checksum 
    adjustment, so make sure the current checksum is correct. */ 
 
 if ((*pskb)->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) { 




 /* Must be RELATED */ 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT((*pskb)->nfct 
       - (struct ip6_conntrack *)(*pskb)->nfct->master 
       == IP6_CT_RELATED 
       || (*pskb)->nfct 
       - (struct ip6_conntrack *)(*pskb)->nfct->master 
       == IP6_CT_RELATED+IP6_CT_IS_REPLY); 
 /* Redirects on non-null nats must be dropped, else they'll 
           start talking to each other without our translation, and be 
           confused... --RR */ 
 
  
 DEBUGP("icmpv6_reply_translation: translating error %p hook %u 
dir %s\n", 
        *pskb, hooknum, dir == IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL ? "ORIG" : 
"REPLY"); 
 /* Note: May not be from a NAT'd host, but probably safest to 
    do translation always as if it came from the host itself 
    (even though a "host unreachable" coming from the host 
    itself is a bit weird). 
 
    More explanation: some people use NAT for anonymizing. 
    Also, CERT recommends dropping all packets from private IP 
    addresses (although ICMP errors from internal links with 
    such addresses are not too uncommon, as Alan Cox points 
    out) */ 
  
 READ_LOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 for (i = 0; i < info->num_manips; i++) { 
  DEBUGP("icmpv6_reply: manip %u dir %s hook %u\n", 
         i, info->manips[i].direction == IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL 
? 
         "ORIG" : "REPLY", info->manips[i].hooknum); 
 
  if (info->manips[i].direction != dir){ 
    continue; 
  } 
 
  /* Mapping the inner packet is just like a normal 
     packet, except it was never src/dst reversed, so 
     where we would normally apply a dst manip, we apply 
     a src, and vice versa. */ 
 
  if (info->manips[i].hooknum == hooknum) { 
   DEBUGP("icmpv6_reply: inner %s ->  
%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x %u\n", 
          info->manips[i].maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC 
          ? "DST" : "SRC", 
          NIP6(info->manips[i].manip.ip), 
          ntohs(info->manips[i].manip.u.udp.port)); 
 
   if (!manip_pkt(inside->ip.nexthdr, pskb, 
           IPV6_HDR_LEN 
           + sizeof(inside->icmp), 
           &info->manips[i].manip, 




   } 
   /* Outer packet needs to have IP header NATe}d like 
                    it's a reply. */ 
 
   /* Use mapping to map outer packet: 0 give no 
                           per-proto mapping */ 
   DEBUGP("icmpv6_reply: outer %s ->  
%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x \n", 
          info->manips[i].maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC 
          ? "SRC" : "DST", 
          NIP6(info->manips[i].manip.ip)); 
   if (!manip_pkt(0, pskb, 0, 
           &info->manips[i].manip, 
           info->manips[i].maniptype)){ 
      
 
goto unlock_fail; 
   } 




 hdrlen = IPV6_HDR_LEN; 
 
 inside = (void *)(*pskb)->data + IPV6_HDR_LEN; 
 
  struct in6_addr *saddrtmp, *daddrtmp; 
  struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb; 
 
 saddrtmp = &skb->nh.ipv6h->saddr; 
   daddrtmp = &skb->nh.ipv6h->daddr; 
 
 inside->icmp.icmp6_cksum = 0; 
 
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - Here we use the csum_ipv6_magic and csum_partial functions 
to calculate the  
 * ICMPv6 header checksum.  csum_partial determines the checksum for 
just the ICMPv6 header 
 * but does not flip the bits at the end.  This is then folded into the 
pseudo-header checksum 
 * calculation done by csum_ipv6_magic, which then yields a proper 
checksum for the entire 
 * ICMPv6 header and pseudo-header combination. 
 * 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */  
 
 
inside->icmp.icmp6_cksum = csum_ipv6_magic(saddrtmp, daddrtmp, (*pskb)-
>len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), IPPROTO_ICMPV6, 
 csum_partial((char *)&inside->icmp, (*pskb)->len - sizeof(struct 
ipv6hdr), 0)); 
 




 return 0; 
} 
 
int __init ip6_nat_init(void) 
 
{ 
 size_t i; 
 /* Leave them the same for the moment. */ 
 ip6_nat_htable_size = ip6_conntrack_htable_size; 
 
 /* One vmalloc for both hash tables */ 
 bysource = vmalloc(sizeof(struct list_head) * 
ip6_nat_htable_size*2); 
 if (!bysource) { 
  return -ENOMEM; 
 } 
 byipsproto = bysource + ip6_nat_htable_size; 
 
 /* Sew in builtin protocols. */ 
 WRITE_LOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 list_append(&ip6_protos, &ip6_nat_protocol_tcp); 
 list_append(&ip6_protos, &ip6_nat_protocol_udp); 
 list_append(&ip6_protos, &ip6_nat_protocol_icmp); 
 WRITE_UNLOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 
 for (i = 0; i < ip6_nat_htable_size; i++) { 
  INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bysource[i]); 
  INIT_LIST_HEAD(&byipsproto[i]); 
 } 
 
 /* FIXME: Man, this is a hack.  <SIGH> */ 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(ip6_conntrack_destroyed == NULL); 
 ip6_conntrack_destroyed = &ip6_nat_cleanup_conntrack; 
 
 return 0; 
} 
 
/* Clear NAT section of all conntracks, in case we're loaded again. */ 
static int clean_nat(const struct ip6_conntrack *i, void *data) 
{ 
 memset((void *)&i->nat, 0, sizeof(i->nat)); 
 return 0; 
} 
 




 ip6_ct_selective_cleanup(&clean_nat, NULL); 









 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: include/linux/ip_nat_core.h 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 







/* This header used to share core functionality between the standalone 
   NAT module, and the compatibility layer's use of NAT for 
masquerading. */ 
extern int ip6_nat_init(void); 
extern void ip6_nat_cleanup(void); 
 
extern unsigned int ip6_do_bindings(struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
    enum ip6_conntrack_info conntrackinfo, 
    struct ip6_nat_info *info, 
    unsigned int hooknum, 
    struct sk_buff **pskb, 
    unsigned int dataoff); 
 
extern struct list_head ip6_protos; 
 
extern int icmpv6_reply_translation(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
      struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
      unsigned int hooknum, 
      int dir); 
 
extern void ip6_replace_in_hashes(struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
         struct ip6_nat_info *info); 
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extern void ip6_place_in_hashes(struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
       struct ip6_nat_info *info); 
 
/* Built-in protocols. */ 
extern struct ip6_nat_protocol ip6_nat_protocol_tcp; 
extern struct ip6_nat_protocol ip6_nat_protocol_udp; 
extern struct ip6_nat_protocol ip6_nat_protocol_icmp; 





















































 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_helper.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * This file was ported, yet due to the scope of this thesis, no helper 
 * files were used. This file was not tested. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
/* ip_nat_helper.c - generic support functions for NAT helpers  
 * 
 * (C) 2000-2002 Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org> 
 * (C) 2003-2004 Netfilter Core Team <coreteam@netfilter.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 
 * published by the Free Software Foundation. 
 * 
 *  14 Jan 2002 Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>: 
 *  - add support for SACK adjustment  
 * 14 Mar 2002 Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>: 
 *  - merge SACK support into newnat API 
 * 16 Aug 2002 Brian J. Murrell <netfilter@interlinx.bc.ca>: 
 *  - make ip_nat_resize_packet more generic (TCP and UDP) 

















#define IPV6_HDR_LEN (sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) 
#define ASSERT_READ_LOCK(x) MUST_BE_READ_LOCKED(&ip6_nat_lock) 











#define DEBUGP printk 
#define DUMP_OFFSET(x) printk("offset_before=%d, offset_after=%d, 
correction_pos=%u\n", x->offset_before, x->offset_after, x-
>correction_pos); 
#else 






/* Setup TCP sequence correction given this change at this sequence */ 
static inline void  
adjust_tcp_sequence(u32 seq, 
      int sizediff, 
      struct ip6_conntrack *ct,  
      enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo) 
{ 
 int dir; 
 struct ip6_nat_seq *this_way, *other_way; 
 
 DEBUGP("ip6_nat_resize_packet: old_size = %u, new_size = %u\n", 
  (*skb)->len, new_size); 
 
 dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); 
 
 this_way = &ct->nat.info.seq[dir]; 
 other_way = &ct->nat.info.seq[!dir]; 
 





 /* SYN adjust. If it's uninitialized, of this is after last 
  * correction, record it: we don't handle more than one 
  * adjustment in the window, but do deal with common case of a 
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  * retransmit */ 
 if (this_way->offset_before == this_way->offset_after 
     || before(this_way->correction_pos, seq)) { 
      this_way->correction_pos = seq; 
      this_way->offset_before = this_way->offset_after; 




 DEBUGP("ip6_nat_resize_packet: Seq_offset after: "); 
 DUMP_OFFSET(this_way); 
} 
/* Frobs data inside this packet, which is linear. */ 
static void mangle_contents(struct sk_buff *skb, 
       unsigned int dataoff, 
       unsigned int match_offset, 
       unsigned int match_len, 
       const char *rep_buffer, 
       unsigned int rep_len) 
{ 
 unsigned char *data; 
 
 BUG_ON(skb_is_nonlinear(skb)); 
 data = (unsigned char *)skb->nh.ipv6h + dataoff; 
 
 /* move post-replacement */ 
 memmove(data + match_offset + rep_len, 
  data + match_offset + match_len, 
  skb->tail - (data + match_offset + match_len)); 
 
 /* insert data from buffer */ 
 memcpy(data + match_offset, rep_buffer, rep_len); 
 
 /* update skb info */ 
 if (rep_len > match_len) { 
  DEBUGP("ip6_nat_mangle_packet: Extending packet by " 
   "%u from %u bytes\n", rep_len - match_len, 
         skb->len); 
  skb_put(skb, rep_len - match_len); 
 } else { 
  DEBUGP("ip6_nat_mangle_packet: Shrinking packet from " 
   "%u from %u bytes\n", match_len - rep_len, 
         skb->len); 





/* Unusual, but possible case. */ 
static int enlarge_skb(struct sk_buff **pskb, unsigned int extra) 
{ 
 struct sk_buff *nskb; 
 
 if ((*pskb)->len + extra > 65535) 
  return 0; 
 
136 
 nskb = skb_copy_expand(*pskb, skb_headroom(*pskb), extra, 
GFP_ATOMIC); 
 if (!nskb) 
  return 0; 
 
 /* Transfer socket to new skb. */ 
 if ((*pskb)->sk) 
  skb_set_owner_w(nskb, (*pskb)->sk); 
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_DEBUG 
 nskb->nf_debug = (*pskb)->nf_debug; 
#endif 
 kfree_skb(*pskb); 
 *pskb = nskb; 
 return 1; 
} 
 
/* Generic function for mangling variable-length address changes inside 
 * NATed TCP connections (like the PORT XXX,XXX,XXX,XXX,XXX,XXX 
 * command in FTP). 
 * 
 * Takes care about all the nasty sequence number changes, 
checksumming, 
 * skb enlargement, ... 
 * 
 * */ 
 
static __inline__ u16 tcp_v6_check(struct tcphdr *th, int len, 
       struct in6_addr *saddr,  
       struct in6_addr *daddr,  
       unsigned long base) 
{ 




ip6_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
    struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
    enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo, 
    unsigned int match_offset, 
    unsigned int match_len, 
    const char *rep_buffer, 
    unsigned int rep_len) 
{ 
 struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h; 
 struct tcphdr *tcph; 
 
 int datalen; 
 
 if (!skb_ip6_make_writable(pskb, (*pskb)->len)) 
  return 0; 
 
 if (rep_len > match_len 
     && rep_len - match_len > skb_tailroom(*pskb) 
     && !enlarge_skb(pskb, rep_len - match_len)) 





 ipv6h = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h; 
 tcph = (void *)ipv6h + IPV6_HDR_LEN; 
 
 mangle_contents(*pskb, IPV6_HDR_LEN + tcph->doff*4, 
   match_offset, match_len, rep_buffer, rep_len); 
 
 datalen = (*pskb)->len - IPV6_HDR_LEN; 
 
 tcph->check = 0; 
 tcph->check = tcp_v6_check(tcph, datalen, &ipv6h->saddr, &ipv6h-
>daddr, 
       csum_partial((char *)tcph, datalen, 0)); 
        
 adjust_tcp_sequence(ntohl(tcph->seq), 
       (int)rep_len - (int)match_len, 
       ct, ctinfo); 
 return 1; 
} 
    
/* Generic function for mangling variable-length address changes inside 
 * NATed UDP connections (like the CONNECT DATA XXXXX MESG XXXXX INDEX 
XXXXX 
 * command in the Amanda protocol) 
 * 
 * Takes care about all the nasty sequence number changes, 
checksumming, 
 * skb enlargement, ... 
 * 
 * XXX - This function could be merged with ip_nat_mangle_tcp_packet 
which 
 *       should be fairly easy to do. 
 */ 
int  
ip6_nat_mangle_udp_packet(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
    struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
    enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo, 
    unsigned int match_offset, 
    unsigned int match_len, 
    const char *rep_buffer, 
    unsigned int rep_len) 
{ 
 struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h; 
 struct udphdr *udph; 
 
 /* UDP helpers might accidentally mangle the wrong packet */ 
 ipv6h = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h; 
 if ((*pskb)->len < IPV6_HDR_LEN + sizeof(*udph) +  
                        match_offset + match_len) 
  return 0; 
 
 if (!skb_ip6_make_writable(pskb, (*pskb)->len)) 
  return 0; 
 
 if (rep_len > match_len 
     && rep_len - match_len > skb_tailroom(*pskb) 
     && !enlarge_skb(pskb, rep_len - match_len)) 
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  return 0; 
 
 ipv6h = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h; 
 udph = (void *)ipv6h + IPV6_HDR_LEN; 
 mangle_contents(*pskb, IPV6_HDR_LEN + sizeof(*udph), 
   match_offset, match_len, rep_buffer, rep_len); 
 
 /* update the length of the UDP packet */ 
 udph->len = htons((*pskb)->len - IPV6_HDR_LEN); 
 
 /* fix udp checksum if udp checksum was previously calculated */ 
 if (udph->check) { 
  int datalen = (*pskb)->len - IPV6_HDR_LEN; 
  udph->check = 0; 
  udph->check = csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6h->saddr, &ipv6h->daddr, 
                                  datalen, IPPROTO_UDP, 
                                  csum_partial((char *)udph, 
                                               datalen, 0)); 
 } 
 
 return 1; 
} 
 
/* Adjust one found SACK option including checksum correction */ 
static void 
sack_adjust(struct sk_buff *skb, 
     struct tcphdr *tcph,  
     unsigned int sackoff, 
     unsigned int sackend, 
     struct ip6_nat_seq *natseq) 
{ 
 while (sackoff < sackend) { 
  struct tcp_sack_block *sack; 
  u_int32_t new_start_seq, new_end_seq; 
 
  sack = (void *)skb->data + sackoff; 
  if (after(ntohl(sack->start_seq) - natseq->offset_before, 
     natseq->correction_pos)) 
   new_start_seq = ntohl(sack->start_seq)  
     - natseq->offset_after; 
  else 
   new_start_seq = ntohl(sack->start_seq)  
     - natseq->offset_before; 
  new_start_seq = htonl(new_start_seq); 
 
  if (after(ntohl(sack->end_seq) - natseq->offset_before, 
     natseq->correction_pos)) 
   new_end_seq = ntohl(sack->end_seq) 
          - natseq->offset_after; 
  else 
   new_end_seq = ntohl(sack->end_seq) 
          - natseq->offset_before; 
  new_end_seq = htonl(new_end_seq); 
 
  DEBUGP("sack_adjust: start_seq: %d->%d, end_seq: %d->%d\n", 
   ntohl(sack->start_seq), new_start_seq, 
   ntohl(sack->end_seq), new_end_seq); 
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  tcph->check =  
   ip6_int_nat_cheat_check(~sack->start_seq, 
new_start_seq, 
        ip6_int_nat_cheat_check(~sack-
>end_seq,  
                new_end_seq, 
             tcph->check)); 
  sack->start_seq = new_start_seq; 
  sack->end_seq = new_end_seq; 




/* TCP SACK sequence number adjustment */ 
static inline unsigned int 
ip6_nat_sack_adjust(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
     struct tcphdr *tcph, 
     struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
     enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo) 
{ 
 unsigned int dir, optoff, optend; 
 
 optoff = IPV6_HDR_LEN + sizeof(struct tcphdr); 
 optend = IPV6_HDR_LEN + tcph->doff*4; 
 
 if (!skb_ip6_make_writable(pskb, optend)) 
  return 0; 
 
 dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); 
 
 while (optoff < optend) { 
  /* Usually: option, length. */ 
  unsigned char *op = (*pskb)->data + optoff; 
 
  switch (op[0]) { 
  case TCPOPT_EOL: 
   return 1; 
  case TCPOPT_NOP: 
   optoff++; 
   continue; 
  default: 
   /* no partial options */ 
   if (optoff + 1 == optend 
       || optoff + op[1] > optend 
       || op[1] < 2) 
    return 0; 
   if (op[0] == TCPOPT_SACK 
       && op[1] >= 2+TCPOLEN_SACK_PERBLOCK 
       && ((op[1] - 2) % TCPOLEN_SACK_PERBLOCK) == 0) 
    sack_adjust(*pskb, tcph, optoff+2, 
         optoff+op[1], 
         &ct->nat.info.seq[!dir]); 
   optoff += op[1]; 
  } 
 } 




/* TCP sequence number adjustment.  Returns true or false.  */ 
int 
ip6_nat_seq_adjust(struct sk_buff **pskb,  
    struct ip6_conntrack *ct,  
    enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo) 
{ 
 struct tcphdr *tcph; 
 int dir, newseq, newack; 
 struct ip6_nat_seq *this_way, *other_way;  
 
 dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); 
 
 this_way = &ct->nat.info.seq[dir]; 
 other_way = &ct->nat.info.seq[!dir]; 
 
 /* No adjustments to make?  Very common case. */ 
 if (!this_way->offset_before && !this_way->offset_after 
     && !other_way->offset_before && !other_way->offset_after) 
  return 1; 
 
 if (!skb_ip6_make_writable(pskb, IPV6_HDR_LEN+sizeof(*tcph))) 
  return 0; 
 
 tcph = (void *)(*pskb)->data + IPV6_HDR_LEN; 
 if (after(ntohl(tcph->seq), this_way->correction_pos)) 
  newseq = ntohl(tcph->seq) + this_way->offset_after; 
 else 
  newseq = ntohl(tcph->seq) + this_way->offset_before; 
 newseq = htonl(newseq); 
 
 if (after(ntohl(tcph->ack_seq) - other_way->offset_before, 
    other_way->correction_pos)) 
  newack = ntohl(tcph->ack_seq) - other_way->offset_after; 
 else 
  newack = ntohl(tcph->ack_seq) - other_way->offset_before; 
 newack = htonl(newack); 
 
 tcph->check = ip6_int_nat_cheat_check(~tcph->seq, newseq, 
      ip6_int_nat_cheat_check(~tcph->ack_seq,  
            newack,  
           tcph->check)); 
 
 DEBUGP("Adjusting sequence number from %u->%u, ack from %u-
>%u\n", 
  ntohl(tcph->seq), ntohl(newseq), ntohl(tcph->ack_seq), 
  ntohl(newack)); 
 
 tcph->seq = newseq; 
 tcph->ack_seq = newack; 
 
 return ip6_nat_sack_adjust(pskb, tcph, ct, ctinfo); 
} 
 
static inline int 
helper_cmp(const struct ip6_nat_helper *helper, 
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    const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple) 
{ 




int ip6_nat_helper_register(struct ip6_nat_helper *me) 
{ 
 int ret = 0; 
 
 WRITE_LOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 if (LIST_FIND(&ip6_helpers, helper_cmp, struct ip6_nat_helper 
*,&me->tuple)) 
  ret = -EBUSY; 
 else 
  list_prepend(&ip6_helpers, me); 
 WRITE_UNLOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 




kill_helper(const struct ip6_conntrack *i, void *helper) 
{ 
 int ret; 
 
 READ_LOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 ret = (i->nat.info.helper == helper); 
 READ_UNLOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 
 return ret; 
} 
 
void ip6_nat_helper_unregister(struct ip6_nat_helper *me) 
{ 
 WRITE_LOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 /* Autoloading conntrack helper might have failed */ 
 if (LIST_FIND(&ip6_helpers, helper_cmp, struct ip6_nat_helper 
*,&me->tuple)) { 




 /* Someone could be still looking at the helper in a bh. */ 
 synchronize_net(); 
 
 /* Find anything using it, and umm, kill them.  We can't turn 
    them into normal connections: if we've adjusted SYNs, then 
    they'll ackstorm.  So we just drop it.  We used to just 
    bump module count when a connection existed, but that 
    forces admins to gen fake RSTs or bounce box, either of 
    which is just a long-winded way of making things 
    worse. --RR */ 







 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: include/linux/ip_nat_helper.h 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * This file was ported, yet due to the scope of the thesis, no helper 
 * files were used. This file was not tested. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 











/* Flags */ 
/* NAT helper must be called on every packet (for TCP) */ 




 struct list_head list;  /* Internal use */ 
 
 const char *name;  /* name of the module */ 
 unsigned char flags;  /* Flags (see above) */ 
 struct module *me;  /* pointer to self */ 
  
 /* Mask of things we will help: vs. tuple from server */ 
 struct ip6_conntrack_tuple tuple; 
 struct ip6_conntrack_tuple mask; 
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 /* Helper function: returns verdict */ 
 unsigned int (*help)(struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
        struct ip6_conntrack_expect *exp, 
        struct ip6_nat_info *info, 
        enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo, 
        unsigned int hooknum, 
        struct sk_buff **pskb); 
 
 /* Returns verdict and sets up NAT for this connection */ 
 unsigned int (*expect)(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
          unsigned int hooknum, 
          struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
          struct ip6_nat_info *info); 
}; 
 
extern struct list_head ip6_helpers; 
 
extern int ip6_nat_helper_register(struct ip6_nat_helper *me); 
extern void ip6_nat_helper_unregister(struct ip6_nat_helper *me); 
 
/* These return true or false. */ 
extern int ip6_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(struct sk_buff **skb, 
    struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
    enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo, 
    unsigned int match_offset, 
    unsigned int match_len, 
    const char *rep_buffer, 
    unsigned int rep_len); 
extern int ip6_nat_mangle_udp_packet(struct sk_buff **skb, 
    struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
    enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo, 
    unsigned int match_offset, 
    unsigned int match_len, 
    const char *rep_buffer, 
    unsigned int rep_len); 
extern int ip6_nat_seq_adjust(struct sk_buff **pskb,  
        struct ip6_conntrack *ct,  






















 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_proto_icmp.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
/* (C) 1999-2001 Paul `Rusty' Russell 
 * (C) 2002-2004 Netfilter Core Team <coreteam@netfilter.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 

















icmpv6_in_range(const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
       enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype, 
       const union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto *min, 
       const union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto *max) 
{ 
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 return (tuple->src.u.icmpv6.id >= min->icmpv6.id 




icmpv6_unique_tuple(struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
    const struct ip6_nat_range *range, 
    enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack) 
{ 
 static u_int16_t id; 
 unsigned int range_size 
  = (unsigned int)range->max.icmpv6.id - range->min.icmpv6.id 
+ 1; 
 unsigned int i; 
 
 /* If no range specified... */ 
 if (!(range->flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED)) 
  range_size = 0xFFFF; 
 
 for (i = 0; i < range_size; i++, id++) { 
  tuple->src.u.icmpv6.id = range->min.icmpv6.id + (id % 
range_size); 
  if (!ip6_nat_used_tuple(tuple, conntrack)) 
   return 1; 
 } 




icmpv6_manip_pkt(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
        unsigned int hdroff, 
        const struct ip6_conntrack_manip *manip, 
        enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype) 
{ 
 
struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb; 
 struct icmp6hdr *hdr; 
 
 
 if (!skb_ip6_make_writable(pskb, hdroff + sizeof(hdr))){ 
 
  return 0; 
 } 
 hdr = (void *)(*pskb)->data + hdroff; 
  
 struct in6_addr *saddr, *daddr; 
 
 saddr = &skb->nh.ipv6h->saddr; 
   daddr = &skb->nh.ipv6h->daddr; 
 
 hdr->icmp6_cksum = 0; 
 
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - Here we use the csum_ipv6_magic and csum_partial functions 
to calculate the  
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 * ICMPv6 header checksum.  csum_partial determines the checksum for 
just the ICMPv6 header 
 * but does not flip the bits at the end.  This is then folded into the 
pseudo-header checksum 
 * calculation done by csum_ipv6_magic, which then yields a proper 
checksum for the entire 
 * ICMPv6 header and pseudo-header combination. 
 * 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */  
 hdr->icmp6_cksum = csum_ipv6_magic(saddr, 
        daddr,  (*pskb)->len - sizeof(struct 
ipv6hdr), 
        IPPROTO_ICMPV6, 
csum_partial((char *)hdr, (*pskb)->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), 0)); 
 
 
 hdr->icmp6_dataun.u_echo.identifier = manip->u.icmpv6.id; 
 
 return 1; 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
icmpv6_print(char *buffer, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *match, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *mask) 
{ 
 unsigned int len = 0; 
 
 if (mask->src.u.icmpv6.id) 
  len += sprintf(buffer + len, "id=%u ", 
          ntohs(match->src.u.icmpv6.id)); 
 
 if (mask->dst.u.icmpv6.type) 
  len += sprintf(buffer + len, "type=%u ", 
          ntohs(match->dst.u.icmpv6.type)); 
 
 if (mask->dst.u.icmpv6.code) 
  len += sprintf(buffer + len, "code=%u ", 
          ntohs(match->dst.u.icmpv6.code)); 
 
 return len; 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
icmpv6_print_range(char *buffer, const struct ip6_nat_range *range) 
{ 
 if (range->min.icmpv6.id != 0 || range->max.icmpv6.id != 0xFFFF) 
  return sprintf(buffer, "id %u-%u ", 
          ntohs(range->min.icmpv6.id), 
          ntohs(range->max.icmpv6.id)); 
 else return 0; 
} 
 
struct ip6_nat_protocol ip6_nat_protocol_icmp 
= { { NULL, NULL }, "ICMP", IPPROTO_ICMPV6, 
    icmpv6_manip_pkt, 
147 
    icmpv6_in_range, 
    icmpv6_unique_tuple, 
    icmpv6_print, 

























































 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_proto_tcp.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
/* (C) 1999-2001 Paul `Rusty' Russell 
 * (C) 2002-2004 Netfilter Core Team <coreteam@netfilter.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 
















tcp_in_range(const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
      enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype, 
      const union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto *min, 
      const union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto *max) 
{ 
 u_int16_t port; 
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 if (maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC) 
  port = tuple->src.u.tcp.port; 
 else 
  port = tuple->dst.u.tcp.port; 
 
 return ntohs(port) >= ntohs(min->tcp.port) 




tcp_unique_tuple(struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
   const struct ip6_nat_range *range, 
   enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype, 
   const struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack) 
{ 
 static u_int16_t port, *portptr; 
 unsigned int range_size, min, i; 
 
 if (maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC) 
  portptr = &tuple->src.u.tcp.port; 
 else 
  portptr = &tuple->dst.u.tcp.port; 
 
 /* If no range specified... */ 
 if (!(range->flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED)) { 
  /* If it's dst rewrite, can't change port */ 
  if (maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_DST) 
   return 0; 
 
  /* Map privileged onto privileged. */ 
  if (ntohs(*portptr) < 1024) { 
   /* Loose convention: >> 512 is credential passing */ 
   if (ntohs(*portptr)<512) { 
    min = 1; 
    range_size = 511 - min + 1; 
   } else { 
    min = 600; 
    range_size = 1023 - min + 1; 
   } 
  } else { 
   min = 1024; 
   range_size = 65535 - 1024 + 1; 
  } 
 } else { 
  min = ntohs(range->min.tcp.port); 
  range_size = ntohs(range->max.tcp.port) - min + 1; 
 } 
 
 for (i = 0; i < range_size; i++, port++) { 
  *portptr = htons(min + port % range_size); 
  if (!ip6_nat_used_tuple(tuple, conntrack)) { 
   return 1; 
  } 
 } 





tcp_manip_pkt(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
       unsigned int hdroff, 
       const struct ip6_conntrack_manip *manip, 
       enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype) 
{ 
 struct tcphdr *hdr; 
 struct in6_addr oldip; 
 u_int16_t *portptr, oldport; 
 int hdrsize = 8; /* TCP connection tracking guarantees this much 
*/ 
 
 /* this could be a inner header returned in icmp packet; in such 
    cases we cannot update the checksum field since it is outside 
of 
    the 8 bytes of transport layer headers we are guaranteed */ 
 if ((*pskb)->len >= hdroff + sizeof(struct tcphdr)) 
  hdrsize = sizeof(struct tcphdr); 
 
 if (!skb_ip6_make_writable(pskb, hdroff + hdrsize)) 
  return 0; 
 
 hdr = (void *)(*pskb)->data + hdroff; 
 
 if (maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC) { 
  /* Get rid of src ip and src pt */ 
  oldip = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->saddr; 
 
  portptr = &hdr->source; 
 } else { 
  /* Get rid of dst ip and dst pt */ 
  oldip = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->daddr; 
  portptr = &hdr->dest; 
 } 
 
 oldport = *portptr; 
 *portptr = manip->u.tcp.port; 
 
 if (hdrsize < sizeof(*hdr)) 
   return 1; 
 
 hdr->check = 0;  
 
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - Here we use the csum_ipv6_magic and csum_partial functions 
to calculate the  
 * TCP header checksum.  csum_partial determines the checksum for just 
the TCP header 
 * but does not flip the bits at the end.  This is then folded into the 
pseudo-header checksum 
 * calculation done by csum_ipv6_magic, which then yields a proper 
checksum for the entire 
 * TCP header and pseudo-header combination. 
 * 
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 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */  
 
 hdr->check = csum_ipv6_magic(&(*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->saddr, 
           &(*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->daddr, 
           (*pskb)->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), 
           IPPROTO_TCP,  
           csum_partial((char *)hdr, (*pskb)->len - 





static unsigned int 
tcp_print(char *buffer, 
   const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *match, 
   const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *mask) 
{ 
 unsigned int len = 0; 
 
 if (mask->src.u.tcp.port) 
  len += sprintf(buffer + len, "srcpt=%u ", 
          ntohs(match->src.u.tcp.port)); 
 
 
 if (mask->dst.u.tcp.port) 
  len += sprintf(buffer + len, "dstpt=%u ", 
          ntohs(match->dst.u.tcp.port)); 
 
 return len; 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
tcp_print_range(char *buffer, const struct ip6_nat_range *range) 
{ 
 if (range->min.tcp.port != 0 || range->max.tcp.port != 0xFFFF) { 
  if (range->min.tcp.port == range->max.tcp.port) 
   return sprintf(buffer, "port %u ", 
           ntohs(range->min.tcp.port)); 
  else 
   return sprintf(buffer, "ports %u-%u ", 
           ntohs(range->min.tcp.port), 
           ntohs(range->max.tcp.port)); 
 } 
 else return 0; 
} 
 
struct ip6_nat_protocol ip6_nat_protocol_tcp 
= { { NULL, NULL }, "TCP", IPPROTO_TCP, 
    tcp_manip_pkt, 
    tcp_in_range, 
    tcp_unique_tuple, 
    tcp_print, 







 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_proto_udp.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
/* (C) 1999-2001 Paul `Rusty' Russell 
 * (C) 2002-2004 Netfilter Core Team <coreteam@netfilter.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 

















udp_in_range(const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
      enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype, 
      const union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto *min, 




 u_int16_t port; 
 if (maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC) 
  port = tuple->src.u.udp.port; 
 else 
  port = tuple->dst.u.udp.port; 
 
 return ntohs(port) >= ntohs(min->udp.port) 




udp_unique_tuple(struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
   const struct ip6_nat_range *range, 
   enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype, 
   const struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack) 
{ 
 
 static u_int16_t port, *portptr; 
 unsigned int range_size, min, i; 
 
 if (maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC) 
  portptr = &tuple->src.u.udp.port; 
 else 
  portptr = &tuple->dst.u.udp.port; 
 
 /* If no range specified... */ 
 if (!(range->flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED)) { 
  /* If it's dst rewrite, can't change port */ 
  if (maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_DST) 
   return 0; 
 
  if (ntohs(*portptr) < 1024) { 
   /* Loose convention: >> 512 is credential passing */ 
   if (ntohs(*portptr)<512) { 
    min = 1; 
    range_size = 511 - min + 1; 
   } else { 
    min = 600; 
    range_size = 1023 - min + 1; 
   } 
  } else { 
   min = 1024; 
   range_size = 65535 - 1024 + 1; 
  } 
 } else { 
  min = ntohs(range->min.udp.port); 
  range_size = ntohs(range->max.udp.port) - min + 1; 
 } 
 
 for (i = 0; i < range_size; i++, port++) { 
  *portptr = htons(min + port % range_size); 
  if (!ip6_nat_used_tuple(tuple, conntrack)) 
   return 1; 
 } 





udp_manip_pkt(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
       unsigned int hdroff, 
       const struct ip6_conntrack_manip *manip, 
       enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype) 
{ 
 
 struct udphdr *hdr; 
 struct in6_addr oldip; 
 u_int16_t *portptr; 
 
 if (!skb_ip6_make_writable(pskb, hdroff + sizeof(hdr))) 
  return 0; 
 
 hdr = (void *)(*pskb)->data + hdroff; 
 if (maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC) { 
  /* Get rid of src ip and src pt */ 
  oldip = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->saddr; 
  portptr = &hdr->source; 
 } else { 
  /* Get rid of dst ip and dst pt */ 
  oldip = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->daddr; 
  portptr = &hdr->dest; 
 } 
 if (hdr->check){ /* 0 is a special case meaning no checksum */ 
  
   hdr->check = 0; 
 
/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - Here we use the csum_ipv6_magic and csum_partial functions 
to calculate the  
 * UDP header checksum.  csum_partial determines the checksum for just 
the UDP header 
 * but does not flip the bits at the end.  This is then folded into the 
pseudo-header checksum 
 * calculation done by csum_ipv6_magic, which then yields a proper 
checksum for the entire 
 * UDP header and pseudo-header combination. 
 * 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */  
 
   hdr->check = csum_ipv6_magic(&(*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->saddr, 
           &(*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->daddr, 
           (*pskb)->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), 
           IPPROTO_UDP,  
           csum_partial((char *)hdr, (*pskb)->len - 
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), 0));  
       
 } 
 
 *portptr = manip->u.udp.port; 




static unsigned int 
udp_print(char *buffer, 
   const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *match, 
   const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *mask) 
{ 
 
 unsigned int len = 0; 
 
 if (mask->src.u.udp.port) 
  len += sprintf(buffer + len, "srcpt=%u ", 
          ntohs(match->src.u.udp.port)); 
 
 
 if (mask->dst.u.udp.port) 
  len += sprintf(buffer + len, "dstpt=%u ", 
          ntohs(match->dst.u.udp.port)); 
 
 return len; 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
udp_print_range(char *buffer, const struct ip6_nat_range *range) 
{ 
 
 if (range->min.udp.port != 0 || range->max.udp.port != 0xFFFF) { 
  if (range->min.udp.port == range->max.udp.port) 
   return sprintf(buffer, "port %u ", 
           ntohs(range->min.udp.port)); 
  else 
   return sprintf(buffer, "ports %u-%u ", 
           ntohs(range->min.udp.port), 
           ntohs(range->max.udp.port)); 
 } 
 else return 0; 
} 
 
struct ip6_nat_protocol ip6_nat_protocol_udp 
= { { NULL, NULL }, "UDP", IPPROTO_UDP, 
    udp_manip_pkt, 
    udp_in_range, 
    udp_unique_tuple, 
    udp_print, 


















 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_proto_unknown.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
/* The "unknown" protocol.  This is what is used for protocols we 
 * don't understand.  It's returned by ip_ct_find_proto(). 
 */ 
 
/* (C) 1999-2001 Paul `Rusty' Russell 
 * (C) 2002-2004 Netfilter Core Team <coreteam@netfilter.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 












static int unknown_in_range(const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
       enum ip6_nat_manip_type manip_type, 
       const union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto *min, 
       const union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto *max) 
{ 




static int unknown_unique_tuple(struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
    const struct ip6_nat_range *range, 
    enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack) 
{ 
 /* Sorry: we can't help you; if it's not unique, we can't frob 
    anything. */ 




unknown_manip_pkt(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
    unsigned int hdroff, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack_manip *manip, 
    enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype) 
{ 
 return 1; 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
unknown_print(char *buffer, 
       const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *match, 
       const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *mask) 
{ 
 return 0; 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
unknown_print_range(char *buffer, const struct ip6_nat_range *range) 
{ 
 return 0; 
} 
 
struct ip6_nat_protocol ip6_unknown_nat_protocol = { 
























 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: include/linux/ip_nat_protocol.h 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
 











 struct list_head list; 
 
 /* Protocol name */ 
 const char *name; 
 
 /* Protocol number. */ 
 unsigned int protonum; 
 
 /* Do a packet translation according to the ip_nat_proto_manip 
  * and manip type.  Return true if succeeded. */ 
 int (*manip_pkt)(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
    unsigned int hdroff, 
    const struct ip6_conntrack_manip *manip, 
    enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype); 
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 /* Is the manipable part of the tuple between min and max incl? 
*/ 
 int (*in_range)(const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
   enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype, 
   const union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto *min, 
   const union ip6_conntrack_manip_proto *max); 
 
 /* Alter the per-proto part of the tuple (depending on 
    maniptype), to give a unique tuple in the given range if 
    possible; return false if not.  Per-protocol part of tuple 
    is initialized to the incoming packet. */ 
 int (*unique_tuple)(struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *tuple, 
       const struct ip6_nat_range *range, 
       enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype, 
       const struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack); 
 
 unsigned int (*print)(char *buffer, 
         const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *match, 
         const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *mask); 
 
 unsigned int (*print_range)(char *buffer, 
        const struct ip6_nat_range *range); 
}; 
 
/* Protocol registration. */ 
extern int ip6_nat_protocol_register(struct ip6_nat_protocol *proto); 
extern void ip6_nat_protocol_unregister(struct ip6_nat_protocol 
*proto); 
 
extern int init_protocols(void) __init; 
extern void cleanup_protocols(void); 





























 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_rule.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
/* (C) 1999-2001 Paul `Rusty' Russell 
 * (C) 2002-2004 Netfilter Core Team <coreteam@netfilter.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 
 * published by the Free Software Foundation. 
 */ 
 












#define ASSERT_READ_LOCK(x) MUST_BE_READ_LOCKED(&ip6_nat_lock) 
#define ASSERT_WRITE_LOCK(x) MUST_BE_WRITE_LOCKED(&ip6_nat_lock) 
 
#if 0 
#define DEBUGP printk 
#else 










#define NAT_VALID_HOOKS ((1<<NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING) | 
(1<<NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING) | (1<<NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT)) 
  
/* Standard entry. */ 
struct ip6t_standard 
{ 
 struct ip6t_entry entry; 





 struct ip6t_entry_target target; 





 struct ip6t_entry entry; 





 struct ip6t_replace repl; 
 struct ip6t_standard entries[3]; 
 struct ip6t_error term; 
} nat_initial_table __initdata 
= { { "nat", NAT_VALID_HOOKS, 4, 
      sizeof(struct ip6t_standard) * 3 + sizeof(struct ip6t_error), 
      { [NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING] = 0, 
 [NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING] = sizeof(struct ip6t_standard), 
 [NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT] = sizeof(struct ip6t_standard) * 2 }, 
      { [NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING] = 0, 
 [NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING] = sizeof(struct ip6t_standard), 
 [NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT] = sizeof(struct ip6t_standard) * 2 }, 
      0, NULL, { } }, 
    { 
     /* PRE_ROUTING */ 
     { { { { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } 
} }, "", "", { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0 }, 
  0, 
  sizeof(struct ip6t_entry), 
  sizeof(struct ip6t_standard), 
  0, { 0, 0 }, { } }, 
       { { { { IP6T_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ip6t_standard_target)), "" 
} }, { } }, 
  -NF_ACCEPT - 1 } }, 
     /* POST_ROUTING */ 
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     { { { { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } 
} }, "", "", { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0 }, 
  0, 
  sizeof(struct ip6t_entry), 
  sizeof(struct ip6t_standard), 
  0, { 0, 0 }, { } }, 
       { { { { IP6T_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ip6t_standard_target)), "" 
} }, { } }, 
  -NF_ACCEPT - 1 } }, 
     /* LOCAL_OUT */ 
     { { { { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } 
} }, "", "", { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0 }, 
  0, 
  sizeof(struct ip6t_entry), 
  sizeof(struct ip6t_standard), 
  0, { 0, 0 }, { } }, 
       { { { { IP6T_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ip6t_standard_target)), "" 
} }, { } }, 
  -NF_ACCEPT - 1 } } 
    }, 
    /* ERROR */ 
    { { { { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } } }, { { { 0 } } }, 
"", "", { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0 }, 
 0, 
 sizeof(struct ip6t_entry), 
 sizeof(struct ip6t_error), 
 0, { 0, 0 }, { } }, 
      { { { { IP6T_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ip6t_error_target)), 
IP6T_ERROR_TARGET } }, 
   { } }, 
 "ERROR" 
      } 
    } 
}; 
 
static struct ip6t_table nat_table = { 
 .name  = "nat", 
 .table  = &nat_initial_table.repl, 
 .valid_hooks = NAT_VALID_HOOKS, 
 .lock  = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED, 
 .me  = THIS_MODULE, 
}; 
 
/* Source NAT */ 
static unsigned int ip6t_snat_target(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
         unsigned int hooknum, 
        const struct net_device *in, 
        const struct net_device *out, 
        const void *targinfo, 
        void *userinfo) 
{ 
 
 struct ip6_conntrack *ct; 
 enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo; 
 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(hooknum == NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING); 
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 ct = ip6_conntrack_get(*pskb, &ctinfo); 
 
 /* Connection must be valid and new. */ 





return ip6_nat_setup_info(ct, targinfo, hooknum); 
} 
 
static unsigned int ip6t_dnat_target(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
        unsigned int hooknum, 
        const struct net_device *in, 
        const struct net_device *out, 
        const void *targinfo, 
        void *userinfo) 
{ 
 struct ip6_conntrack *ct; 
 enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo; 
 
#ifdef CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(hooknum == NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING 
       || hooknum == NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT); 
#else 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(hooknum == NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING); 
#endif 
 
 ct = ip6_conntrack_get(*pskb, &ctinfo); 
 
 /* Connection must be valid and new. */ 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(ct && (ctinfo == IP6_CT_NEW || ctinfo == 
IP6_CT_RELATED)); 
 
 return ip6_nat_setup_info(ct, targinfo, hooknum); 
} 
 
static int ip6t_snat_checkentry(const char *tablename, 
          const struct ip6t_entry *e, 
          void *targinfo, 
          unsigned int targinfosize, 
          unsigned int hook_mask) 
{ 
 struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr = targinfo; 
 
 /* Must be a valid range */ 
 if (targinfosize < sizeof(struct ip6_nat_multi_range)) { 
  DEBUGP("SNAT: Target size %u too small\n", targinfosize); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 if (targinfosize != IP6T_ALIGN((sizeof(struct 
ip6_nat_multi_range) 
           + (sizeof(struct ip6_nat_range) 
       * (mr->rangesize - 1))))) { 
  DEBUGP("SNAT: Target size %u wrong for %u ranges\n", 
         targinfosize, mr->rangesize); 
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  return 0; 
 } 
 
 /* Only allow these for NAT. */ 
 if (strcmp(tablename, "nat") != 0) { 
  DEBUGP("SNAT: wrong table %s\n", tablename); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 if (hook_mask & ~(1 << NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING)) { 
  DEBUGP("SNAT: hook mask 0x%x bad\n", hook_mask); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 return 1; 
} 
 
static int ip6t_dnat_checkentry(const char *tablename, 
          const struct ip6t_entry *e, 
          void *targinfo, 
          unsigned int targinfosize, 
          unsigned int hook_mask) 
{ 
 struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr = targinfo; 
 
 /* Must be a valid range */ 
 if (targinfosize < sizeof(struct ip6_nat_multi_range)) { 
  DEBUGP("DNAT: Target size %u too small\n", targinfosize); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 if (targinfosize != IP6T_ALIGN((sizeof(struct 
ip6_nat_multi_range) 
           + (sizeof(struct ip6_nat_range) 
       * (mr->rangesize - 1))))) { 
  DEBUGP("DNAT: Target size %u wrong for %u ranges\n", 
         targinfosize, mr->rangesize); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 /* Only allow these for NAT. */ 
 if (strcmp(tablename, "nat") != 0) { 
  DEBUGP("DNAT: wrong table %s\n", tablename); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 
 if (hook_mask & ~((1 << NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING) | (1 << 
NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT))) { 
  DEBUGP("DNAT: hook mask 0x%x bad\n", hook_mask); 




 if (hook_mask & (1 << NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT)) { 
  DEBUGP("DNAT: CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL not enabled\n"); 





 return 1; 
} 
 
inline unsigned int 
ip6_alloc_null_binding(struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
     struct ip6_nat_info *info, 
     unsigned int hooknum) 
{ 
 
 /* Force range to this IP; let proto decide mapping for 
    per-proto parts (hence not IP_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED). 
    Use reply in case it's already been mangled (eg local packet). 
 */ 
 
 struct in6_addr ip 
  = (HOOK2MANIP(hooknum) == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC 
     ? conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.ip 
     : conntrack->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.src.ip); 
 struct ip6_nat_multi_range mr 
  = { 1, { { IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS, ip, ip, { 0 }, { 0 } } } 
}; 
 
 DEBUGP("Allocating NULL binding for %p ( 
%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x)\n", conntrack, 
        NIP6(ip)); 
 
 return ip6_nat_setup_info(conntrack, &mr, hooknum); 
} 
 
int ip6_nat_rule_find(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
       unsigned int hooknum, 
       const struct net_device *in, 
       const struct net_device *out, 
       struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
       struct ip6_nat_info *info) 
{ 
  int ret; 
 
 ret = ip6t_do_table(pskb, hooknum, in, out, &nat_table, NULL); 
 
 if (ret == NF_ACCEPT) { 
 
   if (!(info->initialized & (1 << HOOK2MANIP(hooknum)))){ 
   
 /* NUL mapping */ 
   ret = ip6_alloc_null_binding(ct, info, hooknum); 
   } 
 } 
 
 return ret; 
} 
 
static struct ip6t_target ip6t_snat_reg = { 
 .name  = "SNAT", 
 .target  = ip6t_snat_target, 




static struct ip6t_target ip6t_dnat_reg = { 
 .name  = "DNAT", 
 .target  = ip6t_dnat_target, 
 .checkentry = ip6t_dnat_checkentry, 
}; 
 
int __init ip6_nat_rule_init(void) 
{ 
 int ret; 
 
 ret = ip6t_register_table(&nat_table); 
 if (ret != 0) 
  return ret; 
 ret = ip6t_register_target(&ip6t_snat_reg); 
 if (ret != 0) 
  goto unregister_table; 
 
 ret = ip6t_register_target(&ip6t_dnat_reg); 
 if (ret != 0) 
  goto unregister_snat; 
 





































 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: include/linux/ip_nat_rule.h 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 











extern int ip6_nat_rule_init(void) __init; 
extern void ip6_nat_rule_cleanup(void); 
extern int ip6_nat_rule_find(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
       unsigned int hooknum, 
       const struct net_device *in, 
       const struct net_device *out, 
       struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
       struct ip6_nat_info *info); 
 
extern unsigned int 
ip6_alloc_null_binding(struct ip6_conntrack *conntrack, 
     struct ip6_nat_info *info, 
     unsigned int hooknum); 
#endif 







 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_nat_standalone.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
  
/* This file contains all the functions required for the standalone 
   ip_nat module. 
 
   These are not required by the compatibility layer. 
*/ 
 
/* (C) 1999-2001 Paul `Rusty' Russell 
 * (C) 2002-2004 Netfilter Core Team <coreteam@netfilter.org> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 




 * 23 Apr 2001: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> 
 *  - new API and handling of conntrack/nat helpers 
 *  - now capable of multiple expectations for one master 















#define IPV6_HDR_LEN (sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) 
#define IPV6_OPTHDR_LEN (sizeof(struct ipv6_opt_hdr)) 
 
#define ASSERT_READ_LOCK(x) MUST_BE_READ_LOCKED(&ip6_nat_lock) 












#define DEBUGP printk 
#else 
#define DEBUGP(format, args...) 
#endif 
 
#define HOOKNAME(hooknum) ((hooknum) == NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING ? 
"POST_ROUTING"  \ 
      : ((hooknum) == NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING ? "PRE_ROUTING" 
\ 
         : ((hooknum) == NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT ? "LOCAL_OUT"  
\ 
            : ((hooknum) == NF_IP6_LOCAL_IN ? "LOCAL_IN"  
\ 
        : "*ERROR*"))) 
 
static inline int call_expect(struct ip6_conntrack *master, 
         struct sk_buff **pskb, 
         unsigned int hooknum, 
         struct ip6_conntrack *ct, 
         struct ip6_nat_info *info) 
{ 
 return master->nat.info.helper->expect(pskb, hooknum, ct, info); 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
ip6_nat_fn(unsigned int hooknum, 
   struct sk_buff **pskb, 
   const struct net_device *in, 
   const struct net_device *out, 
   int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *), 
    unsigned int dataoff) 
{ 
 
 struct ip6_conntrack *ct; 
 enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo; 
 struct ip6_nat_info *info;  
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 /* maniptype == SRC for postrouting. */ 
 
 enum ip6_nat_manip_type maniptype = HOOK2MANIP(hooknum); 
 
 /* We never see fragments: conntrack defrags on pre-routing 
    and local-out, and ip_nat_out protects post-routing. */ 
 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(!((*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->frag_off 
         & htons(IP6_MF|IP6_OFFSET))); 
 
 (*pskb)->nfcache |= NFC_UNKNOWN; 
 
 /* If we had a hardware checksum before, it's now invalid */ 
 if ((*pskb)->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_HW){ 
  (*pskb)->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE; 
 } 
 ct = ip6_conntrack_get(*pskb, &ctinfo); 
 /* Can't track?  It's not due to stress, or conntrack would 
    have dropped it.  Hence it's the user's responsibilty to 
    packet filter it out, or implement conntrack/NAT for that 
    protocol. 8) --RR */ 
 
 if (!ct) { 
 
  return NF_ACCEPT; 
 } 
 
 switch (ctinfo) { 
 case IP6_CT_RELATED: 
 
 case IP6_CT_RELATED+IP6_CT_IS_REPLY: 
 
  
  if ((*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->nexthdr == IPPROTO_ICMPV6) { 
   
   if (!icmpv6_reply_translation(pskb, ct, hooknum, 
            CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo))){ 
 
    return NF_DROP; 
   } 
   else{ 
 
    return NF_ACCEPT; 
   } 
  } 
 
  /* Fall thru... (Only ICMPs can be IP_CT_IS_REPLY) */ 
 case IP6_CT_NEW: 
 
  info = &ct->nat.info; 
 
  WRITE_LOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
  /* Seen it before?  This can happen for loopback, retrans, 
     or local packets.. */ 
 
  if (!(info->initialized & (1 << maniptype)) 
#ifndef CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL 
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      /* If this session has already been confirmed we must 
not 
       * touch it again even if there is no mapping set up. 
       * Can only happen on local->local traffic with 
       * CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL disabled. 
       */ 
      && !(ct->status & IPS_CONFIRMED) 
#endif 
      ) { 
   unsigned int ret; 
 
   if (ct->master 
       && master_ct6(ct)->nat.info.helper 
       && master_ct6(ct)->nat.info.helper->expect) { 
 
    ret = call_expect(master_ct6(ct), pskb,  
        hooknum, ct, info); 
   } else { 
#ifdef CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL 
    /* LOCAL_IN hook doesn't have a chain!  */ 
    if (hooknum == NF_IP6_LOCAL_IN){ 
      ret = ip6_alloc_null_binding(ct, info, 
         hooknum); 
} 
    else 
#endif 
    ret = ip6_nat_rule_find(pskb, hooknum, in, out, 
             ct, info); 
   } 
   if (ret != NF_ACCEPT) { 
 
    WRITE_UNLOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
    return ret; 
   } 
  } else 
   DEBUGP("Already setup manip %s for ct %p\n", 
          maniptype == IP6_NAT_MANIP_SRC ? "SRC" : 
"DST", 
          ct); 
 
  WRITE_UNLOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
  break; 
 
 default: 
  /* ESTABLISHED */ 
 
  IP6_NF_ASSERT(ctinfo == IP6_CT_ESTABLISHED 
        || ctinfo == 
(IP6_CT_ESTABLISHED+IP6_CT_IS_REPLY)); 
  info = &ct->nat.info; 
 } 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(info); 
 return ip6_do_bindings(ct, ctinfo, info, hooknum, pskb, dataoff); 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
ip6_nat_out(unsigned int hooknum, 
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    struct sk_buff **pskb, 
    const struct net_device *in, 
    const struct net_device *out, 
    int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *), 
     unsigned int dataoff) 
{ 
 /* root is playing with raw sockets. */ 
 if ((*pskb)->len < sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) 
     || IPV6_HDR_LEN < sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)){ 
  return NF_ACCEPT; 
} 
 /* We can hit fragment here; forwarded packets get 
    defragmented by connection tracking coming in, then 
    fragmented (grr) by the forward code. 
 
    In future: If we have nfct != NULL, AND we have NAT 
    initialized, AND there is no helper, then we can do full 
    NAPT on the head, and IP-address-only NAT on the rest. 
 
    I'm starting to have nightmares about fragments.  */ 
 
 
 /*if ((*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->fh & htons(IP6_MF|IP6_OFFSET)) { 
  *pskb = ip6_ct_gather_frags(*pskb); 
 
  if (!*pskb) 
   return NF_STOLEN; 
   }*/ 




static unsigned int 
ip6_nat_local_fn(unsigned int hooknum, 
  struct sk_buff **pskb, 
  const struct net_device *in, 
  const struct net_device *out, 
  int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *), 
   unsigned int dataoff) 
{ 
 struct in6_addr saddr, daddr; 
 unsigned int ret; 
 
 /* root is playing with raw sockets. */ 
 if ((*pskb)->len < sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) 
     || IPV6_HDR_LEN < sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) 
  return NF_ACCEPT; 
 
 saddr = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->saddr; 
 daddr = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->daddr; 
 
 ret = ip6_nat_fn(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, dataoff); 
 /*if (ret != NF_DROP && ret != NF_STOLEN 
     && ((*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->saddr != saddr 
  || (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->daddr != daddr)) 
  return ip6_route_me_harder(pskb) == 0 ? ret : NF_DROP;*/ 





/* We must be after connection tracking and before packet filtering. */ 
 
/* Before packet filtering, change destination */ 
static struct nf_hook_ops ip6_nat_in_ops = { 
 .hook  = ip6_nat_fn, 
 .owner  = THIS_MODULE, 
 .pf  = PF_INET6, 
 .hooknum = NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING, 
 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_NAT_DST, 
}; 
 
/* After packet filtering, change source */ 
static struct nf_hook_ops ip6_nat_out_ops = { 
 .hook  = ip6_nat_out, 
 .owner  = THIS_MODULE, 
 .pf  = PF_INET6, 
 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING, 




/* Before packet filtering, change destination */ 
static struct nf_hook_ops ip6_nat_local_out_ops = { 
 .hook  = ip6_nat_local_fn, 
 .owner  = THIS_MODULE, 
 .pf  = PF_INET6, 
 .hooknum = NF_IP6_LOCAL_OUT, 
 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_NAT_DST, 
}; 
 
/* After packet filtering, change source for reply packets of LOCAL_OUT 
DNAT */ 
static struct nf_hook_ops ip6_nat_local_in_ops = { 
 .hook  = ip6_nat_fn, 
 .owner  = THIS_MODULE, 
 .pf  = PF_INET6, 
 .hooknum = NF_IP6_LOCAL_IN, 




/* Protocol registration. */ 
int ip6_nat_protocol_register(struct ip6_nat_protocol *proto) 
{ 
 int ret = 0; 
 struct list_head *i; 
 
 WRITE_LOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 list_for_each(i, &ip6_protos) { 
  if (((struct ip6_nat_protocol *)i)->protonum 
      == proto->protonum) { 
   ret = -EBUSY; 
   goto out; 




 list_prepend(&ip6_protos, proto); 
 out: 
 WRITE_UNLOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 return ret; 
} 
 
/* Noone stores the protocol anywhere; simply delete it. */ 
void ip6_nat_protocol_unregister(struct ip6_nat_protocol *proto) 
{ 
 WRITE_LOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 LIST_DELETE(&ip6_protos, proto); 
 WRITE_UNLOCK(&ip6_nat_lock); 
 




static int init_or_cleanup(int init) 
{ 




 if (!init) goto cleanup; 
 
 ret = ip6_nat_rule_init(); 
 if (ret < 0) { 
  printk("ip6_nat_init: can't setup rules.\n"); 
  goto cleanup_nothing; 
 } 
 ret = ip6_nat_init(); 
 if (ret < 0) { 
  printk("ip6_nat_init: can't setup rules.\n"); 
  goto cleanup_rule_init; 
 } 
 ret = nf_register_hook(&ip6_nat_in_ops); 
 if (ret < 0) { 
  printk("ip6_nat_init: can't register in hook.\n"); 
  goto cleanup_nat; 
 } 
 ret = nf_register_hook(&ip6_nat_out_ops); 
 if (ret < 0) { 
  printk("ip6_nat_init: can't register out hook.\n"); 
  goto cleanup_inops; 
 } 
#ifdef CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL 
 ret = nf_register_hook(&ip6_nat_local_out_ops); 
 if (ret < 0) { 
  printk("ip6_nat_init: can't register local out hook.\n"); 
  goto cleanup_outops; 
 } 
 ret = nf_register_hook(&ip6_nat_local_in_ops); 
 if (ret < 0) { 
  printk("ip6_nat_init: can't register local in hook.\n"); 






















 return ret; 
} 
 
static int __init init(void) 
{ 
 return init_or_cleanup(1); 
} 
 






















































































 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: include/linux/ ip6t_iprange.h 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 






#define IPRANGE_SRC  0x01 /* Match source IP address */ 
#define IPRANGE_DST  0x02 /* Match destination IP address */ 
#define IPRANGE_SRC_INV  0x10 /* Negate the condition */ 
#define IPRANGE_DST_INV  0x20 /* Negate the condition */ 
 
struct ip6t_iprange { 
 /* Inclusive: network order. */ 





 struct ip6t_iprange src; 
 struct ip6t_iprange dst; 
 
 /* Flags from above */ 
 u_int8_t flags; 
}; 
 







 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_NETMAP.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
/* NETMAP - static NAT mapping of IP network addresses (1:1). 
 * The mapping can be applied to source (POSTROUTING), 
 * destination (PREROUTING), or both (with separate rules). 
 */ 
 
/* (C) 2000-2001 Svenning Soerensen <svenning@post5.tele.dk> 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 











#define MODULENAME "NETMAP" 
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); 
MODULE_AUTHOR("Svenning Soerensen <svenning@post5.tele.dk>"); 
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("iptables 1:1 NAT mapping of IP networks target"); 
 
#if 0 
#define DEBUGP printk 
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#else 




check(const char *tablename, 
      const struct ip6t_entry *e, 
      void *targinfo, 
      unsigned int targinfosize, 
      unsigned int hook_mask) 
{ 
 const struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr = targinfo; 
 
 if (strcmp(tablename, "nat") != 0) { 
  DEBUGP(MODULENAME":check: bad table `%s'.\n", tablename); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (targinfosize != IP6T_ALIGN(sizeof(*mr))) { 
  DEBUGP(MODULENAME":check: size %u.\n", targinfosize); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (hook_mask & ~((1 << NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING) | (1 << 
NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING))) { 
  DEBUGP(MODULENAME":check: bad hooks %x.\n", hook_mask); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (!(mr->range[0].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS)) { 
  DEBUGP(MODULENAME":check: bad MAP_IPS.\n"); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (mr->rangesize != 1) { 
  DEBUGP(MODULENAME":check: bad rangesize %u.\n", mr-
>rangesize); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 return 1; 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
target(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
       const struct net_device *in, 
       const struct net_device *out, 
       unsigned int hooknum, 
       const void *targinfo, 
       void *userinfo) 
{ 
 struct ip6_conntrack *ct; 
 enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo; 
 struct in6_addr new_ip, netmask; 
 const struct ip6_nat_multi_range *mr = targinfo; 
 struct ip6_nat_multi_range newrange; 
 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(hooknum == NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING 
       || hooknum == NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING); 
 ct = ip6_conntrack_get(*pskb, &ctinfo); 
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 netmask.s6_addr[0] = ~(mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr[0] ^ mr-
>range[0].max_ip.s6_addr[0]); 
 netmask.s6_addr[1] = ~(mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr[1] ^ mr-
>range[0].max_ip.s6_addr[1]); 
 netmask.s6_addr[2] = ~(mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr[2] ^ mr-
>range[0].max_ip.s6_addr[2]); 
 netmask.s6_addr[3] = ~(mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr[3] ^ mr-
>range[0].max_ip.s6_addr[3]); 
 
 if (hooknum == NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING){ 
  new_ip.s6_addr[0] = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->daddr.s6_addr[0] & 
~netmask.s6_addr[0]; 
  new_ip.s6_addr[1] = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->daddr.s6_addr[1] & 
~netmask.s6_addr[1]; 
  new_ip.s6_addr[2] = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->daddr.s6_addr[2] & 
~netmask.s6_addr[2]; 




  new_ip.s6_addr[0] = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->saddr.s6_addr[0] & 
~netmask.s6_addr[0]; 
  new_ip.s6_addr[1] = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->saddr.s6_addr[1] & 
~netmask.s6_addr[1]; 
  new_ip.s6_addr[2] = (*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->saddr.s6_addr[2] & 
~netmask.s6_addr[2]; 




 new_ip.s6_addr[0] |= mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr[0] & 
netmask.s6_addr[0]; 
 new_ip.s6_addr[1] |= mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr[1] & 
netmask.s6_addr[1]; 
 new_ip.s6_addr[2] |= mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr[2] & 
netmask.s6_addr[2]; 
 new_ip.s6_addr[3] |= mr->range[0].min_ip.s6_addr[3] & 
netmask.s6_addr[3]; 
 
 newrange = ((struct ip6_nat_multi_range) 
 { 1, { { mr->range[0].flags | IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS, 
   new_ip, new_ip, 
   mr->range[0].min, mr->range[0].max } } }); 
 
 /* Hand modified range to generic setup. */ 
 return ip6_nat_setup_info(ct, &newrange, hooknum); 
} 
 
static struct ip6t_target target_module = {  
 .name   = MODULENAME, 
 .target  = target,  
 .checkentry  = check, 
     .me   = THIS_MODULE  
}; 
 
static int __init init(void) 
{ 
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 return ip6t_register_target(&target_module); 
} 
 

























































 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SAME.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 
/* Same.  Just like SNAT, only try to make the connections 
 *    between client A and server B always have the same source ip. 
 * 
 * (C) 2000 Paul `Rusty' Russell 
 * (C) 2001 Martin Josefsson 
 * 
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as 
 * published by the Free Software Foundation. 
 * 
 * 010320 Martin Josefsson <gandalf@wlug.westbo.se> 
 *  * copied ipt_BALANCE.c to ipt_SAME.c and changed a few things. 
 * 010728 Martin Josefsson <gandalf@wlug.westbo.se> 
 *  * added --nodst to not include destination-ip in new source 
 *    calculations. 
 * * added some more sanity-checks. 
 * 010729 Martin Josefsson <gandalf@wlug.westbo.se> 
 *  * fixed a buggy if-statement in same_check(), should have 
 *    used ntohl() but didn't. 
 *  * added support for multiple ranges. IPT_SAME_MAX_RANGE is 
 *    defined in linux/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4/ipt_SAME.h 
 *    and is currently set to 10. 
 *  * added support for 1-address range, nice to have now that 


















MODULE_AUTHOR("Martin Josefsson <gandalf@wlug.westbo.se>"); 




#define DEBUGP printk 
#else 




same_check(const char *tablename, 
       const struct ip6t_entry *e, 
       void *targinfo, 
       unsigned int targinfosize, 
       unsigned int hook_mask) 
{ 
 unsigned int count, countess0, countess1, countess2, countess3, 
rangeip, index = 0; 
 struct ip6t_same_info *mr = targinfo; 
 
 mr->ipnum = 0; 
 
 if (strcmp(tablename, "nat") != 0) { 
  DEBUGP("same_check: bad table `%s'.\n", tablename); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (targinfosize != IP6T_ALIGN(sizeof(*mr))) { 
  DEBUGP("same_check: size %u.\n", targinfosize); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (hook_mask & ~(1 << NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING | 1 << 
NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING)) { 
  DEBUGP("same_check: bad hooks %x.\n", hook_mask); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (mr->rangesize < 1) { 
  DEBUGP("same_check: need at least one dest range.\n"); 
  return 0; 
 } 
 if (mr->rangesize > IP6T_SAME_MAX_RANGE) { 
  DEBUGP("same_check: too many ranges specified, maximum " 
    "is %u ranges\n", 
    IP6T_SAME_MAX_RANGE); 
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  return 0; 
 } 
 for (count = 0; count < mr->rangesize; count++) { 
  if( (ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[0]) > 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[0])) 
 
      || ((ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[0]) == 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[0])) 
   && (ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[1]) > 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[1]))) 
 
      || ((ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[0]) == 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[0])) 
   && (ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[1]) == 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[1])) 
   && (ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[2]) > 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[2]))) 
       
      || ((ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[0]) == 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[0])) 
   && (ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[1]) == 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[1])) 
   && (ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[2]) == 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[2])) 
   && (ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[3]) > 
ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[3])))) 
    { 
      DEBUGP("same_check: min_ip is larger than max_ip in " 
      "range ` %x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x- 
%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x'.\n", 
      NIP6(mr->range[count].min_ip), 
      NIP6(mr->range[count].max_ip)); 
      return 0; 
    } 
  if (!(mr->range[count].flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS)) { 
    DEBUGP("same_check: bad MAP_IPS.\n"); 
    return 0; 
  } 
  rangeip = (((ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[0]) - 
ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[0])) + 1) *  
      ((ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[1]) - 
ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[1])) + 1) * 
      ((ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[2]) - 
ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[2])) + 1) * 
      ((ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[3]) - 
ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[3])) + 1)); 
  mr->ipnum += rangeip; 




 DEBUGP("same_check: total ipaddresses = %u\n", mr->ipnum); 
 mr->iparray = kmalloc((sizeof(struct in6_addr) * mr->ipnum), 
GFP_KERNEL); 
 if (!mr->iparray) { 
   DEBUGP("same_check: Couldn't allocate %u bytes " 
   "for %u ipaddresses!\n",  
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   (sizeof(struct in6_addr) * mr->ipnum), mr->ipnum); 
   return 0; 
 } 
 DEBUGP("same_check: Allocated %u bytes for %u ipaddresses.\n", 
        (sizeof(struct in6_addr) * mr->ipnum), mr->ipnum); 
  
 for (count = 0; count < mr->rangesize; count++) { 
    
   for (countess0 = ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[0]); 
        countess0 <= ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[0]); 
        countess0++) { 
      
     countess1 = 0; 
     for (countess1 = ntohl(mr->range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[1]); 
   countess1 <= ntohl(mr->range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[1]); 
   countess1++) { 
 
       countess2 = 0; 
       for (countess2 = ntohl(mr-
>range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[2]); 
     countess2 <= ntohl(mr-
>range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[2]); 
     countess2++) { 
  
  countess3 = 0; 
  for (countess3 = ntohl(mr-
>range[count].min_ip.s6_addr32[3]); 
       countess3 <= ntohl(mr-
>range[count].max_ip.s6_addr32[3]); 
       countess3++) { 
      
   mr->iparray[index].s6_addr32[0] = countess0; 
   mr->iparray[index].s6_addr32[1] = countess1; 
   mr->iparray[index].s6_addr32[2] = countess2; 
   mr->iparray[index].s6_addr32[3] = countess3; 
 
   DEBUGP("same_check: Added ipaddress ` 
%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x' " 
    "in index %u.\n", 
    NIP6(mr->iparray[index]), index); 
   index++; 
  } 
       } 
     } 
   } 
 } 
        
 return 1; 
} 
 
static void  
same_destroy(void *targinfo, 
  unsigned int targinfosize) 
{ 





 DEBUGP("same_destroy: Deallocated %u bytes for %u 
ip6addresses.\n", 
   (sizeof(struct in6_addr) * mr->ipnum), mr->ipnum); 
} 
 
static unsigned int 
same_target(struct sk_buff **pskb, 
  const struct net_device *in, 
  const struct net_device *out, 
  unsigned int hooknum, 
  const void *targinfo, 
  void *userinfo) 
{ 
 struct ip6_conntrack *ct; 
 enum ip6_conntrack_info ctinfo; 
 struct in6_addr tmpip, new_ip; 
 u_int32_t aindex; 
 const struct ip6t_same_info *mr = targinfo; 
 struct ip6_nat_multi_range newrange; 
 const struct ip6_conntrack_tuple *t; 
 
 IP6_NF_ASSERT(hooknum == NF_IP6_PRE_ROUTING || 
   hooknum == NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING); 
 ct = ip6_conntrack_get(*pskb, &ctinfo); 
 
 t = &ct->tuplehash[IP6_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple; 
 
 /* Base new source on real src ip and optionally dst ip, 
    giving some hope for consistency across reboots. 
    Here we calculate the index in mr->iparray which 
    holds the ipaddress we should use */ 
  
 tmpip.s6_addr32[0] = ntohl(t->src.ip.s6_addr32[0]); 
 tmpip.s6_addr32[1] = ntohl(t->src.ip.s6_addr32[1]); 
 tmpip.s6_addr32[2] = ntohl(t->src.ip.s6_addr32[2]); 
 tmpip.s6_addr32[3] = ntohl(t->src.ip.s6_addr32[3]); 
 
 if (!(mr->info & IP6T_SAME_NODST)){ 
   tmpip.s6_addr32[0] += ntohl(t->dst.ip.s6_addr32[0]); 
   tmpip.s6_addr32[1] += ntohl(t->dst.ip.s6_addr32[1]); 
   tmpip.s6_addr32[2] += ntohl(t->dst.ip.s6_addr32[2]); 
   tmpip.s6_addr32[3] += ntohl(t->dst.ip.s6_addr32[3]); 
 } 
 
 aindex = ((tmpip.s6_addr32[0] + tmpip.s6_addr32[1] + 
tmpip.s6_addr32[2] + tmpip.s6_addr32[3]) % mr->ipnum); 
   
 new_ip.s6_addr32[0] = ntohl(mr->iparray[aindex].s6_addr32[0]); 
 new_ip.s6_addr32[1] = htonl(mr->iparray[aindex].s6_addr32[1]);  
 new_ip.s6_addr32[2] = htonl(mr->iparray[aindex].s6_addr32[2]); 
 new_ip.s6_addr32[3] = htonl(mr->iparray[aindex].s6_addr32[3]); 
 
 DEBUGP("ip6t_SAME: src= %x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x dst= 
%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x, " 
   "new src= %x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x\n", 
   NIP6(t->src.ip), NIP6(t->dst.ip), 
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   NIP6(new_ip)); 
 
 /* Transfer from original range. */ 
 newrange = ((struct ip6_nat_multi_range) 
  { 1, { { mr->range[0].flags | IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS, 
    new_ip, new_ip, 
    mr->range[0].min, mr->range[0].max } } }); 
 
 /* Hand modified range to generic setup. */ 
 return ip6_nat_setup_info(ct, &newrange, hooknum); 
} 
 
static struct ip6t_target same_reg = {  
 .name  = "SAME", 
 .target  = same_target, 
 .checkentry = same_check, 
 .destroy = same_destroy, 
 .me  = THIS_MODULE, 
}; 
 
static int __init init(void) 
{ 
 return ip6t_register_target(&same_reg); 
} 
 



































 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: include/linux/ipt_SAME.h 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 






#define IP6T_SAME_MAX_RANGE 10 
 




 unsigned char info; 
 u_int32_t rangesize; 
 u_int32_t ipnum; 
 struct in6_addr *iparray; 
 
 /* hangs off end. */ 














/* netfilter.c: look after the filters for various protocols.  
 * Heavily influenced by the old firewall.c by David Bonn and Alan Cox. 
 * 
 * Thanks to Rob `CmdrTaco' Malda for not influencing this code in any 
 * way. 
 * 
 * Rusty Russell (C)2000 -- This code is GPL. 
 * 
 * February 2000: Modified by James Morris to have 1 queue per 
protocol. 
 * 15-Mar-2000:   Added NF_REPEAT --RR. 




/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * *  
 * TB MP - This funciton is the same as skb_ip_make_writable except 
variables and function 
 * names are updated to reflect changes made in the IPv6 suite.  This 
function is necessary  
 * for NAT, or any other function, to write to the skb. 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * */ 
 
int skb_ip6_make_writable(struct sk_buff **pskb, unsigned int 
writable_len) 
{ 
 struct sk_buff *nskb; 
 unsigned int iplen; 
 
 if (writable_len > (*pskb)->len) 
  return 0; 
 
 /* Not exclusive use of packet?  Must copy. */ 
 if (skb_shared(*pskb) || skb_cloned(*pskb)) 
  goto copy_skb; 
 
 /* Alexey says IP hdr is always modifiable and linear, so ok. */ 
 if (writable_len <= IPV6_HDR_LEN) 
  return 1; 
 
 iplen = writable_len - IPV6_HDR_LEN; 
 
 /* DaveM says protocol headers are also modifiable. */ 
 switch ((*pskb)->nh.ipv6h->nexthdr) { 
 case IPPROTO_TCP: { 
  struct tcphdr hdr; 
  if (skb_copy_bits(*pskb, IPV6_HDR_LEN, 
      &hdr, sizeof(hdr)) != 0) 
    goto copy_skb; 
  if (writable_len <= (IPV6_HDR_LEN + hdr.doff*4)) 
    goto pull_skb; 
  goto copy_skb; 
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 } 
 case IPPROTO_UDP: 
  if (writable_len <= IPV6_HDR_LEN + sizeof(struct udphdr)) 
   goto pull_skb; 
  goto copy_skb; 
 case IPPROTO_ICMPV6: 
  if (writable_len 
      <= IPV6_HDR_LEN + sizeof(struct icmp6hdr)) 
   goto pull_skb; 
  goto copy_skb; 




 nskb = skb_copy(*pskb, GFP_ATOMIC); 
 if (!nskb) 
  return 0; 
 BUG_ON(skb_is_nonlinear(nskb)); 
 
 /* Rest of kernel will get very unhappy if we pass it a 
    suddenly-orphaned skbuff */ 
 if ((*pskb)->sk) 
  skb_set_owner_w(nskb, (*pskb)->sk); 
 kfree_skb(*pskb); 
 *pskb = nskb; 
 return 1; 
 
pull_skb: 
































 * IPv6 Network Address Translation 
 * Linux INET6 Implementation 
 * 
 * Created based on: /home/iptables-1.2.9rc1/extensions/libipt_SNAT.c 
 * 
 * Created by: 
 *      Trevor J. Baumgartner 
 *      Matthew D. W. Phillips 
 * 
 *  
 * 
 * Except where noted, porting involved rote updates of function names 
 * and datatypes to reflect those being used in IPv6 versus those being  
 * used in IPv4.  For example, instead of using an unsigned 32 bit  
 * integer for the IPv4 address, an in6_addr struct is used for IPv6, 
 * or instead of using the pointer 'icmphdr' to access the icmp header,  
 * IPv6 uses 'icmp6hdr'.  Substantial changes are explained in detail. 
 * 
 * Certain areas necessitated breaking the IPv6 address down into array 
 * format in order to perform binary operations on the address. 
 *  
 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or 
 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License 
 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 
 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. 
 */   
 




















static char * 
addr_to_numeric(const struct in6_addr *addrp) 
{ 
 /* 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:000.000.000.000 
  * 0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000 */ 
 static char buf[50+1]; 




static struct in6_addr * 
numeric_to_addr(const char *num) 
{ 
 static struct in6_addr ap; 
 int err; 
 if ((err=inet_pton(AF_INET6, num, &ap)) == 1) 
  return &ap; 
#ifdef DEBUG 
 fprintf(stderr, "\nnumeric2addr: %d\n", err); 
#endif 
 return (struct in6_addr *)NULL; 
} 
 
/* Source NAT data consists of a multi-range, indicating where to 




 struct ip6t_entry_target t; 
 struct ip6_nat_multi_range mr; 
}; 
 





"SNAT v%s options:\n" 
" --to-source <ipaddr>[-<ipaddr>][:port-port]\n" 
"    Address to map source to.\n" 




static struct option opts[] = { 
 { "to-source", 1, 0, '1' }, 
 { 0 } 
}; 
 
/* Initialize the target. */ 
static void 
init(struct ip6t_entry_target *t, unsigned int *nfcache) 
{ 
 /* Can't cache this */ 
 *nfcache |= NFC_UNKNOWN; 
} 
 
static struct ip6t_natinfo * 
append_range(struct ip6t_natinfo *info, const struct 
ip6_nat_range *range) 
{ 
 unsigned int size; 
 
 /* One rangesize already in struct ipt_natinfo */ 
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size = IP6T_ALIGN(sizeof(*info) + info->mr.rangesize * 
sizeof(*range)); 
 
 info = realloc(info, size); 
 if (!info) 
  exit_error(OTHER_PROBLEM, "Out of memory\n"); 
 
 info->t.u.target_size = size; 
 info->mr.range[info->mr.rangesize] = *range; 
 info->mr.rangesize++; 
 
 return info; 
} 
 
/* Ranges expected in network order. */ 
static struct ip6t_entry_target * 
parse_to(char *arg, int portok, struct ip6t_natinfo *info) 
{ 
 struct ip6_nat_range range; 
 char *colon; 
 memset(&range, 0, sizeof(range)); 
 colon = strchr(arg, '@'); 
 struct in6_addr *ip; 
        
  
/*TB MP – This section deals with ports. The scope of our work 
did not require port mappings or IP ranges therefore this section 
was commented out and is untested*/ 
 /* 
   if(colon){  
 if (!portok) 
   exit_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, 
       "Need TCP or UDP with port specification"); 
  
 range.flags |= IP6_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED; 
  
 port = atoi(colon+1); 
 if (port == 0 || port > 65535) 
   exit_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, 
       "Port `%s' not valid\n", colon+1); 
  
 dash = strchr(colon, '-'); 
 if (!dash) { 
   range.min.tcp.port 
     = range.max.tcp.port 
     = htons(port); 
 } else { 
   int maxport; 
    
   maxport = atoi(dash + 1); 
   if (maxport == 0 || maxport > 65535) 
     exit_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, 
         "Port `%s' not valid\n", dash+1); 
   if (maxport < port) 
      
     exit_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, 
         "Port range `%s' funky\n", colon+1); 
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   range.min.tcp.port = htons(port); 
   range.max.tcp.port = htons(maxport); 
 } 
  
 if (colon == arg) 
   return &(append_range(info, &range)->t); 
 *colon = '\0'; 
  
 
 range.flags |= IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS; 
 dash = strchr(arg, '-'); 
 if (colon && dash && dash > colon) 
  dash = NULL; 
 
 if (dash) 
  *dash = '\0'; 
 */ 
 ip = numeric_to_addr(arg); 
 range.flags |= IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS; 
 if (!ip) 
exit_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, "Bad IP address 
`%s'\n", arg); 
  
 range.min_ip.s6_addr32[0] = ip->s6_addr32[0]; 
 range.min_ip.s6_addr32[1] = ip->s6_addr32[1];  
 range.min_ip.s6_addr32[2] = ip->s6_addr32[2]; 
 range.min_ip.s6_addr32[3] = ip->s6_addr32[3];  
 
 /* 
 if (dash) { 
    ip = dotted_to_addr(dash+1); 
  if (!ip) 
exit_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, "Bad IP address 
`%s'\n", dash+1 
 } else{ 
 */ 
   
 return &(append_range(info, &range)->t); 
} 
 
/* Function which parses command options; returns true if it 
   ate an option */ 
static int 
parse(int c, char **argv, int invert, unsigned int *flags, 
      const struct ip6t_entry *entry, 
      struct ip6t_entry_target **target) 
{ 
 struct ip6t_natinfo *info = (void *)*target; 
 int portok; 
 
 if (entry->ipv6.proto == IPPROTO_TCP 
     || entry->ipv6.proto == IPPROTO_UDP) 
  portok = 1; 
 else 
  portok = 0; 
 
 switch (c) { 
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 case '1': 
  if (check_inverse(optarg, &invert, NULL, 0)) 
   exit_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, 
       "Unexpected `!' after --to-source"); 
 
  *target = parse_to(optarg, portok, info); 
  *flags = 1; 
  return 1; 
 default: 




/* Final check; must have specfied --to-source. */ 
static void final_check(unsigned int flags) 
{ 
 if (!flags) 
  exit_error(PARAMETER_PROBLEM, 
      "You must specify --to-source"); 
} 
 
static void print_range(const struct ip6_nat_range *r) 
{ 
   if (r->flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS) { 
   
  struct in6_addr a; 
  a.s6_addr32[0] = r->min_ip.s6_addr32[0]; 
  a.s6_addr32[1] = r->min_ip.s6_addr32[1]; 
  a.s6_addr32[2] = r->min_ip.s6_addr32[2]; 
  a.s6_addr32[3] = r->min_ip.s6_addr32[3]; 
  printf("%s", addr_to_numeric(&a)); 
  if ((r->max_ip.s6_addr32[0] != r->min_ip.s6_addr32[0]) || 
      (r->max_ip.s6_addr32[1] != r->min_ip.s6_addr32[1]) || 
      (r->max_ip.s6_addr32[2] != r->min_ip.s6_addr32[2]) || 
      (r->max_ip.s6_addr32[3] != r->min_ip.s6_addr32[3])) { 
   a.s6_addr32[0] = r->max_ip.s6_addr32[0]; 
   a.s6_addr32[1] = r->max_ip.s6_addr32[1]; 
   a.s6_addr32[2] = r->max_ip.s6_addr32[2]; 
   a.s6_addr32[3] = r->max_ip.s6_addr32[3]; 
    printf("-%s", addr_to_numeric(&a)); 
  } 
 } 
 if (r->flags & IP6_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED) { 
  printf(":"); 
  printf("%hu", ntohs(r->min.tcp.port)); 
  if (r->max.tcp.port != r->min.tcp.port) 




/* Prints out the targinfo. */ 
static void 
print(const struct ip6t_ip6 *ip, 
      const struct ip6t_entry_target *target, 
      int numeric) 
{ 
 struct ip6t_natinfo *info = (void *)target; 
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 unsigned int i = 0; 
 
 printf("to: "); 
 for (i = 0; i < info->mr.rangesize; i++) { 
  print_range(&info->mr.range[i]); 




/* Saves the union ip6t_targinfo in parsable form to stdout. */ 
static void 
save(const struct ip6t_ip6 *ip, const struct ip6t_entry_target *target) 
{ 
 struct ip6t_natinfo *info = (void *)target; 
 unsigned int i = 0; 
 
 for (i = 0; i < info->mr.rangesize; i++) { 
  printf("--to-source "); 
  print_range(&info->mr.range[i]); 





struct ip6tables_target snat 
= { NULL, 
    "SNAT", 
    IPTABLES_VERSION, 
    IP6T_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ip6_nat_multi_range)), 
    IP6T_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ip6_nat_multi_range)), 
    &help, 
    &init, 
    &parse, 
    &final_check, 
    &print, 
    &save, 






















APPENDIX D. TESTING RESULTS 
This appendix contains the Ethereal outputs for a 
series of connectivity tests. The purpose of these tests 
was to verify the functionality of the NAT implementation 
for several different protocols. The following sections 
will be labeled by the testing program, the machine on 
which the Ethereal output is collected and, if applicable, 
the interface of the system. The following figure shows the 
topology of the MYSEA IPv6 NAT testing environment. It 
illustrates the locations of the machines as well as their 
IPv6 addresses and MAC addresses. 
 




PING6 – CLIENT 
This Ethereal output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth0 interface of the client. The importance of this 
sequence is that an echo request was successfully sent to 
2004::2 and the reply was received by 2003::3. The 
following command was issued by the client to produce this 
result: 
# ping6 –c 1 2004::2 
 
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      1 0.000000    2003::3               ff02::1:ff00:1        ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 1 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 33:33:ff:00:00:01 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      2 0.000213    2003::1               2003::3               ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 2 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      3 0.000230    2003::3               2004::2               ICMPv6   Echo request 
 
Frame 3 (118 bytes on wire, 118 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      4 0.001486    2004::2               2003::3               ICMPv6   Echo reply 
 
Frame 4 (118 bytes on wire, 118 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      5 4.999079    fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2 2003::3               ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 5 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      6 4.999106    2003::3               fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2 ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 6 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Internet Control Message Protocol v6 
 
PING6 – SERVER 
This Ethereal output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth0 interface of the server. The importance of this 
sequence is that an echo request was successfully forwarded 
to 2004::2 by the TPE at the address 2004::1. The following 
command was issued by the client to produce this result: 
# ping6 –c 1 2004::2 
 
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      1 0.000000    2004::1               ff02::1:ff00:2        ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 1 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 33:33:ff:00:00:02 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      2 0.000036    2004::2               2004::1               ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 2 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      3 0.000167    2004::1               2004::2               ICMPv6   Echo request 
 
Frame 3 (118 bytes on wire, 118 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      4 0.000181    2004::2               2004::1               ICMPv6   Echo reply 
 
Frame 4 (118 bytes on wire, 118 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      5 4.995768    fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 2004::1               ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 5 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      6 4.995992    2004::1               fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 6 (78 bytes on wire, 78 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      7 9.995195    fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:876c fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 7 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      8 9.995222    fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:876c ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 8 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Internet Control Message Protocol v6 
 
PING6 – TPE – ETH0 
This tcpdump output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth0 interface of the TPE. Tcpdump was used on the 
TPE because it is a native OS program and would not 
introduce new code to the kernel. The importance of this 
sequence is that an echo request from 2003::3 was forwarded 
to 2004::2 and the resulting reply was again forwarded to 
2003::3. Note that at this point, eth0 on the TPE, the 
address of the client is still the true address, i.e., 
2003::3. The following command was issued by the client to 
produce this result: 
# ping6 –c 1 2004::2 
201 
 
14:21:05.566665 2003::3 > ff02::1:ff00:1: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 2003::1(src 
lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2003 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 ff02 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0001 ff00 0001 8700 07ce 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 ................ 




14:21:05.566802 2003::1 > 2003::3: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 2003::1(RSO)(tgt lladdr: 
00:c0:a8:88:89:f2) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2003 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 8800 025a e000 0000 ...........Z.... 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 ................ 




14:21:05.566893 2003::3 > 2004::2: icmp6: echo request (len 64, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0040 3a40 2003 0000 0000 0000 `....@:@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 8000 78ae ea04 0001 ..........x..... 
0x0030  3817 b540 fc69 0800 0809 0a0b 0c0d 0e0f 8..@.i.......... 
0x0040  1011 1213 1415 1617 1819 1a1b 1c1d 1e1f ................ 




14:21:05.568097 2004::2 > 2003::3: icmp6: echo reply (len 64, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0040 3a3f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....@:?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 8100 77ae ea04 0001 ..........w..... 
0x0030  3817 b540 fc69 0800 0809 0a0b 0c0d 0e0f 8..@.i.......... 
0x0040  1011 1213 1415 1617 1819 1a1b 1c1d 1e1f ................ 




14:21:10.565796 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2 > 2003::3: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 
2003::3(src lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  02c0 a8ff fe88 89f2 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 8700 d1a0 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0003 ................ 




14:21:10.565871 2003::3 > fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 
2003::3(SO)(tgt lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2003 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 fe80 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  02c0 a8ff fe88 89f2 8800 7115 6000 0000 ..........q.`... 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0003 ................ 
0x0040  0201 00c0 a888 887d                     .......} 
 
PING6 – TPE – ETH1 
This tcpdump output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth1 interface of the TPE. The importance of this 
sequence is that an echo request from the client received 
at 2004::1 was successfully forwarded to 2004::2 and the 
202 
resulting reply was receieved by 2004::1. Note that the 
address of the client is now masked by the NAT mechanism. 
The following command was issued by the client to produce 
this result: 
# ping6 –c 1 2004::2 
 
14:21:05.567757 2004::1 > ff02::1:ff00:2: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 2004::2(src 
lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2004 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 ff02 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0001 ff00 0002 8700 08dd 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0002 ................ 
0x0040  0101 00c0 a888 876c                     .......l 
 
 
14:21:05.567861 2004::2 > 2004::1: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 2004::2(SO)(tgt lladdr: 
00:0d:56:ae:a5:00) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2004 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 8800 b9d6 6000 0000 ............`... 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0002 ................ 
0x0040  0201 000d 56ae a500                     ....V... 
 
 
14:21:05.567924 2004::1 > 2004::2: icmp6: echo request (len 64, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0040 3a3f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....@:?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 8000 78af ea04 0001 ..........x..... 
0x0030  3817 b540 fc69 0800 0809 0a0b 0c0d 0e0f 8..@.i.......... 
0x0040  1011 1213 1415 1617 1819 1a1b 1c1d 1e1f ................ 
0x0050  2021                                    .! 
 
 
14:21:05.568008 2004::2 > 2004::1: icmp6: echo reply (len 64, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0040 3a40 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....@:@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 8100 77af ea04 0001 ..........w..... 
0x0030  3817 b540 fc69 0800 0809 0a0b 0c0d 0e0f 8..@.i.......... 
0x0040  1011 1213 1415 1617 1819 1a1b 1c1d 1e1f ................ 
0x0050  2021                                    .! 
 
 
14:21:10.563537 fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 > 2004::1: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 
2004::1(src lladdr: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  020d 56ff feae a500 2004 0000 0000 0000 ..V............. 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 8700 40a1 0000 0000 ..........@..... 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 ................ 
0x0040  0101 000d 56ae a500                     ....V... 
 
 
14:21:10.563690 2004::1 > fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 
2004::1(RS) (len 24, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0018 3aff 2004 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 fe80 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  020d 56ff feae a500 8800 7c65 c000 0000 ..V.......|e.... 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 ................ 
 
 
14:21:15.562827 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:876c > fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500: icmp6: neighbor sol: 
who has fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500(src lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
203 
0x0010  02c0 a8ff fe88 876c fe80 0000 0000 0000 .......l........ 
0x0020  020d 56ff feae a500 8700 203f 0000 0000 ..V........?.... 
0x0030  fe80 0000 0000 0000 020d 56ff feae a500 ..........V..... 
0x0040  0101 00c0 a888 876c                     .......l 
 
 
14:21:15.562925 fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 > fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:876c: icmp6: neighbor adv: 
tgt is fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500(SO)(tgt lladdr: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  020d 56ff feae a500 fe80 0000 0000 0000 ..V............. 
0x0020  02c0 a8ff fe88 876c 8800 f337 6000 0000 .......l...7`... 
0x0030  fe80 0000 0000 0000 020d 56ff feae a500 ..........V..... 
0x0040  0201 000d 56ae a500                     ....V... 
 
RLOGIN – CLIENT 
This Ethereal output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth0 interface of the client. The importance of this 
sequence is that the rlogin sequence was successfully sent 
to 2004::2 and the replies were received by 2003::3. The 
following command was issued by the client to produce this 
result: 
# rlogin 2004::2 
 
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info  
      1 0.000000    2003::3               2004::2               TCP      1023 > login 
[SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5760 Len=0 MSS=1440 TSV=1146738 TSER=0 WS=0 
 
Frame 1 (94 bytes on wire, 94 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 0, Ack: 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      2 0.001140    fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2 ff02::1:ff00:3        ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 2 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 33:33:ff:00:00:03 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      3 0.001168    2003::3               fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2 ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 3 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
204 
      4 0.001278    2004::2               2003::3               TCP      login > 1023 
[SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5712 Len=0 MSS=1440 TSV=27902 TSER=1146738 WS=0 
 
Frame 4 (94 bytes on wire, 94 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 0, Ack: 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      5 0.001295    2003::3               2004::2               TCP      1023 > login 
[ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5760 Len=0 TSV=1146738 TSER=27902 
 
Frame 5 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 1, Ack: 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      6 0.001365    2003::3               2004::2               Rlogin   User name: root, 
Start Handshake 
 
Frame 6 (87 bytes on wire, 87 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 1, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      7 0.001535    2004::2               2003::3               TCP      login > 1023 
[ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=5712 Len=0 TSV=27903 TSER=1146738 
 
Frame 7 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 1, Ack: 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      8 0.001658    2003::3               2004::2               Rlogin   User name: root, 
Data: root 
 
Frame 8 (109 bytes on wire, 109 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 2, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      9 0.001830    2004::2               2003::3               TCP      login > 1023 
[ACK] Seq=1 Ack=25 Win=5712 Len=0 TSV=27903 TSER=1146738 
 
Frame 9 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 1, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     10 0.154152    2004::2               2003::3               Rlogin   User name: root, 
Start Handshake 
 
Frame 10 (87 bytes on wire, 87 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 1, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     11 0.154329    2003::3               2004::2               TCP      1023 > login 
[ACK] Seq=25 Ack=2 Win=5760 Len=0 TSV=1146753 TSER=27918 
 
Frame 11 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 25, 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     12 0.155758    2004::2               2003::3               Rlogin   User name: root, 
Data: Password:  
 
Frame 12 (96 bytes on wire, 96 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 2, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     13 0.155898    2003::3               2004::2               TCP      1023 > login 
[ACK] Seq=25 Ack=12 Win=5760 Len=0 TSV=1146753 TSER=27918 
 
Frame 13 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 25, 
Ack: 12, Len: 0 
 
RLOGIN – SERVER 
This Ethereal output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth0 interface of the server. The importance of this 
sequence is that the rlogin request was successfully 
forwarded to 2004::2 by the TPE at the address 2004::1. 
Note that the address of the client is successfully masked 
by the NAT mechanism in the TPE. The following command was 
issued by the client to produce this result: 
# rlogin 2004::2 
206 
 
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info  
      1 0.000000    fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 ff02::1:ff00:2        ICMPv6   Multicast 
listener report 
 
Frame 1 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 33:33:ff:00:00:02 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Hop-by-hop Option Header  




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      2 61.169069   2004::1               ff02::1:ff00:2        ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 2 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 33:33:ff:00:00:02 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      3 61.169105   2004::2               2004::1               ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 3 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      4 61.169243   2004::1               2004::2               TCP      1023 > login 
[SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5760 Len=0 MSS=1440 TSV=1146738 TSER=0 WS=0 
 
Frame 4 (94 bytes on wire, 94 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 0, Ack: 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      5 61.169504   2004::2               2004::1               TCP      login > 1023 
[SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5712 Len=0 MSS=1440 TSV=27902 TSER=1146738 WS=0 
 
Frame 5 (94 bytes on wire, 94 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 0, Ack: 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      6 61.170227   2004::1               2004::2               TCP      1023 > login 
[ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5760 Len=0 TSV=1146738 TSER=27902 
 
Frame 6 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 1, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      7 61.170289   2004::1               2004::2               Rlogin   User name: root, 
Start Handshake 
 
Frame 7 (87 bytes on wire, 87 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 1, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      8 61.170302   2004::2               2004::1               TCP      login > 1023 
[ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=5712 Len=0 TSV=27903 TSER=1146738 
 
Frame 8 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 1, Ack: 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      9 61.170592   2004::1               2004::2               Rlogin   User name: root, 
Data: root 
 
Frame 9 (109 bytes on wire, 109 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 2, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     10 61.170597   2004::2               2004::1               TCP      login > 1023 
[ACK] Seq=1 Ack=25 Win=5712 Len=0 TSV=27903 TSER=1146738 
 
Frame 10 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 1, Ack: 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     11 61.192370   2004::2               2004::1               TCP      32803 > auth 
[SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=5760 Len=0 MSS=1440 TSV=27905 TSER=0 WS=0 
 
Frame 11 (94 bytes on wire, 94 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 32803 (32803), Dst Port: auth (113), Seq: 0, 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     12 61.192547   2004::1               2004::2               TCP      auth > 32803 
[RST, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=0 Win=0 Len=0 
 
Frame 12 (74 bytes on wire, 74 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
208 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: auth (113), Dst Port: 32803 (32803), Seq: 0, 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     13 61.322880   2004::2               2004::1               Rlogin   User name: root, 
Start Handshake 
 
Frame 13 (87 bytes on wire, 87 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 1, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     14 61.323266   2004::1               2004::2               TCP      1023 > login 
[ACK] Seq=25 Ack=2 Win=5760 Len=0 TSV=1146753 TSER=27918 
 
Frame 14 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 25, 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     15 61.324522   2004::2               2004::1               Rlogin   User name: root, 
Data: Password:  
 
Frame 15 (96 bytes on wire, 96 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: login (513), Dst Port: 1023 (1023), Seq: 2, Ack: 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     16 61.324830   2004::1               2004::2               TCP      1023 > login 
[ACK] Seq=25 Ack=12 Win=5760 Len=0 TSV=1146753 TSER=27918 
 
Frame 16 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023 (1023), Dst Port: login (513), Seq: 25, 
Ack: 12, Len: 0 
 
RLOGIN – TPE – ETH0 
This tcpdump output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth0 interface of the TPE. The importance of this 
sequence is that the rlogin request from 2003::3 was 
forwarded to 2004::2 and the resulting reply was again 
forwarded to 2003::3. Note that at this point, the address 
of the client is still the true address. The following 
command was issued by the client to produce this result: 
209 
# rlogin 2004::2 
 
17:28:06.644285 2003::3.1023 > 2004::2.login: S [tcp sum ok] 2268744467:2268744467(0) win 
5760 <mss 1440,sackOK,timestamp 1146738 0,nop,wscale 0> (len 40, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0028 0640 2003 0000 0000 0000 `....(.@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b13 .............:K. 
0x0030  0000 0000 a002 1680 99be 0000 0204 05a0 ................ 
0x0040  0402 080a 0011 7f72 0000 0000 0103 0300 .......r........ 
 
 
17:28:06.645375 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2 > ff02::1:ff00:3: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 
2003::3(src lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  02c0 a8ff fe88 89f2 ff02 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0001 ff00 0003 8700 f39e 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0003 ................ 
0x0040  0101 00c0 a888 89f2                     ........ 
 
 
17:28:06.645447 2003::3 > fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 
2003::3(SO)(tgt lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2003 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 fe80 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  02c0 a8ff fe88 89f2 8800 7115 6000 0000 ..........q.`... 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0003 ................ 
0x0040  0201 00c0 a888 887d                     .......} 
 
 
17:28:06.645510 2004::2.login > 2003::3.1023: S [tcp sum ok] 3072001763:3072001763(0) ack 
2268744468 win 5712 <mss 1440,sackOK,timestamp 27902 1146738,nop,wscale 0> (len 40, hlim 
63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0028 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....(.?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 0201 03ff b71b 06e3 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b14 a012 1650 6ee0 0000 0204 05a0 .:K....Pn....... 
0x0040  0402 080a 0000 6cfe 0011 7f72 0103 0300 ......l....r.... 
 
 
17:28:06.645574 2003::3.1023 > 2004::2.login: . [tcp sum ok] 1:1(0) ack 1 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146738 27902> (len 32, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 0640 2003 0000 0000 0000 `......@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b14 .............:K. 
0x0030  b71b 06e4 8010 1680 9d61 0000 0101 080a .........a...... 
0x0040  0011 7f72 0000 6cfe                     ...r..l. 
 
 
17:28:06.645644 2003::3.1023 > 2004::2.login: P [tcp sum ok] 1:2(1) ack 1 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146738 27902> (len 33, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0021 0640 2003 0000 0000 0000 `....!.@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b14 .............:K. 
0x0030  b71b 06e4 8018 1680 9d58 0000 0101 080a .........X...... 
0x0040  0011 7f72 0000 6cfe 00                  ...r..l.. 
 
 
17:28:06.645769 2004::2.login > 2003::3.1023: . [tcp sum ok] 1:1(0) ack 2 win  
5712 <nop,nop,timestamp 27903 1146738> (len 32, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `......?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 0201 03ff b71b 06e4 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b15 8010 1650 9d8f 0000 0101 080a .:K....P........ 
0x0040  0000 6cff 0011 7f72                     ..l....r 
 
 
17:28:06.645940 2003::3.1023 > 2004::2.login: P 2:25(23) ack 1 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146738 27903> (len 55, hlim 64) 
210 
0x0000  6000 0000 0037 0640 2003 0000 0000 0000 `....7.@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b15 .............:K. 
0x0030  b71b 06e4 8018 1680 6e3d 0000 0101 080a ........n=...... 
0x0040  0011 7f72 0000 6cff 726f 6f74 0061 646d ...r..l.root.adm 
0x0050  696e                                    in 
 
 
17:28:06.646065 2004::2.login > 2003::3.1023: . [tcp sum ok] 1:1(0) ack 25 win 5712 
<nop,nop,timestamp 27903 1146738> (len 32, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `......?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 0201 03ff b71b 06e4 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b2c 8010 1650 9d78 0000 0101 080a .:K,...P.x...... 
0x0040  0000 6cff 0011 7f72                     ..l....r 
 
 
17:28:06.798386 2004::2.login > 2003::3.1023: P [tcp sum ok] 1:2(1) ack 25 win 5712 
<nop,nop,timestamp 27918 1146738> (len 33, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0021 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....!.?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 0201 03ff b71b 06e4 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b2c 8018 1650 9d60 0000 0101 080a .:K,...P.`...... 
0x0040  0000 6d0e 0011 7f72 00                  ..m....r. 
 
 
17:28:06.798613 2003::3.1023 > 2004::2.login: . [tcp sum ok] 25:25(0) ack 2 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146753 27918> (len 32, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 0640 2003 0000 0000 0000 `......@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b2c .............:K, 
0x0030  b71b 06e5 8010 1680 9d29 0000 0101 080a .........)...... 
0x0040  0011 7f81 0000 6d0e                     ......m. 
 
 
17:28:06.799994 2004::2.login > 2003::3.1023: P [tcp sum ok] 2:12(10) ack 25 win 5712 
<nop,nop,timestamp 27918 1146753> (len 42, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 002a 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....*.?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 0201 03ff b71b 06e5 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b2c 8018 1650 b57e 0000 0101 080a .:K,...P.~...... 
0x0040  0000 6d0e 0011 7f81 5061 7373 776f 7264 ..m.....Password 
0x0050  3a20                                    :. 
 
 
17:28:06.800181 2003::3.1023 > 2004::2.login: . [tcp sum ok] 25:25(0) ack 12 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146753 27918> (len 32, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 0640 2003 0000 0000 0000 `......@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b2c .............:K, 
0x0030  b71b 06ef 8010 1680 9d1f 0000 0101 080a ................ 
0x0040  0011 7f81 0000 6d0e                     ......m. 
 
RLOGIN – TPE – ETH1 
This tcpdump output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth1 interface of the TPE. The importance of this 
sequence is that an rlogin session from the client was 
translated to appear as if it came from 2004::1.  The 
translated packet was successfully communicated to 2004::2 
and the resulting replies were received by 2004::1. Note 
that the address of the client is now masked by the NAT 
211 
mechanism. The following command was issued by the client 
to produce this result: 
# rlogin 2004::2 
17:28:06.644443 2004::1 > ff02::1:ff00:2: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 2004::2(src 
lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2004 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 ff02 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0001 ff00 0002 8700 08dd 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0002 ................ 
0x0040  0101 00c0 a888 876c                     .......l 
 
 
17:28:06.644550 2004::2 > 2004::1: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 2004::2(SO)(tgt lladdr: 
00:0d:56:ae:a5:00) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2004 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 8800 b9d6 6000 0000 ............`... 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0002 ................ 
0x0040  0201 000d 56ae a500                     ....V... 
 
 
17:28:06.644623 2004::1.1023 > 2004::2.login: S [tcp sum ok] 2268744467:2268744467(0) win 
5760 <mss 1440,sackOK,timestamp 1146738 0,nop,wscale 0> (len 40, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0028 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....(.?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b13 .............:K. 
0x0030  0000 0000 a002 1680 99bf 0000 0204 05a0 ................ 
0x0040  0402 080a 0011 7f72 0000 0000 0103 0300 .......r........ 
 
 
17:28:06.644947 2004::2.login > 2004::1.1023: S [tcp sum ok] 3072001763:3072001763(0) ack 
2268744468 win 5712 <mss 1440,sackOK,timestamp 27902 1146738,nop,wscale 0> (len 40, hlim 
64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0028 0640 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....(.@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 0201 03ff b71b 06e3 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b14 a012 1650 6ee1 0000 0204 05a0 .:K....Pn....... 
0x0040  0402 080a 0000 6cfe 0011 7f72 0103 0300 ......l....r.... 
 
 
17:28:06.645599 2004::1.1023 > 2004::2.login: . [tcp sum ok] 1:1(0) ack 1 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146738 27902> (len 32, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `......?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b14 .............:K. 
0x0030  b71b 06e4 8010 1680 9d62 0000 0101 080a .........b...... 
0x0040  0011 7f72 0000 6cfe                     ...r..l. 
 
 
17:28:06.645667 2004::1.1023 > 2004::2.login: P [tcp sum ok] 1:2(1) ack 1 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146738 27902> (len 33, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0021 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....!.?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b14 .............:K. 
0x0030  b71b 06e4 8018 1680 9d59 0000 0101 080a .........Y...... 
0x0040  0011 7f72 0000 6cfe 00                  ...r..l.. 
 
 
17:28:06.645745 2004::2.login > 2004::1.1023: . [tcp sum ok] 1:1(0) ack 2 win 5712 
<nop,nop,timestamp 27903 1146738> (len 32, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 0640 2004 0000 0000 0000 `......@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 0201 03ff b71b 06e4 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b15 8010 1650 9d90 0000 0101 080a .:K....P........ 




17:28:06.645966 2004::1.1023 > 2004::2.login: P 2:25(23) ack 1 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146738 27903> (len 55, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0037 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....7.?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b15 .............:K. 
0x0030  b71b 06e4 8018 1680 6e3e 0000 0101 080a ........n>...... 
0x0040  0011 7f72 0000 6cff 726f 6f74 0061 646d ...r..l.root.adm 
0x0050  696e                                    in 
 
 
17:28:06.646040 2004::2.login > 2004::1.1023: . [tcp sum ok] 1:1(0) ack 25 win 5712 
<nop,nop,timestamp 27903 1146738> (len 32, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 0640 2004 0000 0000 0000 `......@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 0201 03ff b71b 06e4 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b2c 8010 1650 9d79 0000 0101 080a .:K,...P.y...... 
0x0040  0000 6cff 0011 7f72                     ..l....r 
 
 
17:28:06.667824 2004::2.32803 > 2004::1.auth: S [tcp sum ok] 3060071179:3060071179(0) win 
5760 <mss 1440,sackOK,timestamp 27905 0,nop,wscale 0> (len 40, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0028 0640 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....(.@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 8023 0071 b664 fb0b .........#.q.d.. 
0x0030  0000 0000 a002 1680 528a 0000 0204 05a0 ........R....... 
0x0040  0402 080a 0000 6d01 0000 0000 0103 0300 ......m......... 
 
 
17:28:06.667925 2004::1.auth > 2004::2.32803: R [tcp sum ok] 0:0(0) ack 3060071180 win 0 
(len 20, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0014 0640 2004 0000 0000 0000 `......@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 0071 8023 0000 0000 .........q.#.... 
0x0030  b664 fb0c 5014 0000 3dc0 0000           .d..P...=... 
 
 
17:28:06.798329 2004::2.login > 2004::1.1023: P [tcp sum ok] 1:2(1) ack 25 win 5712 
<nop,nop,timestamp 27918 1146738> (len 33, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0021 0640 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....!.@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 0201 03ff b71b 06e4 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b2c 8018 1650 9d61 0000 0101 080a .:K,...P.a...... 
0x0040  0000 6d0e 0011 7f72 00                  ..m....r. 
 
 
17:28:06.798639 2004::1.1023 > 2004::2.login: . [tcp sum ok] 25:25(0) ack 2 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146753 27918> (len 32, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `......?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b2c .............:K, 
0x0030  b71b 06e5 8010 1680 9d2a 0000 0101 080a .........*...... 
0x0040  0011 7f81 0000 6d0e                     ......m. 
 
 
17:28:06.799969 2004::2.login > 2004::1.1023: P [tcp sum ok] 2:12(10) ack 25 win 5712 
<nop,nop,timestamp 27918 1146753> (len 42, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 002a 0640 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....*.@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 0201 03ff b71b 06e5 ................ 
0x0030  873a 4b2c 8018 1650 b57f 0000 0101 080a .:K,...P........ 
0x0040  0000 6d0e 0011 7f81 5061 7373 776f 7264 ..m.....Password 
0x0050  3a20                                    :. 
 
 
17:28:06.800205 2004::1.1023 > 2004::2.login: . [tcp sum ok] 25:25(0) ack 12 win 5760 
<nop,nop,timestamp 1146753 27918> (len 32, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 063f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `......?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 03ff 0201 873a 4b2c .............:K, 
0x0030  b71b 06ef 8010 1680 9d20 0000 0101 080a ................ 
0x0040  0011 7f81 0000 6d0e                     ......m. 
213 
 
TRACEROUTE6 – CLIENT 
This Ethereal output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth0 interface of the client. The importance of this 
sequence is that a traceroute6 UDP packet sequence was 
successfully sent to 2004::2 and the reply was received by 
2003::3. The following command was issued by the client to 
produce this result: 
# traceroute6 2004::2 
 
No.     Time        Source                Destination           
Protocol Info 
      1 0.000000    2003::3               2004::2               UDP      Source port: 
32769  Destination port: 33434 
 
Frame 1 (78 bytes on wire, 78 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 32769 (32769), Dst Port: 33434 (33434) 
Data (16 bytes) 
 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      2 0.000565    2003::1               ff02::1:ff00:3        ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 2 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 33:33:ff:00:00:03 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      3 0.000602    2003::3               2003::1               ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 3 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      4 0.000714    2003::1               2003::3               ICMPv6   Time exceeded 
(In-transit) 
 
Frame 4 (126 bytes on wire, 126 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 





No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      5 0.031311    2003::3               2004::2               UDP      Source port: 
32769  Destination port: 33434 
 
Frame 5 (78 bytes on wire, 78 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 32769 (32769), Dst Port: 33434 (33434) 
Data (16 bytes) 
 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      6 0.031928    2004::2               2003::3               ICMPv6   Unreachable 
(Port unreachable) 
 
Frame 6 (126 bytes on wire, 126 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      7 5.030159    fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d 2003::1               ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 7 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      8 5.030330    2003::1               fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 8 (78 bytes on wire, 78 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      9 10.030400   fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 9 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
     10 10.030427   fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2 ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 10 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




TRACEROUTE6 – SERVER 
This Ethereal output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth0 interface of the server. The importance of this 
sequence is that a traceroute6 UDP packet sequence was 
successfully forwarded to 2004::2 by the TPE at the address 
2004::1. The following command was issued by the client to 
produce this result: 
# traceroute6 2004::2 
 
No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      1 0.000000    2004::1               ff02::1:ff00:2        ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 1 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 33:33:ff:00:00:02 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      2 0.000035    2004::2               2004::1               ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 2 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      3 0.000166    2004::1               2004::2               UDP      Source port: 
32769  Destination port: 33434 
 
Frame 3 (78 bytes on wire, 78 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 32769 (32769), Dst Port: 33434 (33434) 
Data (16 bytes) 
 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      4 0.000179    2004::2               2004::1               ICMPv6   Unreachable 
(Port unreachable) 
 
Frame 4 (126 bytes on wire, 126 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 




Frame 5 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      6 4.994766    2004::1               fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 6 (78 bytes on wire, 78 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      7 9.994194    fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:876c fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 ICMPv6   Neighbor 
solicitation 
 
Frame 7 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c, Dst: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00 
Internet Protocol Version 6 




No.     Time        Source                Destination           Protocol Info 
      8 9.994220    fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:876c ICMPv6   Neighbor 
advertisement 
 
Frame 8 (86 bytes on wire, 86 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00, Dst: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c 
Internet Protocol Version 6 
Internet Control Message Protocol v6 
 
TRACEROUTE6 – TPE – ETH0 
This tcpdump output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth0 interface of the TPE. The importance of this 
sequence is that the traceroute6 UDP packets from 2003::3 
were forwarded to 2004::2 and the resulting replies were 
again forwarded to 2003::3. Note that at this point, the 
address of the client is still the true address. The 
following command was issued by the client to produce this 
result: 
# traceroute6 2004::2 
 
16:05:30.255708 2003::3.32769 > 2004::2.traceroute: [udp sum ok] udp 16 [hlim 1] (len 24) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0018 1101 2003 0000 0000 0000 `............... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 8001 829a 0018 cd52 ...............R 




16:05:30.256221 2003::1 > ff02::1:ff00:3: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 2003::3(src 
lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2003 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 ff02 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0001 ff00 0003 8700 0657 0000 0000 ...........W.... 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0003 ................ 
0x0040  0101 00c0 a888 89f2                     ........ 
 
 
16:05:30.256305 2003::3 > 2003::1: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 2003::3(SO)(tgt lladdr: 
00:c0:a8:88:88:7d) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2003 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 8800 83cd 6000 0000 ............`... 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0003 ................ 
0x0040  0201 00c0 a888 887d                     .......} 
 
 
16:05:30.256371 2003::1 > 2003::3: [|icmp6] (len 72, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0048 3a40 2003 0000 0000 0000 `....H:@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 0300 4b83 0000 0000 ..........K..... 
0x0030  6000 0000 0018 1101 2003 0000 0000 0000 `............... 
0x0040  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0050  0000                                    .. 
 
 
16:05:30.287017 2003::3.32769 > 2004::2.traceroute: [udp sum ok] udp 16 (len 24, hlim 2) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0018 1102 2003 0000 0000 0000 `............... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 8001 829a 0018 7cd7 ..............|. 
0x0030  0000 07b3 0000 0002 b12f b540 d019 0200 ........./.@.... 
 
 
16:05:30.287582 2004::2 > 2003::3: [|icmp6] (len 72, hlim 63) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0048 3a3f 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....H:?........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2003 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0003 0104 7f9e 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0030  6000 0000 0018 1101 2003 0000 0000 0000 `............... 
0x0040  0000 0000 0000 0003 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0050  0000                                    .. 
 
 
16:05:35.285973 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d > 2003::1: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 
2003::1(src lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  02c0 a8ff fe88 887d 2003 0000 0000 0000 .......}........ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 8700 d48e 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 ................ 
0x0040  0101 00c0 a888 887d                     .......} 
 
 
16:05:35.286097 2003::1 > fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 
2003::1(RS) (len 24, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0018 3aff 2003 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 fe80 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  02c0 a8ff fe88 887d 8800 465d c000 0000 .......}..F].... 
0x0030  2003 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 ................ 
 
 
16:05:40.286260 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2 > fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d: icmp6: neighbor sol: 
who has fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d(src lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:89:f2) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  02c0 a8ff fe88 89f2 fe80 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  02c0 a8ff fe88 887d 8700 af1e 0000 0000 .......}........ 
0x0030  fe80 0000 0000 0000 02c0 a8ff fe88 887d ...............} 




16:05:40.286344 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d > fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:89f2: icmp6: neighbor adv: 
tgt is fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:887d(SO)(tgt lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:88:7d) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  02c0 a8ff fe88 887d fe80 0000 0000 0000 .......}........ 
0x0020  02c0 a8ff fe88 89f2 8800 4e93 6000 0000 ..........N.`... 
0x0030  fe80 0000 0000 0000 02c0 a8ff fe88 887d ...............} 
0x0040  0201 00c0 a888 887d                     .......} 
 
 
TRACEROUTE6 – TPE – ETH1 
This tcpdump output shows the packet sequence as seen 
by the eth1 interface of the TPE. The importance of this 
sequence is that a traceroute6 UDP sequence from the client 
was translated to appear as if it came from 2004::1.  The 
translated packet was successfully communicated to 2004::2 
and the resulting replies were received by 2004::1. Note 
that the address of the client is now masked by the NAT 
mechanism. The following command was issued by the client 
to produce this result: 
# traceroute6 2004::2 
 
16:05:30.287211 2004::1 > ff02::1:ff00:2: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 2004::2(src 
lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2004 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 ff02 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0001 ff00 0002 8700 08dd 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0002 ................ 
0x0040  0101 00c0 a888 876c                     .......l 
 
 
16:05:30.287315 2004::2 > 2004::1: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 2004::2(SO)(tgt lladdr: 
00:0d:56:ae:a5:00) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff 2004 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 8800 b9d6 6000 0000 ............`... 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0002 ................ 
0x0040  0201 000d 56ae a500                     ....V... 
 
 
16:05:30.287382 2004::1.32769 > 2004::2.traceroute: [udp sum ok] udp 16 [hlim 1] (len 24) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0018 1101 2004 0000 0000 0000 `............... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0002 8001 829a 0018 7cd8 ..............|. 
0x0030  0000 07b3 0000 0002 b12f b540 d019 0200 ........./.@.... 
 
 
16:05:30.287463 2004::2 > 2004::1: [|icmp6] (len 72, hlim 64) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0048 3a40 2004 0000 0000 0000 `....H:@........ 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0002 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 0104 4d7e 0000 0000 ..........M~.... 
0x0030  6000 0000 0018 1101 2004 0000 0000 0000 `............... 
0x0040  0000 0000 0000 0001 2004 0000 0000 0000 ................ 




16:05:35.281776 fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 > 2004::1: icmp6: neighbor sol: who has 
2004::1(src lladdr: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  020d 56ff feae a500 2004 0000 0000 0000 ..V............. 
0x0020  0000 0000 0000 0001 8700 40a1 0000 0000 ..........@..... 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 ................ 
0x0040  0101 000d 56ae a500                     ....V... 
 
 
16:05:35.281924 2004::1 > fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500: icmp6: neighbor adv: tgt is 
2004::1(RS) (len 24, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0018 3aff 2004 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  0000 0000 0000 0001 fe80 0000 0000 0000 ................ 
0x0020  020d 56ff feae a500 8800 7c65 c000 0000 ..V.......|e.... 
0x0030  2004 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 ................ 
 
 
16:05:40.281290 fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:876c > fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500: icmp6: neighbor sol: 
who has fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500(src lladdr: 00:c0:a8:88:87:6c) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  02c0 a8ff fe88 876c fe80 0000 0000 0000 .......l........ 
0x0020  020d 56ff feae a500 8700 203f 0000 0000 ..V........?.... 
0x0030  fe80 0000 0000 0000 020d 56ff feae a500 ..........V..... 
0x0040  0101 00c0 a888 876c                     .......l 
 
 
16:05:40.281387 fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500 > fe80::2c0:a8ff:fe88:876c: icmp6: neighbor adv: 
tgt is fe80::20d:56ff:feae:a500(SO)(tgt lladdr: 00:0d:56:ae:a5:00) (len 32, hlim 255) 
0x0000  6000 0000 0020 3aff fe80 0000 0000 0000 `.....:......... 
0x0010  020d 56ff feae a500 fe80 0000 0000 0000 ..V............. 
0x0020  02c0 a8ff fe88 876c 8800 f337 6000 0000 .......l...7`... 
0x0030  fe80 0000 0000 0000 020d 56ff feae a500 ..........V..... 
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APPENDIX E. USER MANUAL 
This appendix contains the man page for ip6tables that 
has been modified to include use instructions for this NAT 
development for IPv6. The NAT description is based on the 
original NAT description in the man page for iptables and 
is highlighted with preceeding “***” below. 
 
NAME 
ip6tables - IPv6 packet filter administration and NAT.   
 
SYNOPSIS 
ip6tables [-t table] -[AD] chain rule-specification [options]  
ip6tables [-t table] -I chain [rulenum] rule-specification [options]  
ip6tables [-t table] -R chain rulenum rule-specification [options]  
ip6tables [-t table] -D chain rulenum [options]  
ip6tables [-t table] -[LFZ] [chain] [options]  
ip6tables [-t table] -N chain  
ip6tables [-t table] -X [chain]  
ip6tables [-t table] -P chain target [options]  
ip6tables [-t table] -E old-chain-name new-chain-name    
 
DESCRIPTION 
Ip6tables is used to set up, maintain, and inspect the tables of IPv6 
packet filter rules in the Linux kernel. Several different tables may 
be defined. Each table contains a number of built-in chains and may 
also contain user-defined chains.  
Each chain is a list of rules which can match a set of packets. Each 
rule specifies what to do with a packet that matches. This is called a 
`target', which may be a jump to a user-defined chain in the same 
table.  
   
TARGETS 
A firewall rule specifies criteria for a packet, and a target. If the 
packet does not match, the next rule in the chain is the examined; if 
it does match, then the next rule is specified by the value of the 
target, which can be the name of a user-defined chain or one of the 
special values ACCEPT, DROP, QUEUE, or RETURN.  
ACCEPT means to let the packet through. DROP means to drop the packet 
on the floor. QUEUE means to pass the packet to userspace (if supported 
by the kernel). RETURN means stop traversing this chain and resume at 
the next rule in the previous (calling) chain. If the end of a built-in 
chain is reached or a rule in a built-in chain with target RETURN is 
matched, the target specified by the chain policy determines the fate 
of the packet.    
 
TABLES 
There are currently two independent tables (which tables are present at 
any time depends on the kernel configuration options and which modules 
are present), as nat table has not been implemented yet.  
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-t, --table table  
This option specifies the packet matching table which the command 
should operate on. If the kernel is configured with automatic module 
loading, an attempt will be made to load the appropriate module for 
that table if it is not already there.  
The tables are as follows:  
 
filter:  
This is the default table (if no -t option is passed). It contains the 
built-in chains INPUT (for packets coming into the box itself), FORWARD 
(for packets being routed through the box), and OUTPUT (for locally-
generated packets).  
 
*** nat: 
This table is consulted when a packet that creates a new connection is 
encountered.  It consists of three built-ins: PREROUTING (for altering 
packets as soon as they come in), OUTPUT (for altering locally-
generated packets before routing), and POSTROUTING (for altering 
packets as they are about to go out. 
 
mangle:  
This table is used for specialized packet alteration. Until kernel 
2.4.17 it had two built-in chains: PREROUTING (for altering incoming 
packets before routing) and OUTPUT (for altering locally-generated 
packets before routing). Since kernel 2.4.18, three other built-in 
chains are also supported: INPUT (for packets coming into the box 
itself), FORWARD (for altering packets being routed through the box), 
and POSTROUTING (for altering packets as they are about to go out).  
   
OPTIONS 
The options that are recognized by ip6tables can be divided into 
several different groups.    
 
COMMANDS 
These options specify the specific action to perform. Only one of them 
can be specified on the command line unless otherwise specified below. 
For all the long versions of the command and option names, you need to 
use only enough letters to ensure that ip6tables can differentiate it 
from all other options.  
 
-A, --append chain rule-specification  
Append one or more rules to the end of the selected chain. When the 
source and/or destination names resolve to more than one address, a 
rule will be added for each possible address combination.  
 
-D, --delete chain rule-specification  
-D, --delete chain rulenum  
Delete one or more rules from the selected chain. There are two 
versions of this command: the rule can be specified as a number in the 
chain (starting at 1 for the first rule) or a rule to match.  
 
-I, --insert  
Insert one or more rules in the selected chain as the given rule 
number. So, if the rule number is 1, the rule or rules are inserted at 




-R, --replace chain rulenum rule-specification  
Replace a rule in the selected chain. If the source and/or destination 
names resolve to multiple addresses, the command will fail. Rules are 
numbered starting at 1.  
 
-L, --list [chain]  
List all rules in the selected chain. If no chain is selected, all 
chains are listed. As every other iptables command, it applies to the 
specified table (filter is the default), so mangle rules get listed by  
 ip6tables -t mangle -n -L 
Please note that it is often used with the -n option, in order to avoid 
long reverse DNS lookups. It is legal to specify the -Z (zero) option 
as well, in which case the chain(s) will be atomically listed and 
zeroed. The exact output is affected by the other arguments given. The 
exact rules are suppressed until you use  
 ip6tables -L –v 
 
-F, --flush [chain]  
Flush the selected chain (all the chains in the table if none is 
given). This is equivalent to deleting all the rules one by one.  
 
-Z, --zero [chain]  
Zero the packet and byte counters in all chains. It is legal to specify 
the -L, --list (list) option as well, to see the counters immediately 
before they are cleared. (See above.)  
 
-N, --new-chain chain  
Create a new user-defined chain by the given name. There must be no 
target of that name already.  
 
-X, --delete-chain [chain]  
Delete the optional user-defined chain specified. There must be no 
references to the chain. If there are, you must delete or replace the 
referring rules before the chain can be deleted. If no argument is 
given, it will attempt to delete every non-builtin chain in the table.  
 
-P, --policy chain target  
Set the policy for the chain to the given target. See the section 
TARGETS for the legal targets. Only built-in (non-user-defined) chains 
can have policies, and neither built-in nor user-defined chains can be 
policy targets.  
 
-E, --rename-chain old-chain new-chain  
Rename the user specified chain to the user supplied name. This is 
cosmetic, and has no effect on the structure of the table.  
-h  
Help. Give a (currently very brief) description of the command syntax.  
   
PARAMETERS 
The following parameters make up a rule specification (as used in the 
add, delete, insert, replace and append commands).  
 
-p, --protocol [!] protocol  
The protocol of the rule or of the packet to check. The specified 
protocol can be one of tcp, udp, ipv6-icmp|icmpv6, or all, or it can be 
a numeric value, representing one of these protocols or a different 
one. A protocol name from /etc/protocols is also allowed. A "!" 
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argument before the protocol inverts the test. The number zero is 
equivalent to all. Protocol all will match with all protocols and is 
taken as default when this option is omitted.  
 
-s, --source [!] address[/mask]  
Source specification. Address can be either a hostname (please note 
that specifying any name to be resolved with a remote query such as DNS 
is a really bad idea), a network IPv6 address (with /mask), or a plain 
IPv6 address. (the network name isn't supported now). The mask can be 
either a network mask or a plain number, specifying the number of 1's 
at the left side of the network mask. Thus, a mask of 64 is equivalent 
to ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0000:0000:0000:0000. A "!" argument before the 
address specification inverts the sense of the address. The flag --src 
is an alias for this option.  
 
-d, --destination [!] address[/mask]  
Destination specification. See the description of the -s (source) flag 
for a detailed description of the syntax. The flag --dst is an alias 
for this option.  
 
-j, --jump target  
This specifies the target of the rule; i.e., what to do if the packet 
matches it. The target can be a user-defined chain (other than the one 
this rule is in), one of the special builtin targets which decide the 
fate of the packet immediately, or an extension (see EXTENSIONS below). 
If this option is omitted in a rule, then matching the rule will have 
no effect on the packet's fate, but the counters on the rule will be 
incremented.  
 
-i, --in-interface [!] name  
Name of an interface via which a packet is going to be received (only 
for packets entering the INPUT, FORWARD and PREROUTING chains). When 
the "!" argument is used before the interface name, the sense is 
inverted. If the interface name ends in a "+", then any interface which 
begins with this name will match. If this option is omitted, any 
interface name will match.  
 
-o, --out-interface [!] name  
Name of an interface via which a packet is going to be sent (for 
packets entering the FORWARD and OUTPUT chains). When the "!" argument 
is used before the interface name, the sense is inverted. If the 
interface name ends in a "+", then any interface which begins with this 
name will match. If this option is omitted, any interface name will 
match.  
 
-c, --set-counters PKTS BYTES This enables the administrator to 
initialize the packet and byte counters of a rule (during INSERT, 
APPEND, REPLACE operations).  
   
OTHER OPTIONS 
The following additional options can be specified:  
 
-v, --verbose  
Verbose output. This option makes the list command show the interface 
name, the rule options (if any), and the TOS masks. The packet and byte 
counters are also listed, with the suffix 'K', 'M' or 'G' for 1000, 
1,000,000 and 1,000,000,000 multipliers respectively (but see the -x 
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flag to change this). For appending, insertion, deletion and 
replacement, this causes detailed information on the rule or rules to 
be printed.  
 
-n, --numeric  
Numeric output. IP addresses and port numbers will be printed in 
numeric format. By default, the program will try to display them as 
host names, network names, or services (whenever applicable).  
 
-x, --exact  
Expand numbers. Display the exact value of the packet and byte 
counters, instead of only the rounded number in K's (multiples of 1000) 
M's (multiples of 1000K) or G's (multiples of 1000M). This option is 
only relevant for the -L command.  
 
--line-numbers  
When listing rules, add line numbers to the beginning of each rule, 
corresponding to that rule's position in the chain.  
 
--modprobe=command  
When adding or inserting rules into a chain, use command to load any 
necessary modules (targets, match extensions, etc).  
   
MATCH EXTENSIONS 
ip6tables can use extended packet matching modules. These are loaded in 
two ways: implicitly, when -p or --protocol is specified, or with the -
m or --match options, followed by the matching module name; after 
these, various extra command line options become available, depending 
on the specific module. You can specify multiple extended match modules 
in one line, and you can use the -h or --help options after the module 
has been specified to receive help specific to that module.  
The following are included in the base package, and most of these can 
be preceded by a ! to invert the sense of the match.    
tcp 
These extensions are loaded if `--protocol tcp' is specified. It 
provides the following options:  
 
--source-port [!] port[:port]  
Source port or port range specification. This can either be a service 
name or a port number. An inclusive range can also be specified, using 
the format port:port. If the first port is omitted, "0" is assumed; if 
the last is omitted, "65535" is assumed. If the second port greater 
then the first they will be swapped. The flag --sport is a convenient 
alias for this option.  
 
--destination-port [!] port[:port]  
Destination port or port range specification. The flag --dport is a 
convenient alias for this option.  
 
--tcp-flags [!] mask comp  
Match when the TCP flags are as specified. The first argument is the 
flags which we should examine, written as a comma-separated list, and 
the second argument is a comma-separated list of flags which must be 
set. Flags are: SYN ACK FIN RST URG PSH ALL NONE. Hence the command  
 ip6tables -A FORWARD -p tcp --tcp-flags SYN,ACK,FIN,RST SYN 
will only match packets with the SYN flag set, and the ACK, FIN and RST 
flags unset.  
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[!] --syn  
Only match TCP packets with the SYN bit set and the ACK and RST bits 
cleared. Such packets are used to request TCP connection initiation; 
for example, blocking such packets coming in an interface will prevent 
incoming TCP connections, but outgoing TCP connections will be 
unaffected. It is equivalent to --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN. If the "!" 
flag precedes the "--syn", the sense of the option is inverted.  
 
--tcp-option [!] number  
Match if TCP option set.  
   
udp 
These extensions are loaded if `--protocol udp' is specified. It 
provides the following options:  
 
--source-port [!] port[:port]  
Source port or port range specification. See the description of the --
source-port option of the TCP extension for details.  
 
--destination-port [!] port[:port]  
Destination port or port range specification. See the description of 
the --destination-port option of the TCP extension for details.  
   
ipv6-icmp 
This extension is loaded if `--protocol ipv6-icmp' or `--protocol 
icmpv6' is specified. It provides the following option:  
 
--icmpv6-type [!] typename  
This allows specification of the ICMP type, which can be a numeric 
IPv6-ICMP type, or one of the IPv6-ICMP type names shown by the command  
 ip6tables -p ipv6-icmp -h 
   
mac 
--mac-source [!] address  
Match source MAC address. It must be of the form XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX. 
Note that this only makes sense for packets coming from an Ethernet 
device and entering the PREROUTING, FORWARD or INPUT chains.  
   
limit 
This module matches at a limited rate using a token bucket filter. A 
rule using this extension will match until this limit is reached 
(unless the `!' flag is used). It can be used in combination with the 
LOG target to give limited logging, for example.  
 
--limit rate  
Maximum average matching rate: specified as a number, with an optional 
`/second', `/minute', `/hour', or `/day' suffix; the default is 3/hour.  
--limit-burst number  
Maximum initial number of packets to match: this number gets recharged 
by one every time the limit specified above is not reached, up to this 
number; the default is 5.  
   
multiport 
This module matches a set of source or destination ports. Up to 15 
ports can be specified. It can only be used in conjunction with -p tcp 
or -p udp.  
--source-ports port[,port[,port...]]  
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Match if the source port is one of the given ports. The flag --sports 
is a convenient alias for this option.  
--destination-ports port[,port[,port...]]  
Match if the destination port is one of the given ports. The flag --
dports is a convenient alias for this option.  
--ports port[,port[,port...]]  
Match if the both the source and destination ports are equal to each 
other and to one of the given ports.  
   
mark 
This module matches the netfilter mark field associated with a packet 
(which can be set using the MARK target below).  
--mark value[/mask]  
Matches packets with the given unsigned mark value (if a mask is 
specified, this is logically ANDed with the mask before the 
comparison).  
   
owner 
This module attempts to match various characteristics of the packet 
creator, for locally-generated packets. It is only valid in the OUTPUT 
chain, and even this some packets (such as ICMP ping responses) may 
have no owner, and hence never match. This is regarded as experimental.  
--uid-owner userid  
Matches if the packet was created by a process with the given effective 
user id.  
--gid-owner groupid  
Matches if the packet was created by a process with the given effective 
group id.  
--pid-owner processid  
Matches if the packet was created by a process with the given process 
id.  
--sid-owner sessionid  
Matches if the packet was created by a process in the given session 
group.  
   
TARGET EXTENSIONS 
ip6tables can use extended target modules: the following are included 
in the standard distribution.    
LOG 
Turn on kernel logging of matching packets. When this option is set for 
a rule, the Linux kernel will print some information on all matching 
packets (like most IPv6 IPv6-header fields) via the kernel log (where 
it can be read with dmesg or syslogd(8)). This is a "non-terminating 
target", i.e. rule traversal continues at the next rule. So if you want 
to LOG the packets you refuse, use two separate rules with the same 
matching criteria, first using target LOG then DROP (or REJECT).  
--log-level level  
Level of logging (numeric or see syslog.conf(5)).  
--log-prefix prefix  
Prefix log messages with the specified prefix; up to 29 letters long, 
and useful for distinguishing messages in the logs.  
--log-tcp-sequence  
Log TCP sequence numbers. This is a security risk if the log is 
readable by users.  
--log-tcp-options  
Log options from the TCP packet header.  
--log-ip-options  
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Log options from the IPv6 packet header.  
   
MARK 
This is used to set the netfilter mark value associated with the 
packet. It is only valid in the mangle table.  
--set-mark mark  
   
REJECT 
This is used to send back an error packet in response to the matched 
packet: otherwise it is equivalent to DROP so it is a terminating 
TARGET, ending rule traversal. This target is only valid in the INPUT, 
FORWARD and OUTPUT chains, and user-defined chains which are only 
called from those chains. The following option controls the nature of 
the error packet returned:  
--reject-with type  









which return the appropriate IPv6-ICMP error message (port-unreach is 
the default). Finally, the option tcp-reset can be used on rules which 
only match the TCP protocol: this causes a TCP RST packet to be sent 
back. This is mainly useful for blocking ident (113/tcp) probes which 
frequently occur when sending mail to broken mail hosts (which won't 
accept your mail otherwise).  
   
 
*** SNAT 
This target is only valid in the nat table, in the 
POSTROUTING chain.  It specifies that the source address of the packet 
should be modified (and all future packets in this connection will also 
be mangled), and rules should cease being examined.  It takes one type 
of option: 
 
     --to-source  ipaddr 
 




Various error messages are printed to standard error. The exit code is 
0 for correct functioning. Errors which appear to be caused by invalid 
or abused command line parameters cause an exit code of 2, and other 
errors cause an exit code of 1.    
BUGS 
Bugs? What's this? ;-) Well... the counters are not reliable on 
sparc64.    
 
COMPATIBILITY WITH IPCHAINS 
This ip6tables is very similar to ipchains by Rusty Russell. The main 
difference is that the chains INPUT and OUTPUT are only traversed for 
packets coming into the local host and originating from the local host 
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respectively. Hence every packet only passes through one of the three 
chains (except loopback traffic, which involves both INPUT and OUTPUT 
chains); previously a forwarded packet would pass through all three.  
The other main difference is that -i refers to the input interface; -o 
refers to the output interface, and both are available for packets 
entering the FORWARD chain. There are several other changes in 
ip6tables.    
 
SEE ALSO 
ip6tables-save(8), ip6tables-restore(8), iptables(8), iptables-save(8), 
iptables-restore(8). The packet-filtering-HOWTO details iptables usage 
for packet filtering, the NAT-HOWTO details NAT, the netfilter-
extensions-HOWTO details the extensions that are not in the standard 
distribution, and the netfilter-hacking-HOWTO details the netfilter 
internals.  
See http://www.netfilter.org/.    
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everywhere.  
James Morris wrote the TOS target, and tos match.  
Jozsef Kadlecsik wrote the REJECT target.  
Harald Welte wrote the ULOG target, TTL match+target and libipulog.  
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ip6tables man page created by Andras Kis-Szabo, based on iptables man 
page written by Herve Eychenne 
<rv@wallfire.org>.  
*** ip6tables man page was modified by Trevor J. Baumgartner and 
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APPENDIX F. COMMON CRITERIA 
This appendix contains a summary of the requirements 
necessary for an EAL5 certification. A listing of the 
requirements can be found in the following table. 
 
Table 4.   EAL5 Requirements 
 
1. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AUTOMATION 
1.1 Partial CM Automation (ACM_AUT.1) 
This component requires that the developer use and 
provide a CM plan. In addition, the CM system must provide 
an automated method through which only authorized changes 
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are made to the TOE. The CM must also support the 
generation of the TOE. Finally, the CM plan must describe 
the automated tools used in the CM system and how the tools 
are used. [CC] 
2. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES 
2.1 Generation Support and Acceptance Procedures 
(ACM_CAP.4) 
This component states that the developer must provide 
a reference for the TOE, use a CM system and provide CM 
documentation. In addition, the reference for the TOE must 
be unique to each version of the TOE and be labeled as 
such. The CM documentation must also include a 
configuration list, a CM plan and an acceptance plan. 
Within the configuration list, all configuration items that 
compromise the TOE must be uniquely identified and 
described. The CM system must also provide measures to 
ensure that only authorized changes are made to the 
configuration items, as well as support the generation of 
the TOE. [CC] 
3. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT SCOPE 
3.1 Development Tools CM Coverage (ACM_SCP.3)  
This component requires the developer to provide a 
list of configuration management items for the TOE. This 
list must include implementation representation, security 
flaws, development tools and evaluation evidence required 
by the assurance components in the ST. [CC] 
4. DELIVERY 
4.1 Detection of Modification (ADO_DEL.2)  
The developer must document and use procedures for 
delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the user. The 
documentation must describe all the procedures necessary to 
maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to 
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a user’s site. The documentation must also describe how the 
various procedures and technical measures provide for the 
detection of modifications, or any discrepancy between the 
developer’s master copy and the version received at the 
user’s site. [CC] 
5. INSTALLATION, GENERATION AND START-UP 
5.1 Installation, Generation, and Start-up Procedures 
(ADO_IGS.1)  
This component requires the developer to document the 
procedures necessary for the secure installation, 
generation, and start-up of the TOE. [CC] 
6. FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION 
6.1 Semiformal Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.3)  
This component states that the developer must provide 
a functional specification. The specification should 
describe the TSF using a semiformal style, supported by 
informal, explanatory text where appropriate. This 
specification must be internally consistent as well as 
completely represent the TSF. [CC] 
7. HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN 
7.1 Semiformal High-Level Design (ADV_HLD.3)  
The high-level design requirements for developer 
action states that the developer must provide the high-
level design of the TSF. This design should be semiformal 
and internally consistent. The design must also describe 
the structure of the TSF in terms of subsystems and the 
secure functionality provided within each subsystem. The 
high-level design should, in addition, identify any 
hardware, firmware or software required by the TSF and any 




8. IMPLEMENTATION REPRESENTATION 
8.1 Implementation of the TSF (ADV_IMP.2) 
The primary requirement for this component is for the 
developer to provide the implementation representation for 
the entire TSF. This representation must unambiguously 
define the TSF so that one would be able to recreate the 
implementation without making any design decisions. The 
representation should be internally consistent and describe 
the relationships between all portions of the 
implementation. [CC] 
9. TSF INTERNALS 
9.1 Modularity (ADV_INT.1) 
This component states that the developer must design 
and structure the TSF in a modular fashion that avoids 
unnecessary interactions between the modules of the design. 
The developer must also provide an architectural 
description. The description must identify the modules of 
the TSF, describe the purpose of each module and describe 
how the TSF design provides for largely independent modules 
that avoid unnecessary interactions. [CC] 
10. LOW-LEVEL DESIGN 
10.1 Descriptive Low-Level Design (ADV_LLD.1)  
This component requires the developer to provide an 
informal, low-level design of the TSF. This design must be 
internally consistent, describe the TSF in terms of 
modules, and describe the purpose of each module and its 
relationship between other modules. This design must 
identify all interfaces to the modules of the TSF and which 
modules are externally visible. The design must also 
describe the purpose and method of use for all modules 
within the TSF. [CC] 
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11. REPRESENTATION CORRESPONDENCE 
11.1 Semiformal Correspondence Demonstration 
(ADV_RCR.2)  
This requirement states that the developer must 
provide an analysis of correspondence between all adjacent 
pairs of TSF representations that are provided. These 
representations must demonstrate that all relevant security 
functionality is correctly and completely refined in the 
less abstract TSF representation. Also, a demonstration of 
correspondence between semiformal representations is 
required. [CC] 
12. SECURITY POLICY MODELING 
12.1 Formal TOE Security Policy Model (ADV_SPM.3) 
The primary requirement for this component is for the 
developer to provide a formal TSP model. The developer must 
demonstrate correspondence between the functional 
specification and the TSP model. The TSP model must 
describe the rules and characteristics of all policies of 
the TSP that can be modeled. It must also include a 
demonstration of consistency and completeness with regards 
to all policies of the TSP. [CC] 
13. ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE 
13.1 Administrator Guidance (AGD_ADM.1)  
This component requires the developer to provide 
administrator guidance addressed to system administrative 
personnel. The guidance should describe the administrative 
functions of the TOE and must be consistent with all other 
documentation supplied for evaluation. This guidance must 





14. USER GUIDANCE 
14.1 User Guidance (AGD_USR.1)  
The primary requirement for this component is that 
user guidance be provided. This guidance must describe the 
functions and interfaces available to the non-
administrative users of the TOE. It must also describe the 
use of user-accessible security functions provided by the 
TOE as well as any warnings that might occur. In addition 
the guidance must be consistent with all other 
documentation supplied for evaluation. [CC] 
15. DEVELOPMENT SECURITY 
15.1 Identification of Security Measures (ALC_DVS.1)  
This component requires the developer to produce 
development security documentation. This documentation must 
describe all the physical, procedural, personnel and other 
security measures necessary to protect the confidentiality 
and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its 
development environment. In addition, the documentation 
must also provide evidence that these security measures are 
followed during the development and maintenance of the TOE. 
[CC] 
16. LIFE CYCLE DEFINITION 
16.1 Standardized Life-Cycle Model (ALC_LCD.2)  
The developer must establish and use a standardized 
life-cycle model to be used in the development and 
maintenance of the TOE. This life-cycle model 
implementation must also have corresponding documentation. 
This model must provide for the necessary control over the 
development and maintenance of the TOE. The life-cycle 
definition documentation must explain why the model was 
chosen and how it was used during development. [CC] 
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17. TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
17.1 Compliance with Implementation Standards 
(ALC_TAT.2) 
This component states that the developer must identify 
the development tools being used for the TOE. In addition, 
the implementation-dependent options of the development 
tools must be documented. Also, the development tools used 
in the implementation must be well defined. [CC] 
18. COVERAGE 
18.1 Analysis of Coverage (ATE_COV.2)  
This component requires the developer to provide an 
analysis of the test coverage. The analysis must 
demonstrate the correspondence between the tests identified 
in the test documentation and the TSF as described in the 
functional specification. Also, the tests identified in the 
test documentation must be complete. [CC] 
19. DEPTH 
19.1 Testing: Low-Level Design (ATE_COV.2)  
This component requires the developer to provide an 
analysis of the depth of testing. This analysis must 
demonstrate that the tests identified in the test 
documentation are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF 
operates in accordance with its high and low level design. 
[CC] 
20. FUNCTIONAL TESTS 
20.1 Functional Testing (ATE_FUN.1) 
This component requires the developer to test the TSF 
and document the results and provide test documentation. 
The documentation should consist of test plans, test 
procedure descriptions and actual test results. The testing 
procedure descriptions must identify the tests to be 
performed and describe the testing scenarios for testing 
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each security function. The test results should demonstrate 
that each tested security function behaved as expected. 
[CC] 
21. INDEPENDENT TESTING 
21.1 Independent Testing - Sample (ATE_IND.2)  
This component requires the developer to provide a 
suitable TOE for testing. The developer must also provide 
an equivalent set of resources to those that were used in 
the developer’s functional testing of the TSF. [CC] 
22. COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS 
22.2 Covert Channel Analysis (AVA_CCA.1)  
This component requires the developer to conduct a 
search for covert channels for each information flow 
control policy and provide analysis documentation. The 
documentation must identify covert channels and estimate 
their capacity. It must also describe the procedures used 
for determining the existence of covert channels. The 
documentation must also describe all assumptions made 
during the analysis as well as the method used for 
estimating channel capacity. It must also describe the 
worst case exploitation scenario for each identified covert 
channel. [CC] 
23. MISUSE 
23.3 Validation of Analysis (AVA_MSU.2)  
This component requires the developer to provide 
guidance documentation as well as a document of the 
analysis of it. The guidance document must identify all 
possible modes of operation of the TOE, their consequences 
and implications for maintaining secure operation. The 
guidance document must list all assumptions about the 
intended environment as well as requirements for external 
security measures. [CC] 
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24. STRENGTH OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS 
24.1 Strength of TOE Security Function Evaluation 
(AVA_SOF.1)  
This component requires the developer to perform a 
strength of TOE security function analysis for each 
mechanism identified in the ST as having a strength of TOE 
security function claim. Also, for each mechanism with a 
strength of TOE security function claim, the strength of 
the TOE security function analysis must show that it meets 
or exceeds the minimum strength level and the specific 
strength of function metric defined in the PP/ST. [CC] 
25. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
25.1 Moderately Resistant (AVA_VLA.3)  
This component requires the developer to perform a 
vulnerability analysis and provide documentation. This 
documentation must describe the analysis of the TOE 
deliverables performed to search for ways in which a user 
can violate the TSP. It must also describe the disposition 
of the identified vulnerabilities. Also, it must show that 
these vulnerabilities cannot be exploited in the specified 
environment for the TOE. In addition, the documentation 
must justify that the TOE is resistant to obvious 

























APPENDIX G. INSTALLATION GUIDE 
This document is intended to guide the installation 
and setup of the modified 2.6.5 Linux kernel that supports 
NAT for IPv6.  It also describes procedures for setting up 
the networking configurations for the TPE in order to run 
NAT.  Due to the myriad of situations that may be 
encountered, this document only describes the basic steps 
needed and does not cover extenuating circumstances brought 
about by other machines. 
 
1. Install Red Hat 9.0  
 
2. Boot into the Red Hat 9.0 kernel 
 
3. Verify network connectivity through an IPv4 ping 
 
4. Insert NAT kernel CD and, if necessary, mount the 
CD 
 
5. Copy the main tar file to /home: 
# cp /mnt/cdrom/IPV6NAT.COMPLETE.tar /home 
 
6. Remove the NAT kernel CD and, if necessary, 
unmount the CD 
 
7. Change directory to the /home directory and then 
unpack the main tar archive: 
# cd /home 
# tar xfv IPV6NAT.COMPLETE.tar 
 
8. This should produce three tar archives: 
- IPV6NAT.IPTABLES.tar ; contains the iptables 
user space code 
- IPV6NAT.MODUTILS.tar ; contains modutils 
necessary to compile 2.6 kernel. 
 - IPV6NAT.KERNEL.tar ; contains the main kernel 
 
9. Unpack the kernel archive: 
# tar xfv IPV6NAT.KERNEL.tar 
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The main kernel directory is: 
/home/usagi/kernel/linux26/ assuming you unpacked 
the archives in the /home directory. 
 
*If installation has been done previously, skip steps 
10 through 19. 
 
10. Unpack the modutils archive: 
# tar xfv IPV6NAT.MODUTILS.tar 
 
11. Change directory to the modutils folder: 
# cd module-init-tools-0.9.15-pre4 
 
12. Now modutils will be installed.  For a more 
detailed installation guide, read the INSTALL file in 
the modutils main directory.  The next step will be to 
configure the package for installation: 
# ./configure -–prefix=/ 
# make moveold 
 
13. Next run make clean and make: 
# make clean 
# make 
 
14. Then run make install: 
# make install 
# ./generate-modprobe.conf/etc/modprobe.conf 
 
15. Change directory back to /home:  
# cd ..  or cd /home 
 
16. Unpack the iptables tar package: 
# tar xfv IPV6NAT.IPTABLES.tar 
 
17. Change directory into the iptables folder: 
# cd iptables-1.2.9rc1 
 
18. Now iptables will be installed.  For a more 
detailed installation guide, read the INSTALL file in 
the modutils main directory.  Run make, telling it 
where the kernel is located: 
# make KERNEL_DIR=/home/usagi/kernel/linux26/ 
 
19. Run make install using the same information: 
# make install KERNEL_DIR=/home/usagi/kernel/linux26 
 
20. Change directory to the kernel directory: 
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# cd /home/usagi/kernel/linux26 
 
21. At this point the kernel needs configuration.  If 
installation done on a machine other than the TPE, the 
kernel will require reconfiguration.  In the current 
directory is the kernel configuration used on the 
development machine.  The configuration is named 
.config.  To configure the kernel using this 
configuration run: 
# make oldconfig 
This should answer all of the kernel option 
questions. 
 
22. To help generate the .config file on a different 
system: 
# cd /usr/src/linux-2.4.20.8 
# make mrproper 
# make oldconfig 
 
Answer all of the questions.  It is highly 
recommended that the user have a solid knowledge 
of kernel configuration before starting.  
Improper configuration can lead to serious 
problems. 
 
# cd /home/usagi/kernel/linux26/ 
# make mrproper 
# make oldconfig 
 
23. For platform specific questions, refer to the 
Linux 2.4.20.8 .config file. For configuration 
parameter that exist in both the Linux 2.4.20.8 and 
the Linux 2.6.5 .config files, use the Linux 2.6.5 
.config file for reference. For configuration 
parameters that do not exist in Linux 2.4, use the 
Linux 2.6.5 .config file for reference. When in doubt, 
deny experimental modules and unknown drivers. 
 
24. This step is only required if the kernel options 
are reconfigured and may be skipped if this is a TPE 
installation.  The following is a list of kernel 
configuration options that must be enabled for NAT to 
function properly: 
 Networking Support (NET) 
 Packet Socket (PACKET) 
 TCP/IP Networking (INET) 
IP6 tables support (IP6_NF_IPTABLES) 
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limit match support (IP6_NF_MATCH_LIMIT) 
MAC address match support (IP6_NF_MATCH_MAC) 
Routing header match support (IP6_NF_MATCH_RT) 
Hop-by-hop and Dst opts header match support  
(IP6_NF_MATCH_OPTS) 
Fragmentation header match support 
(IP6_NF_MATCH_FRAG) 
HL match support (IP6_ NF_MATCH_HL) 
Multiple port match support 
(IP6_NF_MATCH_MULTIPORT) 
Owner match support (IP6_NF_MATCH_OWNER) 
netfilter MARK match support (IP6_NF_MATCH_MARK) 
IPv6 Extension Headers Match 
(IP6_NF_MATCH_IPV6HEADER) 
AH/ESP match support (IP6_NF_MATCH_AHESP) 
Packet Length match support (IP6_NF_MATCH_LENGTH) 
EUI64 address check (IP6_NF_MATCH_EUI64) 
Connection tracking (IP6_NF_CONNTRACK) 
Connection state match support 
(IP6_NF_MATCH_STATE) 
Packet filtering (IP6_NF_FILTER) 
LOG target support (IP6_NF_TARGET_LOG) 
REJECT target support (IP6_NF_TARGET_LOG) 
Packet mangling (IP6_NF_MANGLE) 
HL target support (IP6_NF_TARGET_HL) 
MARK target support (IP6_NF_TARGET_MARK) 
IP6 range match support (IP6_NF_MATCH_IPRANGE) 
Full NAT (IP6_NF_NAT) 
NETMAP target support (IP6_NF_TARGET_NETMAP) 
SAME target support (IP6_NF_TARGET_SAME) 
NAT of local connections (IP6_NF_NAT_LOCAL) 
 Network Packet Filtering (NETFILTER) 
 Connection Tracking (IP_NF_CONNTRACK) 
 IP Tables Support (IP_NF_IPTABLES) 
 Limit match support (IP_NF_MATCH_IPRANGE) 
 MAC address match support (IP_NF_MATCH_MAC) 
 Packet type match support (IP_NF_MATCH_PKTTYPE) 
 Netfilter mark match support (IP_NF_MATCH_MARK) 
 Multiple port match support  
(IP_NF_MATCH MULTIPORT) 
 TOS match support (IP_NF_MATCH TOS) 
 Recent match support (IP_NF_MATCH RECENT) 
 Length match support (IP_NF_MATCH LENGTH) 
 TTL match support (IP_NF_MATCH_TTL) 
Connection state match support  
(IP_NF_MATCH_STATE) 
 Connection tracking match support  
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(IP_NFMATCH_CONNTRACK) 
Owner match support (IP_ NF_MATCH_OWNER) 
 Packet filtering (IP_NF_FILTER) 
 Full NAT (IP_NF_NAT) 
 MASQUERADE target support 
(IP_NF_TARGET_MASQUERADE) 
 REDIRECT target support (IP_NF_TARGET REDIRECT) 
 NETMAP target support (IP_NF_TARGET_NETMAP) 
 SAME target support (IP_NF_TARGET_SAME) 
 NAT of local connections (IP_NF_NAT_LOCAL) 
Packet mangling (IP_NF_MANGLE) 
 
25. Next step is to clear out already compiled object 
files: 
# make clean 
 
26. To add a specific tag to this compiled version of 
the kernel, bring up the Makefile located in the 
directory you are in and change the name from “IPv6-
NAT” to whatever tag you like.  “IPv6-NAT” is the 
default tag. 
 
27. Compile the kernel: 
# make bzImage 
 
28. Make the modules: 
# make modules 
 
29. Install the modules: 
# make modules_install 
 
30. Run install:  
# make install 
 
31. Bring up the grub.conf file and edit it.  Change 
directory to /boot/grub and then bring up grub.conf in 
the editor of your choice. 
 
32. Edit the line just below your kernel label that 
says root=LABEL=/.  Change root=LABEL=/  to say 
root=/dev/hda2. 
*NOTE: this is a configuration issue that may not be 
present on other machines and the hda2 label can 
change from machine to machine.  This change 
specifically sets up the kernel for the TPE. 
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33. Reboot and select the NAT kernel from the grub 
list. 
 
34. Check network connectivity through an IPv4 ping 
 
/* NAT SETUP */ 
 
35. Once logged in, bring up a terminal window 
 
36. Issuing the following commands will setup both 
network interfaces.  The global addresses may be 
changed, but the subnet of the internal computers must 
be the same. 
# ifconfig eth0 inet6 add 2003::1/64 
# ifconfig eth1 inet6 add 2004::1/64 
 
37. Setup the user-space ip6tables: 
# ip6tables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth1 -j SNAT --
to-source 2004::1 
 
This assumes the same topography as the IPv6 testbed. 
 
38. Turn on forwarding: 
# sysctl –w net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1 
 
39. Verify IPv6 network connectivity through an IPv6 
ping  
 
40. NAT is now ready and functioning.  All messages 
sent from the Client will be translated before being 
forwarded to the server, so that the server only sees 
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